Testing the Common-Mechanisms Theory of False Hearing and False Memory: The Roles of Executive Functioning and Inhibitory Control by Failes, Eric
Washington University in St. Louis 
Washington University Open Scholarship 
Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations Arts & Sciences 
Winter 1-15-2021 
Testing the Common-Mechanisms Theory of False Hearing and 
False Memory: The Roles of Executive Functioning and Inhibitory 
Control 
Eric Failes 
Washington University in St. Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds 
 Part of the Applied Behavior Analysis Commons, Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, and the 
Gerontology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Failes, Eric, "Testing the Common-Mechanisms Theory of False Hearing and False Memory: The Roles of 
Executive Functioning and Inhibitory Control" (2021). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations. 2314. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/2314 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts & Sciences at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an 




WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS 
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences 
 
Dissertation Examination Committee: 
Mitchell S. Sommers, Chair  
Mark A. McDaniel 
Jonathan E. Peelle 
Henry L. Roediger, III 






Testing the Common-Mechanisms Theory of False Hearing and False Memory: The Roles of 





A dissertation presented to  
The Graduate School  
of Washington University in 
partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree 





















© 2021, Eric Failes
ii 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. v 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vii 
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................ viii 
Abstract of the Dissertation ........................................................................................................... xi 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 False memory and similarities to false hearing ................................................................ 6 
1.2 Potential mechanisms underlying false hearing and false memory ............................... 10 
1.2.1 Executive functioning ................................................................................................. 12 
1.2.2  Inhibitory control ........................................................................................................ 16 
1.3 The present study ........................................................................................................... 26 
Chapter 2: Experiment 1 ............................................................................................................... 28 
2.1 Methods .......................................................................................................................... 28 
2.1.1 Participants ................................................................................................................. 28 
2.1.2  Hearing acuity ............................................................................................................. 28 
2.1.3  Speech Perception in Noise (SPIN) task .................................................................... 29 
2.1.3.1  SPIN task stimuli .......................................................................................................... 29 
2.1.3.2  SPIN task procedure ..................................................................................................... 30 
2.1.4  Memory task ............................................................................................................... 31 
2.1.4.1  Memory task stimuli..................................................................................................... 31 
2.1.4.2  Memory task procedure ................................................................................................ 32 
2.1.5  Shipley Vocabulary Test ............................................................................................ 34 
2.1.6  Auditory Stroop task ................................................................................................... 34 
2.1.7  Executive functioning battery ..................................................................................... 35 
2.1.7.1  Wisconsin Card Sorting Test ....................................................................................... 36 
2.1.7.2  WAIS-R Arithmetic test ............................................................................................... 36 
2.1.7.3  WMS-III Mental Control test ....................................................................................... 37 
2.1.7.4  WMS-III Backward Digit Span.................................................................................... 37 
2.1.7.5  Controlled Oral Word Association Test ....................................................................... 37 
iii 
 
2.1.8  General procedure ....................................................................................................... 38 
2.1.9  MPT modeling procedure................................................................................................ 38 
2.2 Results ............................................................................................................................ 42 
2.2.1 Stroop task .................................................................................................................. 42 
2.2.2 Executive functioning battery ..................................................................................... 44 
2.2.3 Memory task ............................................................................................................... 50 
2.2.3.1  Accuracy....................................................................................................................... 50 
2.2.3.2  False memory ............................................................................................................... 52 
2.2.3.3  Subjective judgements of false memory ...................................................................... 53 
2.2.3.4  Relationships with inhibitory control and executive functioning ................................ 55 
2.2.4 SPIN task .................................................................................................................... 57 
2.2.4.1  Accuracy....................................................................................................................... 58 
2.2.4.2  False hearing ................................................................................................................ 59 
2.2.4.3  Subjective judgements of false hearing ........................................................................ 60 
2.2.4.4  Relationship with false memory ................................................................................... 61 
2.2.4.5  Relationship with inhibitory control and executive functioning .................................. 63 
2.2.5 MPT modeling ............................................................................................................ 66 
2.2.5.1  Memory task ................................................................................................................. 66 
2.2.5.2  SPIN task ...................................................................................................................... 71 
2.3 Experiment 1 discussion................................................................................................. 76 
Chapter 3: Experiment 2 ............................................................................................................... 90 
3.1 Methods .......................................................................................................................... 95 
3.1.1 Participants ................................................................................................................. 95 
3.1.2 Materials ..................................................................................................................... 95 
3.1.3 Procedure .................................................................................................................... 98 
3.2 Results .......................................................................................................................... 100 
3.2.1 Accuracy ................................................................................................................... 100 
3.2.2 False hearing ............................................................................................................. 101 
3.2.3 Confidence ................................................................................................................ 102 
3.2.3.1  Accurate responses ..................................................................................................... 102 
3.2.3.2  False hearing responses .............................................................................................. 104 
iv 
 
3.2.4 Cloze value analyses ................................................................................................. 105 
3.2.5 Fixation analyses ...................................................................................................... 109 
3.2.5.1  Baseline sentences ...................................................................................................... 110 
3.2.5.2  Congruent sentences ................................................................................................... 112 
3.2.5.3  Incongruent sentences ................................................................................................ 113 
3.3 Experiment 2 discussion............................................................................................... 115 
Chapter 4: General discussion .................................................................................................... 120 
4.1 Relationship between false hearing and false memory ................................................ 121 
4.2 Evidence for mechanisms underlying the relationship between false hearing and false 
memory.................................................................................................................................... 122 
4.2.1 Inhibitory control ...................................................................................................... 122 
4.2.2 Executive functioning ............................................................................................... 131 
4.3 Implications for the common-mechanisms theory of false hearing and false memory 134 
4.4 Implications for our understanding of speech perception ............................................ 136 
4.5 Limitations and future directions ................................................................................. 138 
4.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 141 
References ................................................................................................................................... 144 










List of Figures 
Figure 1: Figure depicting context benefits from Wingfield et al. (1991) ......................................3 
Figure 2: Accuracy and confidence from Sommers et al. (2015; Experiment 2) ...........................6 
Figure 3: Capture model from Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) ..............................................23 
Figure 4: Capture model for SPIN data ........................................................................................39 
Figure 5: Average reaction times for accurate responses in the baseline and incongruent 
conditions of the auditory Stroop task by younger and older adults .............................................44 
Figure 6: Average accuracy and susceptibility to false memory ..................................................52 
Figure 7: Average remember/know/guess judgements of false memory ......................................55 
Figure 8: Average accuracy and susceptibility to false hearing in Experiment 1 .........................59 
Figure 9: Average hear/know/guess judgements of false hearing ................................................61 
Figure 10: Correlation between average susceptibility to false hearing and average susceptibility 
to false memory .............................................................................................................................62 
Figure 11: Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the base 
capture model of memory .............................................................................................................67 
Figure 12: Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the 
capture model of memory allowing group differences in capture and recollection .....................70 
Figure 13: Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the base 
capture model of hearing ..............................................................................................................72 
Figure 14: Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the 
capture model of hearing allowing for group differences in the capture, hearing, word generation, 
and attribution threshold parameters .............................................................................................75 
Figure 15: Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the basic 
capture model of hearing specifying a different hearing parameter in the baseline condition and a 
different accessibility bias parameter in the congruent condition ................................................84 
Figure 16: Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the 
capture model of hearing specifying a different hearing parameter in the baseline condition and a 
different accessibility bias parameter in the congruent condition allowing age differences in 
accessibility bias and word generation .........................................................................................85 
vi 
 
Figure 17: Correlation between the likelihood of false recall and the likelihood of generating that 
word as an associate of other words in the list from Deese (1959) ..............................................92 
Figure 18: Example screen from the visual world task .................................................................99 
Figure 19: Average accuracy and susceptibility to false hearing and dramatic false hearing in 
Experiment 2 ...............................................................................................................................101 
Figure 20: Average confidence in accurate responses and cases of false hearing ......................104 
Figure 21: Proportion of fixations over time for baseline sentences ..........................................111 
Figure 22: Proportion of fixations over time for congruent sentences .......................................113 



















List of Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for tasks comprising the executive functioning battery ...........45 
Table 2: Bivariate correlations between components of executive functioning battery and 
auditory Stroop interference .......................................................................................46 
Table 3: Factor loadings from the EFA of measures in the executive functioning battery ......47 
Table 4: Factor loadings from the EFA of measures in the executive functioning battery and 
the Stroop difference score .........................................................................................50 
Table 5: Fit statistics for each MPT model in the memory task ...............................................69 
Table 6: Fit statistics for each MPT model in the SPIN task ...................................................74 
Table 7: Means and standard deviations for lexical characteristics of target words in the 
























I would like to begin by thanking each of my dissertation committee members: Mitch Sommers, 
Kristin Van Engen, Roddy Roediger, Jonathan Peelle, and Mark McDaniel. As usual, I decided 
to make things hard on myself by taking on a massive project, and I could not have done it alone. 
This work was designed to build upon the shoulders of giants, and it was great to have those 
giants on my side throughout this process. The advice you gave me from project design through 
to the final manuscript resulted in a better end product and far fewer headaches, which I 
appreciate immensely. Additionally, I would like to thank each of you for your flexibility, which 
allowed me to see this project through to a satisfying conclusion despite an ongoing global 
pandemic. As if completing a dissertation project was not hard enough! 
 
I am especially grateful to my advisor, Mitch Sommers. I did not initially apply to complete my 
graduate studies as a member of the Speech and Hearing Lab, but I am so grateful that I ended up 
working with you. For the past five years, I have gotten to work on projects that I find truly 
interesting and enjoyable. Through these projects and your guidance, I have become a better 
researcher, critical thinker, and writer. Thank you for offering me this amazing opportunity and 
for preparing me for whatever adventure comes next. 
 
A huge thank-you to three stats whizzes who helped relieve a great many headaches throughout 
the dissertation process. First, to Pete Millar, thank you for teaching me the basics of MPT 
modeling and for providing the brilliant idea to plot observed versus expected counts to visualize 
goodness-of-fit. Second, to Anthony Bishara, thank you for helping me troubleshoot the MPT 
analyses and for brainstorming theoretically-sound ways to improve model fit. Finally, to Mike 
ix 
 
Strube, thank you for being willing to answer my many questions about mixed-effects modeling 
(some sent at 2am the morning before submitting the dissertation to the committee). 
 
I would also like to thank the other members of the Speech and Hearing Lab, both past and 
present: to John Morton for introducing me to the topic of false hearing, which has been my 
passion for the last five years; to Avanti Dey for helping me over the hurdles of being a Canadian 
in a U.S. graduate program; to Nikki Runge for paving the way and for the helpful advice at each 
stage of the program; to Lauren Gaunt and Maggie Zink for sharing your eye-tracking expertise 
to help get my project off the ground; to Steve Dessenberger for commiserating over the many 
technical issues we encountered and for working with me to find timely solutions; and to Kate 
McClannahan for your helpful insights into academia and for the delicious rosemary sugar 
cookies that powered me through the second draft of the dissertation manuscript.  
 
Also, special thanks to my many undergraduate research assistants: to Liam Gibbs for spending 
dozens of hours in the hot, sound-proof booth recording the stimuli for the SPIN task; and to 
Adam Isaacs, Aryn Lyke, Audrey Ulfers, Davis Holmes, Forrest Whiting, and Zi’Onay Walker 
for your hard work collecting data. Without you, this project would have taken a decade to 
complete! 
 
Grad school has been difficult, but it was worth it if only for the friends I made at WashU. Thank 
you to the members of my band, Coefficient of Alienation – Emily Streeper, Hank Chen, Marina 
Gross, Ruthie Shaffer, Sam Chung, and Yu-Hua Yeh – you gave me something to look forward 
to at the end of each week. Thank you to Eylül Tekin, Francis Anderson, Öykü Üner, Reshma 
x 
 
Gouravajhala, and Sam Chung for the philosophical arguments, movie and game nights, and 
dinner parties that made these past five years some of the happiest of my life. I could not have 
asked for better people with whom to share these experiences.  
 
Most of all, thank you to Reshma Gouravajhala. You have been my partner in all things, but your 
support has perhaps been most tangible throughout this dissertation process. From commenting 
on project ideas to aiding in hours-long searches for pictures for the visual world task, your 
influence is felt throughout this project. You have elevated my successes, softened my failures, 
and kept me sane through long writing days (and nights). I am forever grateful for your support.  
 
Lastly, I would like to thank my parents for their unending love and support. Moving away from 
my home and country to start grad school was the hardest thing I have done in my life. Thank 
you both for believing in me and for letting me go on this adventure. It has been one of my 
greatest joys to get to share my accomplishments with you. Here is one more.  
 
Eric Failes 









ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Testing the Common-Mechanisms Theory of False Hearing and False Memory: The Roles of 
Executive Functioning and Inhibitory Control 
by 
Eric Failes 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological & Brain Sciences 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2020 
Mitchell S. Sommers, Chair 
Recent studies have shown that older adults are more susceptible to context-based 
misperceptions in hearing than are younger adults, a phenomenon that has been referred to as 
false hearing (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). The authors of these studies have noted 
similarities between false hearing and false memories (Jacoby et al., 2005), suggesting that the 
two phenomena may arise from similar cognitive mechanisms. The present dissertation project 
investigated similarities between false hearing and false memories. In Experiment 1, I directly 
compared susceptibility to false hearing and false memories in younger and older adults. I then 
investigated two cognitive mechanisms that could underlie these phenomena: inhibitory control 
and executive functioning. I found that poorer executive functioning was related to increased 
susceptibility to both false hearing and false memory, supporting executive functioning as a 
common cognitive mechanism underlying these phenomena. In Experiment 2, I tested whether 
the predictive strength of sentences influenced susceptibility to false hearing, building upon the 
finding of a strong relationship between backwards associative strength and susceptibility to 
false memory (Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001b). I found that the predictive strength of 
sentences was positively associated with susceptibility to false hearing, supporting the idea that 
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increasing inhibitory control demands increased the likelihood that false hearing would occur. 
Finally, I present eye-tracking data suggesting that predictive sentences increased activation of a 
single word, and that older adults were less likely than younger adults to suppress this activation 
when a different word was presented. The findings of these experiments support the idea that 
false hearing and false memory share at least one common cognitive mechanism, but highlight 
differences between these phenomena and between younger and older adults. 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
The ability to comprehend speech is one that is largely taken for granted because speech 
perception and comprehension seem almost automatic in one’s native language. The average 
conversational speech rate is estimated to be between 140 and 180 words per minute (Miller et 
al., 1984; Wingfield et al., 1999), a quickly flowing stream of sounds that a listener must parse 
into individual words, match to internal representations in the mental lexicon, process for 
meaning, and fit within the context of what has previously been said. Add to this the extra 
challenges imposed by difficult listening situations, such as holding a conversation in a noisy 
environment, and one might question how speech can be processed in such a fluid manner. 
 Although speech comprehension in younger, normal-hearing, adults does seem effortless 
and automatic, there are a number of populations who may have increased difficulty given the 
perceptual demands described above. For example, older adults may be expected to have an 
especially difficult time comprehending speech due to age-related hearing loss (Morrell et al., 
1996; Sommers et al., 2011). However, despite declines in hearing acuity, speech comprehension 
has been shown to be relatively stable until late in life. For example, in a cross-sectional study of 
adults ages 20 through 90, Sommers et al. (2011) found that listening comprehension remained 
stable until approximately age 65, whereas hearing acuity – especially in the high audiometric 
frequencies – began to decline earlier in life. Indeed, there is evidence that decline in hearing 
acuity can begin as early as the third decade of life (Morrell et al., 1996).  
 Sommers et al. (2011) suggested that one explanation for their finding of preserved 
listening comprehension despite declines in hearing acuity is that the passages used in their 
comprehension tasks provided a cohesive semantic context, which may have allowed older 
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adults to infer what was missed due to hearing loss. There is substantial evidence showing that, 
relative to younger adults, older adults benefit as much or more from the addition of semantic 
context in speech perception (Benichov et al., 2012; Dubno et al., 2000; Hutchinson, 1989; 
Nittrouer & Boothroyd, 1990; Pichora-Fuller et al., 1995; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers & 
Danielson, 1999; Sommers et al., 2015; Wingfield et al., 1991). For example, Wingfield et al. 
(1991) used a word-onset gating procedure – a task in which words were presented in 50 ms 
increments until their first phoneme could be correctly identified – under three different 
conditions: 1) where the target word was preceded by no context (e.g., The word is _____), 2) 
where the word was preceded by what the authors deemed a weakly predictive sentence (i.e., a 
sentence with a cloze value1 of less than .15), or 3) where the word was preceded by what the 
authors deemed a highly predictive sentence (i.e., a sentence with a cloze value greater than or 
equal to .15). The authors found that older adults needed to hear more of the target word before 
they could correctly identify the first phoneme than did younger adults when the target word was 
preceded by either no context or a weakly predictive sentence. The authors attributed this age-
related deficit in the gating paradigm to impaired hearing acuity in the older adults. However, 
younger and older adults identified words at similar gates when the target word was preceded by 
a highly predictive sentence (see Figure 1). This finding suggests that older adults may be able to 
compensate for deficits in hearing acuity by using available contextual cues to infer what was 
missed due to hearing loss or cognitive decline, which could at least partly explain the Sommers 
et al. (2011) finding of preserved listening comprehension despite declining hearing acuity. 
 
1 A cloze value is a measure of predictive strength and refers to the proportion of participants 
who complete a given sentence with a specific word. For example, a sentence with a cloze value 




Although semantic context can help older adults compensate for hearing loss, it can also 
lead older adults astray. Rogers et al. (2012), for example, demonstrated that older adults can be 
over-reliant on contextual cues in speech perception such that they report hearing a contextually 
predicted word when a similar sounding (but unpredicted) word is presented. Specifically, 
Rogers et al. used a process dissociation procedure (see Jacoby, 1991) to create conditions in 
which using context as a basis for responding would lead to a different response than if 
participants used the phonological content of the speech signal as a basis for responding, 
allowing the researchers to determine the extent to which participants relied on context. In the 
study by Rogers et al., this was accomplished by first having participants study semantically 
related cue-target word pairs (e.g., barn – hay) presented both visually and aurally to establish a 
relationship between the word pairs. After the study phase, participants completed a speech 
perception task in which two words were presented aurally, the first word in the clear (i.e., 
without background noise) and the second word in background noise. The word pairs were one 
of three types: 1) a cue-target pair from the study phase (congruent condition; e.g., barn – hay); 
Figure 1. Figure from Wingfield et al. (1991) depicting the amount of a target word that needed 
to be presented before the first phoneme could be correctly identified by younger and older 
adults when the target word was preceded by no context, a weakly predictive sentence (low 
context condition), or a highly predictive sentence (high context condition).  
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2) a cue from the study phase paired with a word differing from the learned target word by a 
single phoneme, known as a phonological neighbor (incongruent condition; e.g., barn – pay); or 
3) a pair of unstudied, unrelated words (baseline condition; e.g., cloud – fun). Participants were 
tasked with identifying the word in the background noise and also reporting their confidence in 
the accuracy of their response from 0-100% certainty. In the congruent condition, the same 
response (hay) would be supported regardless of whether participants used context (i.e., the 
paired cue word) or the phonological characteristics of the target word as a basis for responding. 
In the incongruent condition, however, using context as a basis for responding would lead to a 
different response (hay) than using the phonological content of the target word as a basis for 
responding (pay). Thus, the authors were able to determine the extent to which participants relied 
on context by determining the proportion of incongruent trials in which participants erroneously 
provided the contextually predicted response (e.g., reporting hearing hay when presented with 
the pair barn – pay), which the authors referred to as false hearing.  
Rogers et al. (2012, Experiment 2) found that both younger and older adults frequently 
experienced false hearing on incongruent trials. However, despite performance being equated 
across age groups in the baseline condition by manipulating the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 
individually for each participant, older adults were significantly more likely to experience false 
hearing than were younger adults (.39 vs. .26). Additionally, older adults experienced higher 
confidence in cases of false hearing than did younger adults, with older adults being almost four 
times more likely to report 100% confidence in cases of false hearing than younger adults (.27 
vs. .07). This data showed that both younger and older adults often used context to facilitate 
speech perception in noise and indicated that older adults were especially reliant on contextual 
cues as a basis for responding. 
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More recent research (Sommers et al., 2015, Experiment 2) has reported that false 
hearing can also be evoked using sentence contexts. Instead of using learned word pairs to 
provide context as in Rogers et al. (2012), Sommers et al. (2015; Experiment 2) used complete 
sentences divided into three conditions: 1) sentences providing no context for predicting the 
sentence-final word (baseline condition; e.g., He was thinking about the sheep), 2) sentences 
providing a valid context for predicting the sentence-final word (congruent condition; e.g., The 
shepherd watched his sheep), and 3) sentences in which the sentence-final word was a 
phonological neighbor of the predicted sentence-final word (incongruent condition; e.g., The 
shepherd watched his sheath). In all cases, the participant’s task was to report the sentence-final 
word, which was presented in background noise, and to judge their confidence in the accuracy of 
their response on a 0-100 point scale. As in Rogers et al. (2012, Experiment 2), SNRs for the 
final word were set individually to obtain approximately 50% accuracy for all participants in the 
baseline condition. Importantly, all participants were warned that sentences would sometimes be 
misleading, and there were three times as many incongruent sentences as congruent sentences. 
Both the warning instructions and the disproportionate use of incongruent sentences should have 
discouraged a context-based response strategy.  
The proportion of accurate responses (hits) in the congruent and baseline conditions and 
the proportion of context-based misperceptions in the incongruent condition (i.e., cases of false 
hearing) from Sommers et al. (2015, Experiment 2) are shown in panel A of Figure 2, and the 
confidence associated with those responses is shown in panel B. Despite explicitly warning 
participants that sentences could be misleading and instructing participants to respond based on 
what they heard and not based on context, Sommers et al. found that both younger and older 
adults experienced false hearing in the incongruent condition (e.g., reported hearing sheep when 
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presented The shepherd watched his sheath). However, as in Rogers et al. (2012), older adults 
were more susceptible to false hearing than were younger adults (.50 vs. .39), and were more 
confident in cases of false hearing than were younger adults, with older adults reporting 
maximum confidence in cases of false hearing four times as often as younger adults (.16 vs. .04). 
Participants’ continued use of contextual cues in conditions that discouraged use of context lends 
further support to the argument that both age groups – but especially older adults – relied on 
context as a basis for responding. 
 
1.1 False memory and similarities to false hearing 
As in speech perception, memory can also be biased by contextual cues and prior knowledge. 
Bartlett (1932) was among the first researchers to study how memory can be distorted by prior 
knowledge. In his seminal work, Bartlett had participants read the short story “The War of the 
Ghosts” and asked them to recall the story verbatim. Bartlett found that, when recalling the story, 
participants often changed details to better conform to their own experiences. For example, 
Figure 2. Plots from Sommers et al. (2015; Experiment 2) depicting the proportion of 
correct responses in the congruent and baseline conditions and cases of false hearing (false 
alarms) in the incongruent condition (A) and the confidence in congruent and baseline 






whereas the story depicts two men hunting seals, participants often falsely recalled that the two 
men had been fishing. Bartlett’s study is often considered one of the first studies demonstrating 
false memory, an umbrella term used to describe a variety of memory distortions. 
 Since Bartlett’s (1932) study, several paradigms have been developed to study false 
memory, perhaps the most prevalent being the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm 
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In the DRM paradigm, participants study lists of 
words in which each word in the list is semantically related (or sometimes phonologically 
related, see Finley et al., 2017; Sommers & Huff, 2003; Sommers & Lewis, 1999; Watson et al., 
2003) to an unpresented critical word. For example, for the critical word needle, participants 
might study the words thread, pin, eye, sewing, etc., but would not study the word needle. 
Roediger and McDermott (1995, Experiment 1) found that when asked to remember the studied 
words, participants falsely reported having studied the critical word in 40% of cases in a recall 
test and in 84% of cases in a recognition test. Additionally, participants indicated that they were 
sure they had studied the critical word in 58% of cases in the recognition test, demonstrating 
high confidence in their false memories. 
 A number of other paradigms have also been used to study false memories. In schema 
paradigms like Bartlett’s (1932) study described above, researchers test how participants’ 
expectations based on past experiences influence memory. Brewer and Treyens (1981), for 
example, found that after being left alone in a graduate student’s office for 35 seconds, 
participants falsely recalled seeing at least one item, on average, that might be expected to be in 
this setting (e.g., a book) even though the item was not present. In misinformation paradigms, 
participants witness an event (through films, written narratives, or lists), then are asked questions 
about the event before completing a final memory test. Critically, some of the post-event 
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questions introduce details that were not present in the original event. Loftus (1975, Experiment 
4) showed that nearly 30% of participants incorporated incorrect information introduced through 
post-event questioning into their memory for an event after a one-week delay. In pragmatic 
inference paradigms (Brewer, 1977; Chan & McDermott, 2006; Chan & McDermott, 2007), 
participants study sentences for which an inference regarding the outcome can be made, although 
the inferred outcome is not guaranteed. For example, when reading the sentence “The safe-
cracker put the match to the fuse,” the reader may infer that the fuse was lit, but this outcome is 
not guaranteed. Brewer (1977) found that participants were more likely to falsely recall 
pragmatic inferences of a studied sentence (e.g., The safe-cracker lit the fuse) than the studied 
sentence verbatim (.26 vs. .19). Finally, having participants repeatedly imagine that an event 
occurred increases participants’ likelihood of falsely remembering that the event occurred (Goff 
& Roediger, 1998), a phenomenon known as imagination inflation. Thus, false memories can be 
evoked using diverse methods. 
Interestingly, the patterns of age differences observed by Rogers et al. (2012) and 
Sommers et al. (2015) in false hearing are remarkably similar to those observed in past studies of 
false memory: Older adults have been shown to be more susceptible to false memory than 
younger adults in the DRM paradigm (Balota et al., 1999; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Watson 
et al., 2001) and a number of variations of the misinformation paradigm (Jacoby, 1999; Jacoby et 
al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2003; Roediger & Geraci, 2007; but see Huff & Umanath, 2018; Prull 
& Yockelson, 2013 for equal performance across age groups). Additionally, older adults have 
been shown to be more confident in the accuracy of their false memories than younger adults 
(Jacoby et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2003), just as older adults were more confident in cases of 
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false hearing than younger adults in the studies by Rogers et al. (2012) and Sommers et al. 
(2015). 
One study of false memory that is particularly useful for comparison with studies of false 
hearing was conducted by Jacoby et al. (2005) who, like Rogers et al. (2012) and Sommers et al. 
(2015), used the process dissociation framework to separate context-based responding from, in 
this case, responding based on conscious recollection. As in the study by Rogers et al. described 
above, Jacoby et al. first had participants study semantically related word pairs (e.g., knee-bone). 
Participants then completed a cued fragment completion test in which they saw a cue word and a 
fragment of its paired target word from the study phase (e.g., knee-b_n_) and were tasked with 
completing the fragment with the word from the study phase (e.g., bone). Critically, before each 
cue-fragment pair, one of three types of primes was presented: 1) the studied target word 
(congruent condition; e.g., bone), 2) an unstudied word that was semantically related to the cue 
word and that could plausibly complete the fragment (incongruent condition; e.g., bend), or 3) a 
string of ampersands (baseline condition; &&&&&). These primes provided valid, invalid, and 
neutral cues for recalling the studied target word, respectively. Participants also characterized the 
subjective experience of their memory by making a remember/familiar/guess judgement. 
Participants were instructed to rate their response as “remembered” if they recalled specific 
details from when the item was presented at study, “familiar” if they knew that the word had 
been in the study list but could not remember specific details about its presentation, and 
“guessed” if they had no idea what word had been paired with the cue word in the study phase.  
In line with findings from other studies of false memory (Balota et al., 1999; Jacoby, 
1999; Jacoby et al., 2005; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Mitchell et al., 2003; Roediger & Geraci, 
2007; Watson et al., 2001) and from the false hearing studies described above (Rogers et al., 
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2012; Sommers et al., 2015), Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) found that both younger and 
older adults often erroneously completed the fragment with the prime word in the incongruent 
condition (e.g., completing the cue-fragment pair “knee-b_n_” with “bend” when “bone” had 
been presented in the study phase), although older adults were more susceptible to these false 
memories than were younger adults (.68 vs. .48). Additionally, older adults were more than ten 
times as likely to characterize their false memories as “remembered” than were younger adults 
(.43 vs. .04), providing a conceptual replication of older adults’ elevated confidence in cases of 
false hearing relative to younger adults (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). These 
findings suggest that false memories evoked using the process dissociation framework – like 
cases of false hearing – result largely from overreliance on context as a basis for responding. 
The similarity of their false hearing findings with those of Jacoby et al. (2005, 
Experiment 2) in false memory led Rogers et al. (2012) and Sommers et al. (2015) to suggest 
that false memory and false hearing might result, at least in part, from common cognitive 
mechanisms as opposed to mechanisms specific to either memory or perception. However, no 
published work has directly investigated the relationship between false hearing and false 
memory. The primary goals of the present study were to fill this gap in the literature and to 
investigate specific cognitive mechanisms that may underlie these two phenomena. Identifying 
specific mechanisms will not only advance our understanding of false hearing and false memory, 
but will also allow for creation of interventions to reduce susceptibility to these errors. 
1.2 Potential mechanisms underlying false hearing and 
false memory 
Although no published research has directly tested the mechanisms underlying false hearing, a 
wealth of research has investigated potential mechanisms underlying false memory (Bixter & 
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Daniel, 2013; Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Colombel et al., 2016; Jacoby et al., 
2005; Long et al., 2008; McCabe et al., 2009; Meade et al., 2012; Sommers & Huff, 2003, 
Experiment 2; Unsworth & Brewer, 2010; Watson et al., 2005). Several cognitive abilities have 
been shown to be correlated with susceptibility to false memory, but here I will focus on 
executive functioning and inhibitory control due to their proposed relations to false hearing in 
past studies (Jacoby et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). It is important to 
note that executive functioning is composed of a number of different cognitive abilities, 
including inhibitory control. I consider executive functioning and inhibitory control separately in 
the present study for two reasons. First, each of these constructs have been shown to be 
predictive of susceptibility to false memory (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; 
Colombel et al., 2016; Jacoby et al., 2005; McCabe et al., 2009; Meade et al., 2012; Sommers & 
Huff, 2003, Experiment 2), and one of the primary goals of this dissertation project is to test for 
similarities between false hearing and false memory. Therefore, I used the same measures of 
executive functioning and inhibitory control that have been shown to be predictive of false 
memory in past studies to determine whether they were also predictive of false hearing. Second, 
it is important to determine whether the relationship between executive functioning and false 
hearing and false memory can be accounted for by inhibitory control’s inclusion in the executive 
functioning construct. Since executive functioning is composed of multiple cognitive abilities, 
showing that executive functioning is related to false hearing and false memory would narrow 
down the list of potential cognitive abilities that could underlie these phenomena but would not 
single out any specific cognitive ability. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that there are 
multiple functions of inhibitory control (Kramer et al., 1994; Lustig et al., 2007) – controlling 
what information enters working memory, removing information that is no longer relevant from 
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working memory, and suppressing prepotent, but incorrect, responses – and only the suppression 
function is referenced in the inhibitory control theory of false hearing (Jacoby et al., 2012; 
Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). Including a separate measure of the suppression 
aspect of inhibitory control – here, an auditory Stroop task – in addition to a measure of 
executive functioning allowed me to determine whether the relationship between executive 
functioning and false hearing and false memory persisted after statistically controlling for this 
aspect of inhibitory control, which would indicate that components of executive functioning 
aside from response suppression were related to false hearing and false memory. However, if the 
relationship between executive functioning and false hearing and false memory became non-
significant after controlling for this aspect of inhibitory control, this would suggest that this 
relationship could be fully accounted for by variance attributable to differences in the ability to 
suppress a prepotent response.   
1.2.1 Executive functioning 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) were among the first researchers to allude to executive functioning. 
In their model of working memory, the authors described a central executive component that 
oversaw the functioning of two primary storage subsystems of working memory: the 
phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad. The central executive in this model was 
involved in allocation of attention and improving efficiency of working memory when the 
capacity of the storage subsystems was exceeded by implementing encoding and retrieval 
strategies (e.g., chunking). Shortly thereafter, Posner and Snyder (1975) coined the term 
cognitive control, which the authors described as a limited-capacity mechanism involved in 
directing attention based on one’s goals. The role of cognitive control proposed by Posner and 
Snyder is similar to that of the modern conception of executive functioning, which is often 
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described as the set of cognitive abilities involved in maintaining goals and directing behavior 
toward achieving those goals. As stated above, the modern construct of executive functioning is 
comprised of several cognitive abilities, and is typically thought to include inhibitory control, 
working memory, planning, and set shifting, although an exhaustive list of the components of 
executive functioning is up for debate (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007). Executive functioning is 
generally believed to be controlled by the frontal lobes of the brain – particularly the prefrontal 
cortex – as evinced by the development of executive functioning coinciding with maturation of 
the frontal lobes through adolescence (Anderson et al., 2001) and disorders affecting the frontal 
lobes (e.g., ADHD and autism) being associated with impaired executive functioning (see Jurado 
& Rosselli, 2007). For this reason, the term “frontal lobe functioning” is sometimes used 
interchangeably with executive functioning (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; 
McCabe et al., 2009; McCabe et al., 2010; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & McDaniel, 2007) and 
executive functioning is often assessed by measures shown to activate frontal lobe activity, such 
as the battery developed by Glisky et al. (1995) that was used in the present study, which will be 
discussed in further detail below.  
Studies investigating the role of executive functioning in false memory have focused 
almost exclusively on explaining the increased susceptibility to false memory experienced by 
older, relative to younger, adults. Since older adults have been shown to be both more likely to 
experience deficits in executive functioning (Chan & McDermott, 2007; McCabe et al., 2009; 
Roediger & McDaniel, 2007) and more susceptible to false memory (Balota et al., 1999; Chan & 
McDermott, 2007; Jacoby, 1999; Jacoby et al., 2005; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Mitchell et 
al., 2003; Roediger & Geraci, 2007; Watson et al., 2001; but see Huff & Umanath, 2018; Prull & 
Yockelson, 2013 for equal performance across age groups) than younger adults, it is possible that 
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deficits in executive functioning could increase susceptibility to false memory. Supporting this 
conclusion, executive functioning has been shown to partially mediate the relationship between 
age and susceptibility to false recognition of lures on a recognition memory test (McCabe et al., 
2009). Additionally, several studies investigating the role of executive functioning in false 
memory have revealed that older adults’ increased susceptibility to false memory relative to 
younger adults is partially, if not fully, eliminated when considering only older adults with high 
executive functioning (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; 
Roediger & Geraci, 2007). There is also evidence that younger adults with lower executive 
functioning are more susceptible to false memory than those with higher executive functioning 
(Chan & McDermott, 2007). Therefore, it is plausible that deficits in executive functioning give 
rise to false memories and that older adults’ increased susceptibility to false memory relative to 
younger adults results, at least in part, from age-related declines in executive functioning. 
The authors of past studies have suggested that older adults with high executive 
functioning are less susceptible to false memories than those with low executive functioning due 
to preserved source monitoring (Butler et al., 2004; McCabe et al., 2009; Roediger & Geraci, 
2007). According to this theory, better executive functioning improves one’s ability to 
distinguish between true memory traces and information activated due to its association with 
available contextual cues. However, Meade et al. (2012) presented evidence to suggest that 
improved source monitoring cannot fully account for the relationship between executive 
functioning and susceptibility to false memory. The authors found that older adults with high 
executive functioning demonstrated decreased susceptibility to false memory of the critical word 
in a categorized list memory paradigm relative to older adults with low executive functioning 
when given a free report cued recall test, but similar performance across the high and low 
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executive functioning groups when given a forced report cued recall test. Additionally, older 
adults with high executive functioning displayed equal susceptibility to false memory relative to 
older adults with low executive functioning when the authors controlled for guessing by 
subtracting the proportion of unpresented critical words that were recalled from the proportion of 
presented critical words that were recalled. This led the authors to suggest that differences in 
susceptibility to false memory between older adults with high versus low executive functioning 
may reflect differences in retrieval strategies. Specifically, older adults with low executive 
functioning may have been more likely to guess that the critical word was present due to its 
association with the studied list words, whereas older adults with high executive functioning may 
have employed a more conservative retrieval strategy. This conclusion was also endorsed by 
Chan and McDermott (2007), who stated that higher executive functioning may be related to 
increased use of controlled recollective processes, whereas individuals with lower executive 
functioning may rely to a greater degree on automatic, familiarity-based processing (see Jacoby, 
1991; McDermott & Chan, 2006 for additional information on controlled versus automatic 
processing). 
It is interesting to note that both Rogers et al. (2012) and Sommers et al. (2015) invoked 
the distinction between controlled and automatic processing to explain age differences in 
susceptibility to false hearing. Specifically, the authors suggested that the older adults in their 
studies were less able than younger adults to constrain their responding to available sensory 
information – which the authors called controlled or careful listening – and instead gave the 
automatic response that was supported by context. Sommers et al. suggested that the inability to 
suppress the automatic, context-based response reflected a failure of inhibitory control. Since 
inhibitory control is typically considered to be a component of executive functioning (see Jurado 
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& Rosselli, 2007), it is possible that differences in susceptibility to false memory between older 
adults with high and low executive functioning observed in past studies (Butler et al., 2004; 
Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007) resulted from 
differences in inhibitory control. In the next section, I describe evidence for the role of inhibitory 
control in false memory and false hearing. 
1.2.2  Inhibitory control  
One specific component of executive functioning that has received a great deal of attention in the 
false memory and false hearing literatures is inhibitory control. As noted above, there are thought 
to be three different aspects of inhibitory control: controlling what information enters working 
memory, removing information that is no longer relevant from working memory, and 
suppressing prepotent, but incorrect, responses (Lustig et al., 2007). In support of distinct 
functions of inhibitory control, measures purported to tap into different functions of inhibitory 
control have been shown to be uncorrelated in previous studies (Kramer et al., 1994; Pineda & 
Merchan, 2003). For example, the number of categories achieved on the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test – a measure of the aspect of inhibitory control involved in removing no-longer-relevant 
information from working memory – has been shown to be uncorrelated with interference on a 
Stroop task (Pineda & Merchan, 2003) – a measure of the response suppression aspect of 
inhibitory control – and performance on the two tasks have loaded onto separate factors in 
exploratory factor analyses (Boone et al., 1998; Pineda & Merchan, 2003) and principle 
components analyses (Rodríguez-Aranda & Sundet, 2006). Thus, there are distinct aspects of 
inhibitory control that can be separated in different tasks. 
The response suppression function of inhibitory control is often referenced in explaining 
false hearing (Jacoby et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). According to the 
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inhibitory control theory of false hearing, misleading contextual information increases the 
activation of words in the mental lexicon that fit with the semantic context, thereby increasing 
competition for perception when the target word is unpredicted by context. For example, hearing 
the sentence “The shepherd watched his…” creates a strong expectation that the word sheep 
should follow, so the word sheep should become highly activated while listening to the sentence. 
When an unexpected but similar sounding word (e.g., sheath) is presented instead of the 
predicted word – as in the incongruent condition of the study by Sommers et al. (2015, 
Experiment 2) described above – participants may still perceive the predicted word if that word 
received more activation from context than the target word received from the auditory signal. To 
improve the chances of accurately hearing the unpredicted target word, it is thought that 
inhibitory control can be used to suppress the activation of the unpresented, but contextually 
predicted, word. Thus, according to this theory, false hearing occurs when people are unable to 
sufficiently inhibit the contextually predicted word, and older, relative to younger, adults are 
especially prone to false hearing due to an age-related deficit in inhibitory control (Cohn et al., 
1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher et al., 1997; Jacoby et al., 2005; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers 
& Danielson, 1999, Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000). 
 Past studies have provided at least indirect evidence to support inhibitory control as a 
mechanism underlying false hearing. Sommers and Danielson (1999, Experiment 2), for 
example, conducted a study to investigate how inhibitory control influenced veridical speech 
perception of lexically easy words (i.e., words with few phonological neighbors, that have 
relatively low frequency of occurrence in language) and lexically hard words (i.e., words with 
many phonological neighbors, that have relatively high frequency of occurrence in language). 
According to the Neighborhood Activation Model (NAM; Luce & Pisoni, 1998), hearing a word 
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activates both the spoken word and its phonological neighbors in the mental lexicon. The NAM 
postulates that relative activation of these words is determined by two primary factors: 1) the 
phonological similarity of the activated words to the presented word, and 2) the frequency with 
which the activated words appear in language. Thus, lexically hard words should be harder to 
identify in noise than lexically easy words because they have a greater number of high-frequency 
phonological competitors. Sommers and Danielson suggested that inhibitory control might be 
needed to reduce the activation of phonological neighbors to accurately hear the target word. 
Consequently, they hypothesized that lexically hard words, which have more high-frequency 
phonological neighbors to compete for perception, should require greater inhibitory control than 
lexically easy words. Additionally, they hypothesized that valid contextual cues may aid speech 
perception by selectively increasing the activation of the contextually predicted target word in 
the mental lexicon, thereby decreasing the need to inhibit phonological neighbors that did not fit 
with semantic context. 
Sommers and Danielson (1999) tested these predictions by having younger and older 
adults listen to sentences with the final word in noise for identification, similar to the design of 
the false hearing study by Sommers et al. (2015, Experiment 2). Unlike the study by Sommers et 
al., however, the sentences used in Sommers and Danielson’s study were never misleading. 
Instead, the sentences used by Sommers and Danielson provided either little context for 
predicting the target word (low-predictability sentences; e.g., She was thinking about the path) or 
a highly predictive context supporting the target word (high-predictability sentences; e.g., She 
was walking along the path). Participants also completed two measures of the response 
suppression aspect of inhibitory control – a selective attention paradigm developed by Garner 
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(1974) and an auditory Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) – scores from which were combined to form a 
composite measure of inhibitory control.  
In line with their hypotheses, Sommers and Danielson (1999, Experiment 2) found that 
their measure of the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control was significantly 
correlated with identification of lexically hard, but not lexically easy, words, such that 
individuals with poorer inhibitory control had more difficulty identifying lexically hard words 
than individuals with better inhibitory control. Supporting the idea that valid contextual cues 
decreased the need to inhibit activated phonological neighbors of the target word, the correlation 
between their measure of inhibitory control and identification of lexically hard words was 
stronger when the word was preceded by a low-predictability sentence (r = -.73) than a high-
predictability sentence (r = -.58). Together, these findings suggest that inhibitory control was 
needed to suppress activation of phonological neighbors of a target word, and that the 
availability of predictive context partially alleviated reliance on inhibitory control to achieve 
accurate perception. 
Sommers and Danielson’s (1999, Experiment 2) study established the relationship 
between the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control and veridical hearing but does not 
tell us whether inhibitory control contributes to false hearing. However, the proposal that 
inhibitory control is needed to reduce activation of a target word’s phonological neighbors and 
that context increases the activation of semantically viable words is highly pertinent to the 
studies of false hearing discussed above. Recall that the target words in the incongruent 
condition of the tasks used by Rogers et al. (2012) and Sommers et al. (2015) were phonological 
neighbors of the word predicted by context. Based on the NAM (Luce & Pisoni, 1998) and the 
findings of Sommers and Danielson, we would expect that hearing the incongruent target word 
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(e.g., sheath in the sentence The shepherd watched his sheath) would activate the contextually 
predicted phonological neighbor of the target word (e.g., sheep), and that the activation of this 
phonological neighbor would be boosted due to its compatibility with available contextual cues. 
This set of conditions should result in an increased probability that participants would mistakenly 
“hear” the contextually predicted phonological neighbor, a case of false hearing. Therefore, if the 
role of inhibitory control is to decrease activation of phonological neighbors of the target word, 
as suggested by Sommers and Danielson, then we might expect that individuals with better 
inhibitory control would be less susceptible to false hearing than those with poorer inhibitory 
control. 
One experimental method that may be particularly useful for testing the inhibitory control 
account of false hearing described above is eye-tracking. Eye-tracking has been increasingly 
used to study language processing because it allows the researcher to observe changes in 
attentional focus over time, providing a real-time assessment of the processing that occurs before 
a response is made. In speech perception research, eye-tracking is often used within a visual 
world paradigm (Allopenna et al., 1998; Dahan & Gaskell, 2007; Ito et al., 2018; Kukona, 2020; 
Mishra & Singh, 2013; Revill & Spieler, 2012), in which different response options are depicted 
in the form of written words or pictures. It has been argued that changes in the proportion of 
fixations on the images in the visual world paradigm can be used as a proxy for changes in 
activation, with more highly activated response options receiving more attention than less highly 
activated options (Tanenhaus et al., 2000). Supporting this claim, images depicting high-
frequency words, which are assumed to gain more activation than low-frequency words by 
speech perception models such as the NAM (Luce & Pisoni, 1998), tend to receive a greater 
proportion of fixations than images depicting low-frequency words (Dahan & Gaskell, 2007; 
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Dahan et al., 2001; Revill & Spieler, 2012). Similarly, following from Sommers and Danielson’s 
(1999) claim that words gain activation when supported by contextual cues, images depicting 
words that are congruent with available semantic context tend to receive a greater proportion of 
fixations than images depicting words that do not fit with context (Ito et al., 2018; Kukona, 
2020). Therefore, the eye-tracking methodology could allow for a test of the inhibitory control 
theory of false hearing. Misleading sentences, as in the incongruent condition of the study by 
Sommers et al. (2015), should lead to increased fixations on an image depicting the contextually 
predicted (but incorrect) word. If participants are able to suppress the activation of the 
contextually predicted word when the unpredicted target word is presented, fixations on the 
image depicting the contextually predicted word should decrease and fixations on the image 
depicting the target word should increase following presentation of the target word. In 
Experiment 2 of the present study, I used eye-tracking to test this hypothesis. 
Whereas the relationship between inhibitory control and false hearing has not been tested 
directly in past studies, there has been empirical support for a relationship between inhibitory 
control and false memory (Colombel et al., 2016; Lövdén, 2003; Sommers & Huff, 2003, 
Experiment 2). Similar to the inhibitory control theory of false hearing, the inhibitory control 
theory of false memory suggests that false memories occur when an individual is unable to 
suppress activation of unpresented information. Using the DRM paradigm as an example, the 
inhibitory control theory suggests that reading a list of words in which each word is semantically 
(or phonologically) related to an unpresented critical word increases the activation of the critical 
word. False memories occur when the individual is unable to suppress activation of the critical 
word using inhibitory control (see Balota et al., 1999), leading to the experience of remembering 
the critical word even though it was not presented. In support of this theory, Sommers and Huff 
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(2003, Experiment 2) found that reaction time on incongruent trials of an auditory Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935) – an indicator of the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control – was 
positively related to both false recall and false recognition in phonologically-associated DRM 
lists, accounting for 11% of variance in false recall and 7% of variance in false recognition after 
controlling for differences in age and processing speed (assessed by reaction time on baseline 
trials of the auditory Stroop task). Similarly, Colombel et al. (2016) found that a composite of 
four measures of inhibitory control predicted false recall of critical words in the DRM paradigm, 
also accounting for 11% of the variance in susceptibility to false recall. Thus, poor inhibitory 
control has been shown to be related to increased susceptibility to false memory, at least within 
the DRM paradigm. 
Further evidence for the role of inhibitory control in false memory comes from the 
capture model (see Figure 3), a multinomial processing tree (MPT) model that has been shown to 
explain age differences in susceptibility to false memories evoked using the process dissociation 
framework (Jacoby et al., 2005, Experiment 2). The capture model used by Jacoby et al. (2005, 
Experiment 2; see study description above) had five parameters: 1) a capture parameter (C) 
corresponding to the probability of being captured by available contextual cues, in which case 
participants respond with the prime without attempting recollection; 2) a recollection parameter 
(R) corresponding to the probability of successfully remembering the studied target word when 
the individual was not captured by context; 3) an accessibility bias parameter (A) reflecting the 
probability of responding with the easily accessible prime following an unsuccessful attempt at 
recollection; 4) a word generation parameter (W) corresponding to the probability of generating 
the pre-determined alternative response on a given trial; and 5) an attribution threshold parameter 
(AT) signifying the likelihood of characterizing a response as “remembered” or “familiar” versus 
23 
 
“guessed.” The authors suggested that the capture parameter represented inhibitory control, 
indexing the ability to resist the context-based response. They were then able to test the 
contribution of inhibitory control to responding in their memory task by comparing the fit of an 
MPT model that did not include the capture parameter to a model that included the capture 
parameter. 
 
Supporting the role of inhibitory control in their memory task, Jacoby et al. (2005, 
Experiment 2) found that model fit was improved by adding the capture parameter. This finding 
was important, as it suggested that an additional means of achieving an accurate response in the 
congruent condition and a false memory response in the incongruent condition other than 
remembering the target word (the recollection parameter), responding based on ease of 
Figure 3. The capture model from Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2). The table indicates 
performance in the three prime conditions (congruent/incongruent/baseline). Correct responses 
are signified by a plus sign (+), incorrect responses are signified by a minus sign (−), and 
“Other” refers to responses other than the target word or the pre-determined alternative word. 
Responses are characterized as either “remembered” or “familiar” (RF) or as “guessed” (G).   
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accessibility in memory (the accessibility bias parameter), or guessing (the word generation 
parameter) was necessary to fit the data. This provided evidence that capture – interpreted as 
representing inhibitory control – contributed to accurate responses in the congruent condition and 
false memory responses in the incongruent condition in the memory task. 
In addition to finding that capture influenced responding in the memory task, the MPT 
model created by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) also provided evidence that age differences 
in their memory task could be fully accounted for by differences in capture. When allowing all of 
the parameters in their MPT model to vary across age groups, the authors found that only the 
capture parameter differed significantly between younger and older adults. In fact, the model 
estimated that younger adults were never captured by context (capture parameter = .00) whereas 
older adults had a 38% chance of being captured by context. This aligns with previous studies 
suggesting that inhibitory control is better in younger adults than older adults (Cohn et al., 1984; 
Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher et al., 1997; Jacoby et al., 2005; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers & 
Danielson, 1999, Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000), 
and suggests that younger adults’ false memories may have resulted predominantly from 
accessibility bias (i.e., the other parameter in the MPT model that gives rise to false memory 
responses) whereas older adults’ false memories may have reflected a combination of 
accessibility bias and failures of inhibitory control. Therefore, it is possible that differences in 
inhibitory control can fully account for older adults’ increased susceptibility to false memory 
relative to younger adults, and that different mechanisms may give rise to false memories in 
younger and older adults. 
The ability of the capture model to account for age differences in false memory may be 
important for advancing our understanding of the mechanisms underlying false hearing. As noted 
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above, the methods and results of the study of false memory by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 
2) were quite similar to those of the study of false hearing by Rogers et al. (2012). Additionally, 
much as the false memories in the Jacoby et al. study were described as resulting from being 
captured by an easily accessible prime, the words that were falsely heard in the studies by Rogers 
et al. and Sommers et al. (2015) were also easily accessible due to their association with 
available contextual cues. Therefore, it is possible that both false memory and false hearing arise 
from being captured by available contextual cues (i.e., failures to inhibit the contextually 
predicted response). Together, these similarities suggest that the capture model might be a good 
fit to false hearing data. 
It is important to note that although Jacoby et al. (2005) interpreted the capture parameter 
as representing inhibitory control, this is not necessarily the case. The authors’ interpretation of 
capture was based on the idea that capture occurs when participants are unable to resist the 
prepotent response – resulting in accurate responses in the congruent condition and false memory 
responses in the incongruent condition – a description that aligns with that of the response 
suppression aspect of inhibitory control (Lustig et al., 2007). However, the capture model does 
not manipulate any factors to isolate cognitive processes, but instead estimates parameters based 
on the patterns of responses across context conditions that would be expected if responding was 
influenced by a particular cognitive ability. Thus, it is possible that the capture parameter could 
reflect processes other than inhibitory control that would result in a similar pattern of responding. 
For example, the capture parameter could reflect personality factors such as conscientiousness, 
with less conscientious participants being less likely to follow instructions or pay attention to the 
target word, instead using context as a basis for responding to decrease listening effort. Whereas 
personality factors such as this may be partially accounted for by other parameters in the model, 
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such as the accessibility bias parameter, these factors could influence the capture parameter. 
Therefore, finding that adding the capture parameter improves model fit is weak evidence in 
isolation for the role of inhibitory control in false hearing and false memory. In conjunction with 
other evidence supporting the role of inhibitory control, however, finding that adding the capture 
parameter improves model fit may increase our confidence that inhibitory control influences 
responding. 
1.3 The present study 
In Experiment 1 of the present study, I examined whether the age-related increase in 
susceptibility to false hearing observed in past studies (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015) 
could be accounted for by two related mechanisms that have been shown to explain age 
differences in susceptibility to false memory: executive functioning and the response suppression 
aspect of inhibitory control. I used a speech perception in noise (SPIN) task that was nearly 
identical to that used by Sommers et al. (2015, Experiment 2) in which participants identified 
words in noise at the end of three types of sentences: 1) sentences providing no context (baseline 
condition; e.g., The word is page), 2) sentences providing a valid semantic context (congruent 
condition; e.g., She put the toys in the box), or 3) sentences providing a misleading semantic 
context (incongruent condition; e.g., She put the toys in the fox). Participants characterized their 
responses as either “heard,” “known,” or “guessed” to correspond to the 
remember/familiar/guess judgements made in the study of false memory by Jacoby et al. (2005, 
Experiment 2). Participants also completed the memory task used by Jacoby et al., allowing for 
direct comparison of susceptibility to false hearing and false memory.  
In addition to the SPIN and memory tasks, participants completed a battery of executive 
functioning measures (Glisky et al., 1995) and an auditory Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) – each of 
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which has demonstrated significant relationships with false memory (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & 
McDermott, 2007; McCabe et al., 2009; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007; Sommers 
& Huff, 2003, Experiment 2) – to assess the relationships between executive functioning, 
inhibitory control, false hearing, and false memory. To further assess the role of inhibitory 
control in false hearing and false memory, the capture model created by Jacoby et al. (2005, 
Experiment 2) was fit to the data from the SPIN and memory tasks to determine 1) whether 
adding a capture parameter improved model fit relative to models that did not account for 
capture, and 2) the extent to which differences in responding between younger and older adults 
could be explained by differences in capture. To fit the capture model to data from the SPIN 
task, the recollection parameter from the original capture model was replaced with a hearing 
parameter, which corresponded to the likelihood of accurately hearing the target word in noise.  
This experiment provided the first direct test of the relationship between false hearing 
and false memory, and was the first to examine the roles of executive functioning and inhibitory 
control in false hearing. Additionally, this was the first use of the capture model to investigate 
the cognitive processes contributing to false hearing. Consequently, the findings of this 
experiment will have important implications for our understanding of speech perception and 
memory, separately, and for formulation of a united theory of context-based errors across 
perceptual and memory systems. 
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Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants 
An a priori power analysis was conducted in G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) to determine the 
sample size needed to detect a correlation of -.32 – the correlation between executive functioning 
and false alarms characterized as “remembered” on a recognition memory test (i.e., false 
memories) from McCabe et al., (2009), who used the same executive functioning battery as in 
the present study (Glisky et al., 1995) – with a power of .80. The power analysis revealed that 56 
younger and 56 older adults would be needed. Based on the results of this power analysis, data 
was collected from 60 younger adults ages 18-23 (M = 19.05, SD = 1.05) and 58 older adults 
ages 65-81 (M = 71.17, SD = 4.14) for Experiment 1. 
All participants were native English speakers who did not require the use of a hearing aid 
and who self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants completed a 
demographic questionnaire gathering information about gender, age, handedness, years of 
education, ethnic group, occupation or area of study, domestic arrangement (i.e., live alone or 
with others), current/past health issues that could affect performance, and number of languages 
spoken in addition to English. 
2.1.2  Hearing acuity 
Hearing thresholds were assessed for octave frequencies from 250 to 8000 Hz in a sound-
attenuating booth using standard pure-tone audiometry. Best-ear pure-tone averages (PTA) 
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across the 500, 1000, and 2000 Hz frequencies2 differed significantly between younger (M = 
4.72, SD = 4.51) and older adults (M = 17.39, SD = 9.74), t(79.78) = -9.01, p < .001. Therefore, 
the older adults in this study exhibited poorer hearing acuity, on average, than the younger 
adults, as would be expected due to age-related hearing loss (Morrell et al., 1996; Sommers et 
al., 2011). 
2.1.3  Speech Perception in Noise (SPIN) task 
2.1.3.1  SPIN task stimuli 
Stimuli in the SPIN task were 42 carrier sentences (baseline sentences; e.g., The word is page) 
and 42 high-predictability sentences (congruent sentences; e.g., She put the toys in a box) 
selected from the Revised Speech Perception in Noise Test (Bilger et al., 1984) or created 
specifically for this study. For each congruent sentence, an incongruent sentence was created by 
changing either the first or last sound in the sentence-final word (first sound changed in 85% of 
cases) to form an alternative word that was not predicted by the sentence context (e.g., She put 
the toys in the fox). The length, frequency, and phonological neighborhood density of all target 
words were gathered from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007). The length of target 
words in the congruent (M = 4.35, SD = .99), incongruent (M = 4.36, SD = 1.05), and baseline 
conditions (M = 4.08, SD = .73) did not differ significantly, F(2,197) = 1.35, p > .05. The 
frequency of target words in the congruent (M = 53,839, SD = 120,601.25, incongruent (M = 
57,573, SD = 86,165.11), and baseline conditions (M = 59,267, SD = 115,873.36) also did not 
differ significantly, F(2,197) = .04, p > .05. Finally, the phonological neighborhood density of 
target words in the congruent (M = 19.22, SD = 11.03), incongruent (M = 19.20, SD = 11.45), 
and baseline conditions (M = 18.95, SD = 9.73) did not differ significantly, F(2,197) = .01, p > 
 
2 The 500, 1000, and 2000 Hz frequencies were chosen because these frequencies are known to 
be important for speech perception (Dobie, 2011). 
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.05. Congruent and incongruent sentences were counterbalanced such that the congruent and 
incongruent versions of a sentence appeared an equal number of times across participants but 
with only one version appearing in a single experimental session. All sentences were recorded at 
44,100 Hz and 16-bit resolution in a double-walled, sound-attenuating booth, and were spoken at 
a normal rate by a male with a Midwestern American accent. All sentences were played at an 
average amplitude of 64 dB sound pressure level (SPL). 
2.1.3.2  SPIN task procedure 
Baseline, congruent, and incongruent sentences were played through headphones with the final 
word presented in speech-shaped noise for identification. The SNR was set to -4 dB SPL for 
younger adults and to +1 dB SPL for older adults, SNRs shown to achieve approximately 50% 
target word identification accuracy in the baseline condition in pilot testing. Participants 
completed six practice trials divided equally among baseline, congruent, and incongruent stimuli. 
They then completed 120 test trials composed of 40 baseline trials, 40 congruent trials, and 40 
incongruent trials. Stimuli in each counterbalancing condition were randomized once and that 
order was used for all participants in that condition. Participants were instructed to identify the 
word in noise, and to type their response after hearing each sentence. Participants were warned 
that sentence contexts could be misleading, and were given an example of an incongruent 
sentence.  
After typing their response, participant completed a version of the remember/know 
paradigm (Tulving, 1985) – a hear/know/guess paradigm – in which they were instructed to 
indicate whether they heard the word they typed on the previous screen, did not hear the word 
they typed on the previous screen but knew that it was the word that was presented, or simply 
guessed the word they typed on the previous screen. Descriptions of the hear, know, and guess 
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responses were presented on screen each time participants made this judgement. Participants 
indicated their response by pressing the number key corresponding to their judgement. This task 
was self-paced, with participants having an unlimited amount of time to type their response for 
the SPIN task and to make their hear/know/guess judgement. 
It should be noted that context was only a valid predictor of the target word in one-third 
of sentences. This, in addition to the warning participants received regarding the presence of 
incongruent sentences, should have biased participants against using the sentence context as a 
basis for responding. 
2.1.4  Memory task 
2.1.4.1  Memory task stimuli 
Susceptibility to false memory was assessed using the memory task from Jacoby et al. (2005, 
Experiment 2). Participants completed two phases in this task, a study phase and a test phase. 
Stimuli in the study phase were 99 semantically related cue-target word pairs (e.g., head – skull). 
Cue words ranged from three to nine letters in length (M = 5.08, SD = 1.41), and target words 
ranged from three to seven letters in length (M = 4.59, SD = .79). Stimuli in the test phase 
consisted of the same cue words from the study phase matched with a fragment of its paired 
target word created by replacing certain letters with dashes (e.g., head – s--l-). Target words in 
the test phase had between one and five letters replaced by dashes (M = 2.21, SD = .71), and 
retained between one and four letters (M = 2.38, SD = .63), although all but one fragment (-u- for 
the target word “mug”) retained at least two letters. Prior to presenting the target fragment in the 
test phase, participants saw one of three types of prime words: 1) the target word from the study 
phase (congruent condition; e.g., skull), 2) an alternative word that could complete the target 
fragment and that was semantically related to the cue word (incongruent condition; e.g., scalp), 
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or 3) a string of five ampersands (&&&&&), which provided no predictive value for the 
fragment completion task (baseline condition). There were no differences in target word length 
between the congruent (M = 4.57, SD = .73), incongruent (M = 4.47, SD = .78), and baseline 
conditions (M = 4.73, SD = .87), F(2,87) = .87, p > .05. I obtained the log frequencies for target 
words in the congruent (M = 9.37, SD = 2.01), incongruent (M = 9.67, SD = 1.55), and baseline 
conditions (M = 9.29, SD = 1.74) from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007), and 
found that there were no differences in target word frequency across conditions, F(2,87) = .38,  p 
> .05. 
2.1.4.2  Memory task procedure 
Participants were told to study a list of semantically related word pairs for a later memory test. 
They were shown six cue-target word pairs as examples. Following the examples, participants 
completed the study phase, in which 90 cue-target word pairs were presented. An additional 
three cue-target word pairs were presented following the study phase to act as a buffer against 
the recency effect. For younger adults, each word pair was presented for 1000 ms, whereas each 
word pair was presented for 3000 ms for older adults, a manipulation used by Jacoby et al. 
(2005, Experiment 2) to equate memory for words in the baseline condition. An interstimulus 
interval (ISI) of 500 ms separated each cue-target word pair. To equate the interval from the first 
word in the study phase to the last word in the buffer trials, younger adults were shown a screen 
following the buffer trials for 186 seconds instructing them to relax and wait for the memory test 
to begin in three minutes, whereas older adults started the memory test immediately following 
the buffer trials. Stimuli in the study phase were presented in the same pre-determined random 
order for all participants, and each cue-target word pair was presented only once. 
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In the memory test, participants were again shown the word pairs from the learning 
phase, but in each case the second word in the pair was fragmented by substituting dashes for 
some of the letters. Participants were instructed to complete the word fragment by typing the full 
word that accurately completed the learned word pair from the study phase. As noted, before 
each cue-fragment pair was presented, a congruent, incongruent, or baseline prime was flashed 
on screen. Participants were explicitly warned at the start of the study that primes would appear, 
and were told that the prime would either be the target word from the study phase, in which case 
they should use this word to complete the word fragment, an unstudied word that was 
semantically related to the presented cue and that could complete the word fragment, in which 
case they should not use this word to complete the word fragment, or a string of ampersands. The 
prime remained on screen for 500 ms and offset 500 ms before presentation of the cue-fragment 
pair. Participants completed 30 trials in each of the three prime conditions (baseline, congruent, 
and incongruent), and trials were presented in a pre-determined random order. 
After typing the word that completed each cue-target word pair, participants indicated 
their reason for providing their response by selecting one of three options: remember, know, or 
guess. Participants were told to select “remember” if they recalled specific details of the word’s 
presentation in the study list, so they were certain that their response was the word from the 
study list. They were told to select “know” if they knew that they had studied the word they 
typed, but could not recall specific details about studying it. Finally, they were told to select 
“guess” if they were purely guessing with no idea of the correct answer. The descriptions for 
each these response types were presented on screen each time participants made the 
remember/know/guess judgement. Participants indicated their response by pressing the number 
key corresponding to their judgement. This task was self-paced, with participants having an 
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unlimited amount of time to type their response for the fragment completion task and to make 
their remember/know/guess judgement. 
As was true of contextual cues in the SPIN task, the prime was only an accurate cue for 
memory in one-third of trials, and participants were warned that the prime could be misleading. 
Therefore, if anything, participants should have been biased against using the prime as a basis for 
responding. 
2.1.5  Shipley Vocabulary Test 
Vocabulary knowledge was assessed using the Shipley Vocabulary Test (Shipley, 1940). 
Participants completed 40 trials in which they decided which of four words was most similar in 
meaning to a target word, and indicated their responses by pressing the number key 
corresponding to their answer. The target word was presented at the top of the screen in capital 
letters, and the four numbered response options were presented horizontally below. Participants 
had an unlimited time to select their response. An interval of 1000 ms separated the input of a 
response and the onset of the next trial. Older adults (M = 34.98, SD = 2.98) displayed 
significantly better vocabulary knowledge than younger adults (M = 30.83, SD = 3.61), t(112.80) 
= -6.79, p < .001. 
2.1.6  Auditory Stroop task 
Individual differences in the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control were assessed 
using the auditory Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) from Sommers and Huff (2003, Experiment 2). 
Stimuli in this task were three spoken words (male, female, and person) spoken by four different 
talkers (two male and two female). Combinations of the words and talkers created three 
conditions: 1) a neutral condition in which the word person was spoken by either a male or 
female talker, 2) a congruent condition in which the word male or female was spoken by a talker 
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of the same gender (e.g., a male talker saying male), and 3) an incongruent condition in which 
the word male or female was spoken by a talker of the opposite gender (e.g., a female talker 
saying male). Participants were tasked with pressing the “z” key on the keyboard if the speaker 
was male and the “/” key if the speaker was female as quickly and accurately as possible, and 
their response times and accuracy were recorded. Participants completed 24 trials in each 
condition for a total of 72 test trials. As in the study by Sommers and Huff, inhibitory control 
was assessed by the response time in the incongruent condition after controlling for response 
time in the baseline condition, indexing the increased processing time needed to suppress 
responding with the spoken word to accurately respond with the gender of the speaker. 
Prior to completing the test trials, participants heard each sound stimulus and were tasked 
with saying aloud the gender of the speaker and the word they said to ensure that participants 
could accurately identify the gender of the speaker and the spoken word. Participants accurately 
identified 98.93% of stimuli, on average. Participants then completed 12 practice trials divided 
equally between baseline, congruent, and incongruent conditions before beginning test trials. All 
auditory stimuli were recorded at 44,100 Hz and 16-bit resolution in a double-walled, sound-
attenuating booth, and were played at an average amplitude of 64 dB SPL. 
2.1.7  Executive functioning battery 
Executive functioning was assessed using a battery of five measures identified by Glisky et al. 
(1995) as tapping into frontal lobe functioning – often used interchangeably with executive 
functioning (see McCabe et al., 2010) – that has since been used in several studies of false 
memory (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; McCabe et al., 2009; Meade et al., 
2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007). The tests were a computerized version of the modified 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Hart et al., 1988), the Arithmetic test from the Wechsler Adult 
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Intelligence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981), the Mental Control test and Backward 
Digit Span from the Wechsler Memory Scale – III (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997), and the 
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (Spreen & Benton, 1977). Following the procedure used 
by Chan and McDermott (2007), the outcome measures from each of these tests were 
standardized in the full sample then averaged together to form a composite executive functioning 
score for each participant. 
2.1.7.1  Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
In the modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Hart et al., 1988), participants saw a series of 
target cards one at a time and sorted them into one of four piles based on a changing sorting rule. 
Cards could be sorted based on the shape depicted on the card, the number of shapes on the card, 
or the color of the shapes on the card (the fourth pile did not match the target card on any of 
these features). Participants were instructed to click on the pile that they believed the target card 
belonged to based on the current sorting rule. Participants were not told the current sorting rule 
but were given feedback after each trial indicating whether or not they had sorted the card 
correctly. The sorting rule changed after the participant successfully sorted six cards in the 
current response category. As in the study by Hart et al. (1988), the order of categories was 
color, shape, number, color, shape, number. Participants continued until they had completed all 
six response categories or until 72 trials elapsed. The number of categories completed within the 
allotted 72 trials was the outcome measure. 
2.1.7.2  WAIS-R Arithmetic test 
In the Arithmetic test from the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981), the experimenter read arithmetic 
problems aloud and the participant was tasked with solving the problems as quickly as possible 
while being accurate. Participants were not allowed to write anything down, but the experimenter 
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would repeat the question once if requested. Participants were scored based on the accuracy of 
their response and received bonus points on questions 10-14 if the correct answer was given in 
an amount of time specified on the WAIS-R scoring packet. Response time was recorded using a 
handheld stopwatch. 
2.1.7.3  WMS-III Mental Control test 
In the Mental Control test from the WMS-III (Wechsler, 1997), participants were instructed to 
say a sequence (e.g., list the days of the week in forward order starting with Sunday) aloud in the 
proper order as quickly as possible. Participants were scored based on the number of errors 
committed and received bonus points on perfectly accurate responses based on their response 
time in accordance with the WMS-III scoring packet. Response time was recorded using a 
handheld stopwatch. 
2.1.7.4  WMS-III Backward Digit Span 
In the Backward Digit Span from the WMS-III (Wechsler, 1997), the experimenter said strings 
of numbers of increasing length aloud and participants were instructed to repeat the numbers 
aloud in reverse order. Participants completed two strings of lengths two through eight and 
testing was stopped either after all strings were completed or when participants were unable to 
perfectly recall all numbers in both trials at a given string length. Participants were told that there 
was no time limit, and received one point for each string recalled perfectly. 
2.1.7.5  Controlled Oral Word Association Test 
In the Controlled Oral Word Association Test (Spreen & Benton, 1977), participants said aloud 
as many words as they could think of (other than proper names) starting with the letters F, A, and 
S. The outcome measure was the total number of distinct words generated across the three letters 
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given one minute for each letter. Responses were recorded by hand by the experimenter, and a 
one-minute timer was used to indicate when the allotted time had elapsed.  
2.1.8  General procedure 
The experiment took place across two one-hour sessions on different days. During the first 
session, participants read a consent document and completed the demographics form, then 
completed the hearing test, SPIN task, auditory Stroop task, and Shipley Vocabulary Test. 
During the second session, participants completed the memory task, Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test, Arithmetic test, Mental Control test, Backward Digit Span, and Controlled Oral Word 
Association Test, in that order. Participants were offered breaks between each of the tasks. 
Student participants received one course credit and older adults received a total of $15 ($10 + $5 
to cover transportation costs) after completing each session of the experiment. 
2.1.9  MPT modeling procedure 
The capture model proposed by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) – an MPT model – was fit to 
the data from the SPIN and memory tasks using the fit.mpt function from the MPTinR package 
in R (Singmann & Kellen, 2013). The model fit to the memory task data was the same as used by 
Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2; see Figure 3). The model fit to the SPIN task data can be seen 
in Figure 4. Similar to the capture model proposed by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2), the 
model fit to the SPIN data had five parameters: 1) a capture parameter (C) representing the 
likelihood of responding based on context without listening to the target word, 2) a hearing 
parameter (H) representing the likelihood of accurately hearing the target word when capture did 
not occur, 3) an accessibility bias parameter (A) representing the likelihood of responding with 
the most easily accessed response (i.e., the contextually predicted word in the 
congruent/incongruent conditions and the presented word in the baseline condition) following an 
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unsuccessful attempt to hear the target word, 4) a word generation parameter (W) representing 
the likelihood of providing the pre-designated alternative word (e.g., the alternative word for box 
in the sentence She put the toys in the box is fox), and 5) an attribution threshold parameter (AT) 
signifying the likelihood of characterizing a response as “heard” or “known” versus “guessed.”  
 
I first ran two versions of this model to assess the role of inhibitory control (i.e., capture) 
in the SPIN and memory tasks. One model constrained the capture parameter to 0 and the other 
allowed the capture parameter to be estimated freely. The fit of these models to the data was then 
compared using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to determine whether adding the 
capture parameter to the model improved model fit. If adding the capture parameter improved 
model fit, this would indicate that having a means of achieving an accurate response in the 
Figure 4. The capture model to be used in Experiment 1. The table indicates performance in 
the three context conditions (congruent/incongruent/baseline). Correct responses are signified 
by a plus sign (+), incorrect responses are signified by a minus sign (−), and “Other” refers to 
responses other than the target word or the pre-determined alternative word. Responses are 




congruent condition or a false hearing/memory response in the incongruent condition other than 
those provided by the other parameters in the model better explained the data. This would 
provide evidence for the role of inhibitory control – or another cognitive process that would 
result in the same response pattern – in these responses. For these models, all parameters were 
assumed to be equal across groups.  
Next, multiple versions of the model including the capture parameter were fit to assess 
group differences in individual parameters. The simplest model assumed no group differences in 
any of the model’s parameters. Increasingly complex iterations of the model allowing all 
combinations of parameters to vary between age groups were fit to the data, and model fits were 
compared using BIC values to determine which model best described the data. 
In addition to BIC values, the goodness-of-fit of models to the data was assessed by 
comparing G2 values to a critical G2 value. As in Millar et al. (2018), I performed a compromise 
power analysis to set the critical value for each significance test using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 
2009). This compromise power analysis was done to compensate for the hypersensitivity of MPT 
models to detecting minor deviations between the observed values and those predicted by the 
model, which results in models being deemed to be statistically “poor fits” to the data when they, 
in fact, describe the observed data quite accurately (see Millar et al., 2018). Following the 
procedure used by Millar et al., the minimum effect size for the compromise power analysis was 
set at ω = .10, the β/α ratio was set at 1.0, and the total sample size was calculated as the number 
of participants multiplied by the number of trials (SPIN task: 118 participants x 120 trials = 
14,160; memory task: 118 participants x 90 trials = 10,620). When testing the fit of an individual 
model, the degrees of freedom was the number of independent response categories (i.e., all of the 
different possible response types in each context condition, such as baseline hits judged as 
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guessed or cases of false memory in the incongruent condition judged as remembered or known) 
minus the number of parameters estimated. When comparing the fit of two models, the degrees 
of freedom was the number of models being compared minus one (2 – 1 = 1). 
As in Jacoby et al. (2005), the accessibility bias and word generation parameters in all the 
models described above were allowed to differ in the baseline condition relative to the congruent 
and incongruent conditions. This was done under the assumption that accessibility of the target 
word and the likelihood of generating the pre-selected alternative word would differ in cases 
where context was unavailable relative to when it was available. However, unlike in the models 
created by Jacoby et al., I did not constrain the accessibility bias parameter to .50 in the baseline 
condition. Jacoby et al. set the accessibility bias parameter to .50 under the assumption that there 
should be a 50% chance of generating the target word and a 50% chance of generating the 
alternative word when the subject was unable to recollect the target word and there were no 
contextual cues available. However, this explanation failed to account for the fact that words 
other than the target word or the alternative word could be generated to complete the fragment. 
For example, for the cue-fragment pair head – s--l-, participants could generate the target word 
(skull), the alternative word (scalp), or a different word (e.g., smile). Thus, the probability of 
generating the target word when recollection fails should be less than .50 assuming an equal 
probability of generating all possible words in the absence of contextual cues. This issue is even 
more apparent in the hearing task, where any word could plausibly complete the sentence in the 
baseline condition (The word is…). For this reason, I allowed the accessibility bias parameter in 
the baseline condition to be estimated freely rather than setting it to .50, although as mentioned 
above, I allowed this parameter to differ in the baseline condition relative to the congruent and 
incongruent conditions. This decision was justified by the accessibility bias parameter in the 
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baseline condition being estimated at .36 in the memory task and .16 in the SPIN task when all 
parameters were held constant across age groups. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Stroop task 
Before analyzing data from the SPIN and memory tasks to address my main hypotheses, I 
conducted a mixed-effects linear regression model using the glmer function from the lme4 
package in R (Bates et al., 2015) predicting reaction time within the auditory Stroop task to 
ensure that participants experienced the typical Stroop effect and to determine whether the 
magnitude of the Stroop effect differed across age groups, indicating the expected age difference 
in inhibitory control (Cohn et al., 1984; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers & Danielson, 1999, 
Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000). This model was run 
on a subset of the full data including only baseline and incongruent trials, the trial types used by 
Sommers and Huff (2003, Experiment 2) to calculate the Stroop effect. Predictors in the model 
were an intercept term representing reaction time in the baseline condition for younger adults, a 
trial type variable representing the change in reaction time from the baseline condition to the 
incongruent condition (i.e., the magnitude of the Stroop effect) for younger adults, an age group 
variable representing the change in reaction time on baseline trials from younger to older adults, 
and the interaction of age group and trial type representing the change in the magnitude of the 
Stroop effect from younger to older adults. The reaction time in the baseline condition and the 
change in reaction time from the baseline condition to the incongruent condition were allowed to 
vary randomly across subjects, and reaction time was allowed to vary randomly across items 
(i.e., audio files for each speaker/word combination). For these analyses, I used only trials in 
which participants responded accurately (mean accuracy was .99 in the baseline condition and 
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.98 in the incongruent condition). Additionally, I excluded reaction times that were two standard 
deviations above or below the participants average in that trial type. On average, 5% of trials 
were excluded in each age group for this reason. 
Average reaction times for accurate responses in the baseline and incongruent conditions 
of the auditory Stroop task are presented in Figure 5. The interaction of age group and trial type 
was non-significant, so it was removed from the model to allow for interpretation of main 
effects. This indicates that there was no difference in the magnitude of the Stroop effect across 
groups. The model revealed a robust Stroop effect in both age groups, as exhibited by a main 
effect of Stroop condition (Estimated difference [ED] = 73.24 ms, t = 2.72, p < .05). 
Additionally, older adults were slower to respond than younger adults in the baseline condition 
(ED = 201.16 ms, t = 5.64, p < .001). Thus, both groups experienced the predicted Stroop effect, 
and although older adults experienced general slowing as indicated by slower reaction times in 
the baseline condition, older adults did not experience an inflated Stroop effect as reported in 
previous studies (Cohn et al., 1984; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers & Danielson, 1999, Experiment 
2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000)3. The lack of age differences in 
the magnitude of the Stroop effect foreshadows that inhibitory control as assessed by the 
auditory Stroop task may not be a good predictor of false hearing or false memory given that 
older adults are typically more susceptible than younger adults to false hearing (Rogers et al., 





3 The same results were found when controlling for individual differences in hearing acuity by 




2.2.2 Executive functioning battery 
Next, I conducted analyses to determine whether the five measures in the executive functioning 
battery tapped into a single construct. Descriptive statistics for each of the tasks in the executive 
functioning battery and results of t-tests comparing group means are presented in Table 1. Older 
adults achieved fewer categories in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, t(61.95) = 5.39, p < .001, 
and displayed poorer working memory capacity in the backward digit span than younger adults, 




Figure 5. Average reaction times for accurate responses in the baseline 
and incongruent conditions of the auditory Stroop task by younger and 




Descriptive statistics for tasks comprising the executive functioning battery 
 
 Younger adults Older adults 
 
 M SD M SD t-test 
WCST 5.97 .26 5.09 1.22 *** 
Arithmetic score 11.90 2.99 12.62 3.80 n.s. 
Mental Control 23.07 4.12 22.79 3.95 n.s. 
Backwards Digit 
Span 
9.05 2.67 7.00 2.38 *** 
COWAT 47.62 10.76 46.31 13.90 n.s. 
Note. WCST = Categories achieved in Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; COWAT = 
Controlled Oral Word Association Test; *** = p < .001; n.s. = p > .05 
 
 
I next sought to determine whether the individual components of the battery were 
correlated. As can be seen in Table 2, there were significant correlations between each 
component of the battery with the exception of the number of categories completed in the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which was only significantly related to the Arithmetic score from 
the WAIS-R and the Backwards Digit Span. The reason that the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test did 
not correlate with the other tasks in the battery was likely that there was limited variability in the 
number of categories that participants achieved. As can be seen in Table 1, nearly all younger 
adults completed all six categories, as did most older adults. Thus, the lack of significant 
correlations between the categories achieved on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the other 




















WCST 1.00      
Arithmetic 
score 
.20* 1.00     
Mental 
Control score 
.00 .28** 1.00    
Backwards 
Digit Span 
.23* .31*** .22* 1.00   
COWAT .14 .19* .32*** .34*** 1.00  
Stroop Diff -.14 .04 .03 -.05 .03 1.00 
Note. WCST = Categories achieved in Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; COWAT = Controlled 
Oral Word Association Test; Stroop Diff = Difference in reaction time for accurate 




To supplement the basic correlational analysis, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) with varimax rotation using the factanal function from the stats package in R (R Core 
Team, 2012) to determine whether all five measures in the executive functioning battery loaded 
onto a single latent factor. Parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) was used to determine the optimal 
number of factors to retain using the parallel function in the nFactors package in R (Raiche & 
Magis, 2020)4. In parallel analysis, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to create a 
distribution of eigenvalues from randomly generated datasets, then the eigenvalues from the EFA 
are compared to this distribution to determine whether the obtained eigenvalues were greater 
 
4
 Parallel analysis has been shown to be a better method of factor extraction than Kaiser’s (1960) 
method of retaining any factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.00, which tends to overestimate 
the number of factors to retain (Zwick & Velicer, 1986). 
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than 95% of generated eigenvalues (i.e., significant at the α = .05 level). If the EFA revealed that 
a single-factor model could explain the data and that all five measures within the executive 
functioning battery displayed high loadings on the single factor, then this would justify 
combining the measures to create a composite score. 
Parallel analysis determined that the first factor was significant (eigenvalue = 1.92, 
critical = 1.15) and the second factor did not account for significant additional variance 
(eigenvalue = 1.03, critical = 1.04). As can be seen in Table 3, each of the measures in the 
executive functioning battery demonstrated moderate-to-strong loadings on the single factor, 
although the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test displayed a weaker loading likely due to the limited 
variability mentioned above. Based on the results of the correlations and the EFA, I felt justified 
in combining the tasks into a single executive functioning composite score as in past studies 
(Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007). 
Table 3 
Factor loadings from the EFA of measures in the executive functioning battery 
 Factor loading 
WCST .29 
Arithmetic score .49 
Mental Control score .45 
Backwards Digit Span .62 
COWAT .54 
Note. WCST = Categories achieved on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; COWAT = 




 Having created the executive functioning composite, I next tested whether younger and 
older adults differed in executive functioning. As expected, older adults (M = -.16, SD = .68) 
exhibited poorer executive functioning than younger adults (M = .16, SD = .51), t(105.8) = 2.93, 
p < .01. This converges with past research showing that executive functioning declines with age 
(Chan & McDermott, 2007; McCabe et al., 2009; Roediger & McDaniel, 2007). 
 Finally, I conducted analyses to determine whether inhibitory control as assessed by the 
auditory Stroop task was related to the measures in the executive functioning battery. As can be 
seen in Table 2, the difference in reaction time for accurate responses between incongruent and 
baseline Stroop trials did not correlate significantly with any of the measures of executive 
functioning. This suggests that the aspect of inhibitory control captured by interference on the 
auditory Stroop task was not related to performance on any individual component of the 
executive functioning battery. 
To supplement the correlational analysis, I conducted a second EFA to determine 
whether inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task loaded onto the same factor as 
the measures in the executive functioning battery. Since inhibitory control is typically considered 
an executive function (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007), inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory 
Stroop task should load onto the same factor as the measures of executive functioning. It was 
also important to establish that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task loaded 
onto the executive functioning factor for the planned analysis described below in which the 
executive functioning score is added to a mixed-effects logistic regression model including age 
group, baseline Stroop reaction time, and incongruent Stroop reaction time to determine whether 
executive functioning was predictive of false hearing and false memory after controlling for the 
response suppression aspect of inhibitory control. If inhibitory control as assessed by the 
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auditory Stroop task did not load onto the same factor as measures of executive functioning, then 
this would suggest that the auditory Stroop task measured something other than what was 
included in the executive functioning battery – either a different component of inhibitory control 
(Kramer et al., 1994; Lustig et al., 2007) or something other than inhibitory control – and I 
would not be able to draw the conclusion that the inhibitory control component of the executive 
functioning battery was controlled for in this analysis. The EFA included each of the measures 
from the executive functioning battery and a standardized difference score subtracting baseline 
Stroop reaction time from incongruent Stroop reaction time. The difference score was calculated 
to demonstrate differences in inhibitory control accounting for variability in processing speed. 
Parallel analysis revealed a significant first factor (eigenvalue = 1.93, critical = 1.20) and 
a significant second factor (eigenvalue = 1.16, critical = 1.08). As can be seen in Table 4, the 
Stroop difference score only loaded onto the second factor, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
loaded strongly onto this factor. However, the Stroop difference score only loaded weakly onto 
this factor, suggesting that it shared little variance with either latent factor. All the other 
measures in the executive functioning battery loaded strongly onto the first factor and only 
weakly onto the second factor. The findings of the EFA in addition to the low correlations 
between the auditory Stroop difference score and each measure in the executive functioning 
battery suggest that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task tapped a latent 
variable that was different from that tapped by measures in the executive functioning battery5. 
Therefore, the analysis proposed above including age group, baseline Stroop reaction time, 
 
5 I conducted this analysis again using incongruent Stroop reaction time as an index of inhibitory 
control instead of the Stroop difference score and obtained similar results. The data indicated a 
second significant factor (eigenvalue = 1.24, critical = 1.08), and both WCST and incongruent 
Stroop reaction time loaded onto one factor whereas the other measures of executive functioning 
loaded onto the other factor. 
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incongruent Stroop reaction time, and executive functioning score as simultaneous predictors can 
be used to determine whether the executive functioning score made an independent contribution 
to predicting false memory and false hearing controlling for the other variables, but it cannot be 
concluded that controlling for Stroop task performance fully partialled out the inhibitory control 
component of the executive functioning battery. This issue will be discussed further below. 
Table 4 
Factor loadings from the EFA of measures in the executive functioning battery and the 
Stroop difference score 
 Factor 1 loading Factor 2 loading 
WCST .22 .57 
Arithmetic score .48 .12 
Mental Control score .57 -.22 
Backwards Digit Span .55 .23 
COWAT .55  
Stroop difference score  -.23 
Note. WCST = Categories achieved in Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; COWAT = 
Controlled Oral Word Association Test; Stroop difference score = difference in reaction 
time between the baseline and incongruent conditions of the auditory Stroop task 
 
2.2.3 Memory task 
2.2.3.1  Accuracy 
Accuracy in the memory task was analyzed using mixed-effects logistic regression using the 
glmer function from the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2015). The dependent variable in this 
model was trial-by-trial accuracy. The model included an intercept term corresponding to the 
odds of an accurate response for younger adults in the baseline condition, two dummy coded 
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variables indicating the change in the odds of an accurate response from the baseline condition to 
the congruent and incongruent conditions for younger adults, a group variable representing the 
change in odds of an accurate response from younger to older adults in the baseline condition, 
and the interaction of group with the congruent and incongruent condition dummy codes to 
determine whether the change in the odds of an accurate response from the baseline condition to 
the congruent and incongruent conditions differed between younger and older adults. The odds 
of an accurate response in the baseline condition and the change in odds of an accurate response 
from the baseline to the congruent and incongruent conditions were allowed to vary randomly 
across subjects, and the odds of an accurate response were allowed to vary randomly across 
items (i.e., target words). 
As shown in Figure 6, patterns in the memory task closely resembled those from Jacoby 
et al. (2005, Experiment 2). First, it is important to note that the age groups differed in baseline 
accuracy, with the odds of an accurate response being 1.69 times greater in the older adult group 
than in the younger adult group (z = 4.15, p < .001)6. As in Jacoby et al., however, I found that 
younger adults’ performance improved in the congruent condition relative to the baseline 
condition (OR = 5.96, z = 6.84, p < .001), and that older adults experienced marginally greater 
improvement to performance from the baseline to the congruent condition relative to younger 
adults (OR = 1.56, z = 1.96, p = .05). Similarly, younger adults’ performance was negatively 
impacted in the incongruent condition relative to the baseline condition (OR = .47, z = -3.06, p < 
.01), and older adults’ performance was negatively impacted to a significantly greater degree 
than was that of younger adults (OR =.33, z = -5.60, p < .001). This supports the conclusion that 
 
6 Age groups demonstrated equivalent performance in the baseline condition of the same task in 
the study by Jacoby et al. (2005). It is possible that adding a 186 second retention interval for the 
younger adult group to compensate for the shorter presentation duration of stimuli in the study 
phase resulted in lower accuracy for younger, relative to older, adults in the present study. 
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older adults were more likely to respond based on available context (i.e., the prime word) than 
were younger adults. 
 
2.2.3.2  False memory 
I then compared the odds of experiencing false memory across age groups in the incongruent 
condition of the memory task. For this analysis, I created a mixed-effects logistic regression 
model predicting trial-by-trial false memory on a subset of data that included only incongruent 
trials. The predictors in this model were an intercept term corresponding to the odds of a false 
memory response in the younger adult group and an age group variable corresponding to the 
change in the odds of a false memory response from the younger adult group to the older adult 
group. The odds of experiencing false memory was allowed to vary randomly across subjects 
and across items. 
Figure 6. Average proportion of hits and susceptibility to false memory (FM) for younger and 
older adults in the memory task. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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As in Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2), older adults in Experiment 1 were more 
susceptible to false memory than younger adults (see Figure 6). For younger adults, the odds of 
experiencing a false memory was 1.39 times greater than the odds of giving any other response 
combined on incongruent trials, which was not a significant difference (z = 1.62, p > .05). The 
odds that an older adult would experience a false memory were 1.79 times greater than for 
younger adults (z = 2.48, p < .05). This further supports the idea that older adults were more 
likely to respond based on context, leading to false memory when context was misleading. 
2.2.3.3  Subjective judgements of false memory 
I next investigated the relative odds of rating false memories as remembered versus known or 
guessed across groups. A mixed-effects multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted 
to assess group differences in susceptibility to false memory responses judged as remembered, 
known, and guessed. This analysis was conducted using the brm function from the brms package 
in R (Bürkner, 2017). The model separately generated the odds of giving a know or a guess 
classification relative to a remember classification. An intercept term corresponding to the odds 
of giving either a know or guess classification relative to a remember classification in younger 
adults and a dummy-coded grouping variable corresponding to the change in those odds from 
younger to older adults were included as predictors. The relative odds of experiencing a false 
memory rated as remembered versus known or guessed was allowed to vary randomly across 
subjects and items. The brm function does not output p-values, but the statistical significance of 
estimates can be assessed by the 95% confidence interval (95% CI) surrounding the estimate: If 
the confidence interval includes 1.00, then the estimated odds ratio is not statistically significant 
at the α = .05 level. 
54 
 
As can be seen in Figure 7, younger adults were numerically least likely to rate false 
memories as remembered and most likely to rate false memories as guessed. However, there was 
no significant difference in the odds of characterizing a false memory as known (OR = 1.18, 95% 
CI = .73 – 1.95) or guessed (OR = 1.35, 95% CI = .78 – 2.37) relative to remembered for 
younger adults. Older adults displayed the opposite pattern, rating most cases of false memory as 
remembered and the fewest as guessed. The difference in pattern between younger and older 
adults was reflected in a significant group difference in the change in odds from a remember 
rating to a guess rating (OR = .16, 95% CI = .08 – .33). The change in odds from a remember 
rating to a know rating did not differ significantly across age groups (OR = .52, 95% CI = .26 – 
1.04). These findings suggest that younger adults had better metacognition regarding the 




2.2.3.4  Relationships with inhibitory control and executive functioning 
To test the effects of the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control and executive 
functioning, I conducted separate mixed-effects logistic regression models predicting trial-by-
trial false memory. In the inhibitory control models, average reaction times from the baseline 
condition of the auditory Stroop task standardized across all participants and age group were 
entered as simultaneous predictors. I then added standardized average incongruent Stroop 
reaction times to the model and compared it to the previous model using the anova function in R 
to determine whether incongruent Stroop reaction time accounted for additional variance after 
controlling for age group and general processing speed (i.e., baseline Stroop reaction time). The 
executive functioning model included the executive functioning composite score standardized 
Figure 7. Proportion of false memory responses characterized as remembered, 




across all participants and age group as predictors to determine whether executive functioning 
was predictive of false hearing or false memory after controlling for age group. I also tested the 
interaction between age group and the cognitive predictors (baseline and incongruent Stroop 
reaction times and the executive functioning score). However, none of the interaction effects 
were significant, so they were removed from the models to allow for interpretation of the main 
effects. The odds of experiencing false memory were allowed to vary randomly across subjects 
and items in these models. 
To test the relationship between the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control and 
false memory, I first conducted the base model including age group and average baseline Stroop 
reaction time standardized across groups as predictors. In this model, age group was marginally 
significant, with the odds of experiencing a false memory being 1.62 times greater in older adults 
than in younger adults controlling for average processing speed (z = 1.82, p = .07). Processing 
speed was not a significant predictor of false memory after controlling for age group (OR = 1.15, 
z = .84, p > .05). Adding incongruent Stroop reaction time did not improve the model (χ2 = .67, p 
> .05), indicating that the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control was not a significant 
predictor of false memory after controlling for age and processing speed. Age group remained a 
marginally significant predictor of susceptibility to false memory controlling for average 
baseline and incongruent Stroop reaction time (OR = 1.58, z = 1.72, p = .08), but the effects of 
baseline and incongruent Stroop reaction times were not significant (ps > .05). 
The relationship between executive functioning and false memory, however, was 
significant. After controlling for age group, a one standard deviation increase in executive 
functioning score decreased the odds of experiencing a false memory by a factor of 2.29 (z = -
4.46, p < .001). Age group did not significantly predict false memory after controlling for 
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executive functioning (OR = 1.38, z = 1.44, p > .05), suggesting that differences in executive 
functioning could fully account for age differences in false memory. Additionally, the full model 
including group, baseline and incongruent Stroop reaction times, and executive functioning score 
was a significantly better fit to the data than one that included only group and 
baseline/incongruent Stroop reaction times (χ2 = 18.34, p < .001). Whereas executive functioning 
score was a significant predictor of false memory in this full model (OR = .44, z = -4.45, p < 
.001), none of the other predictors were significant (ps > .05). This indicates that executive 
functioning accounted for significant variance in susceptibility to false memory after controlling 
for age, processing speed, and the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control as assessed 
by the auditory Stroop task. However, as discussed above, the results of an EFA suggested that 
inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task tapped into a different latent construct 
than the executive functioning battery. Therefore, it cannot be concluded from this analysis that 
executive functions other than the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control were 
significantly related to susceptibility to false memory since the inhibitory control component of 
the executive functioning battery may not have been fully partialled out by including incongruent 
Stroop performance in the model. 
2.2.4 SPIN task 
Statistical analyses for the SPIN task were nearly identical to those for the memory task. The 
only difference was that best-ear PTA was included as a covariate in analyses testing the 
relationships between the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control, executive 
functioning, and false hearing. This was done to further control for individual differences in 
hearing acuity above and beyond the between-groups SNR manipulation, as individual 
differences in hearing acuity may account for differences in susceptibility to false hearing. 
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2.2.4.1  Accuracy 
The patterns in the SPIN task closely resembled those in past studies of false hearing (see Figure 
8; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). The SNR manipulation – i.e., using a -4 dB SPL 
SNR for younger adults and a more favorable +1 dB SPL SNR for older adults to account for age 
differences in hearing acuity (Morrell et al., 1996; Sommers et al., 2011) – did not successfully 
equate performance in the baseline condition across age groups. The odds of an accurate 
response in the baseline condition were 1.52 times greater in older than younger adults (z = 2.22, 
p < .05), suggesting that the more favorable SNR allowed older adults to more accurately 
identify target words in the absence of predictive context. Younger adults were significantly 
more likely to accurately identify the target word in the congruent condition relative to the 
baseline condition (OR = 15.96, z = 7.55, p < .001), demonstrating benefit to speech perception 
from the presence of valid contextual cues. Despite being better able to identify the target words 
in the baseline condition, older adults experienced significantly greater improvement from the 
baseline to the congruent condition relative to younger adults (OR = 1.71, z = 2.34, p < .05). In 
the incongruent condition, younger adults were less likely to accurately identify the target word 
than in the baseline condition (OR = .26, z = -3.75, p < .001), and older adults experienced 
significantly greater detriment to performance from the baseline to the incongruent condition 
than did younger adults (OR = .62, z = -2.17, p < .05). Thus, as in the memory task, older adults’ 
performance was influenced to a greater degree by the presence of valid and invalid context 




2.2.4.2  False hearing 
As can be seen in Figure 8, younger and older adults both experienced false hearing in the 
incongruent condition. Unlike for false memory, the odds of experiencing false hearing was 3.16 
times lower than the odds of giving any other response combined on incongruent trials for 
younger adults (z = -3.86, p < .001). As in past studies (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 
2015), however, older adults were marginally more likely to experience false hearing than 
younger adults, with the odds of experiencing false hearing being 1.71 times greater in older, 
relative to younger, adults (z = 1.92, p = .05). Thus, as was true in the memory task, older adults 
were more likely than younger adults to erroneously use invalid contextual cues in speech 
perception, resulting in greater susceptibility to false hearing.  
Figure 8. Average proportion of hits and susceptibility to false hearing (FH) for younger and 
older adults in the SPIN task. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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2.2.4.3  Subjective judgements of false hearing 
Unlike in the memory task, both age groups displayed poor metacognition in the SPIN task, 
frequently characterizing cases of false hearing as heard. As can be seen clearly in Figure 9, 
younger adults were less likely to characterize cases of false hearing as guessed relative to heard 
(OR = .04, 95% CI = .02 – .08). Younger adults were also numerically less likely to characterize 
cases of false hearing as known relative to heard, but this difference did not reach significance 
(OR = .64, 95% CI = .39 – 1.04). The change in odds between hear and know judgements was 
significantly greater in older adults (OR = .43, 95% CI = .25 – .74), although there was no group 
difference in the change of odds between hear and guess judgements (OR = .88, 95% CI = .41 – 
2.02). These findings suggest that both younger and older adults often had the subjective 
experience of hearing the contextually predicted word in incongruent sentences even though a 




2.2.4.4  Relationship with false memory 
Before testing the relationship between false hearing and both inhibitory control and executive 
functioning, I first tested the direct relationship between false hearing and false memory. After 
all, if there was no relationship between false hearing and false memory, it may be a moot point 
to look for common mechanisms. Susceptibility to false hearing was positively correlated with 
susceptibility to false memory (r = .39, p < .001; see Figure 10). This indicates that individuals 
who were more susceptible to false memories also tended to be more susceptible to false hearing.  
Figure 9. Proportion of false hearing responses characterized as heard, known, 





To supplement the basic correlational analysis, I conducted a mixed-effects logistic 
regression with age group, average susceptibility to false memory standardized across 
participants, and the interaction of age group and average susceptibility to false memory as 
predictors of trial-by-trial false hearing. The interaction of age group and average susceptibility 
to false memory was not significant, so it was removed from the model. The odds of 
experiencing false hearing were allowed to vary randomly across subjects and items. 
As was true of the correlational analysis, the mixed-effects logistic regression model 
suggested that individuals who were more susceptible to false memory were also more 
susceptible to false hearing: A one standard deviation increase in average susceptibility to false 
memory increased the odds of false hearing by a factor of 1.97 after controlling for age group (z 
= 5.19, p < .001). Age group was not a significant predictor of false hearing after controlling for 
Figure 10. Correlation between average susceptibility to false hearing and average 
susceptibility to false memory (r = .39). 
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average susceptibility to false memory (OR = 1.33, z = 1.10, p > .05). The presence of a direct 
relationship between false hearing and false memory suggests that at least one common 
mechanism may underlie these phenomena. I next examined the relationships between false 
hearing and both the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control and executive functioning 
to determine whether similar relationships to those observed in the false memory analyses 
emerged. 
2.2.4.5  Relationship with inhibitory control and executive functioning 
In the base model assessing the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control, age group did 
not significantly predict susceptibility to false hearing after controlling for individual differences 
in processing speed and best-ear PTA (OR = .90, z = -.26, p > .05). However, the effect of 
average baseline Stroop reaction time approached significance (OR = 1.89, z = 1.66, p = .10), 
indicating that slower processing speed on the auditory Stroop task tended to be related to 
increased susceptibility to false hearing in younger adults controlling for best-ear PTA7. 
Additionally, as mentioned above, the interaction of age group and baseline Stroop reaction time 
approached significance (OR = .46, z = -1.75, p = .08), suggesting that the relationship between 
processing speed on the Stroop task and false hearing was weaker in older, relative to younger, 
adults. Best-ear PTA was the only significant predictor of false hearing in this model, with a one 
standard deviation increase in best-ear PTA increasing susceptibility to false hearing by a factor 
of 1.44 controlling for age group and processing speed (z = 2.01, p < .05). Of interest was 
whether adding average incongruent Stroop reaction time would account for additional variance 
 
7 This effect only pertains to younger adults because the model also included age group. The 
model controls for age group by assessing the effect of baseline Stroop reaction time when group 
equals 0. Since the younger adult group was coded 0, the effect of baseline Stroop reaction time 
pertains to the younger adult group, whereas the interaction of age group and baseline Stroop 




in the data, which was not the case (χ2 = 0.41, p > .05). This indicates that the response 
suppression aspect of inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task was not 
predictive of false hearing after controlling for age, processing speed, and best-ear PTA. All 
predictors were non-significant in this final model (ps > .05) aside from best-ear PTA, which was 
marginally significant (OR = 1.42, z = 1.93, p = .05). 
As was true in false memory, executive functioning was a significant predictor of false 
hearing. After controlling for age group and best-ear PTA, a one standard deviation increase in 
executive functioning reduced the odds of false hearing by a factor of 2.53 (z = -4.20, p < .001). 
Age group was not a significant predictor of false hearing after controlling for executive 
functioning and best-ear PTA (OR = .90, z = -.32, p > .05), again suggesting that differences in 
executive functioning fully accounted for age-related differences in false hearing. Best-ear PTA 
was also non-significant after controlling for age group and executive functioning (OR = 1.31, z 
= 1.54, p > .05). Additionally, adding executive functioning to the model of inhibitory control 
including age group, baseline/incongruent Stroop reaction times, the group by baseline Stroop 
interaction, and best-ear PTA improved model fit (χ2 = 18.94, p < .001), indicating that executive 
functioning was predictive of susceptibility to false hearing even after controlling for age, 
processing speed, the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control as assessed by the 
auditory Stroop task, and hearing acuity. However, as discussed above, the results of an EFA 
suggested that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task tapped into a different 
latent construct than the executive functioning battery. Therefore, as with false memory, I cannot 
conclude from this analysis that executive functions other than the response suppression aspect 
of inhibitory control were significantly related to susceptibility to false hearing. In this model, 
both executive functioning (OR = .38, z = -4.51, p < .001) and the group by baseline Stroop 
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reaction time interaction (OR = .41, z = -2.02, p < .05) were significant, but all other predictors 
were non-significant (ps > .05). 
To determine whether the relationship between false hearing and false memory could be 
fully accounted for by individual differences in executive functioning, I tested whether the 
relationship between false hearing and false memory remained significant after controlling for 
executive functioning. For this analysis, I conducted a new mixed-effects logistic regression 
model with age group, average susceptibility to false memory, and score on the executive 
functioning battery as predictors of false hearing. Susceptibility to false hearing was allowed to 
vary randomly across subjects and items. If the relationship between false hearing and false 
memory remained significant after controlling for executive functioning, this would indicate that 
factors above and beyond those captured by the executive functioning battery contributed to the 
relationship between false hearing and false memory. In this model, both executive functioning 
(OR = .52, z = -2.88, p < .01) and false memory (OR = 1.70, z = 3.87, p < .001) were 
independently predictive of false hearing after controlling for age group. Age group was not 
significant after controlling for average susceptibility to false memory and executive functioning 
score (OR = 1.14, z = .53, p > .05). This suggests that despite being predictive of both false 
hearing and false memory, executive functioning cannot fully account for the relationship 
between these two phenomena. Additionally, it suggests that the executive functioning battery 
accounted for unique variance in false hearing that was not accounted for by susceptibility to 
false memory. Therefore, it is possible that aspects of the executive functioning battery tapped 
into variability in susceptibility to false hearing related to individual differences in speech 




2.2.5 MPT modeling 
2.2.5.1  Memory task 
Beginning with the memory task, I found that neither the model in which the capture parameter 
was constrained to 0 (G2(18) = 475.17, critical = 52.75, BIC = 530.79) nor the model in which 
the capture parameter was freely estimated (G2(17) = 425.08, critical = 51.49, BIC = 489.97 ) – 
which I will refer to simply as the capture model – provided good fits to the data. However, the 
capture model did provide significantly better fit to the data than did the model that did not 
include the capture parameter (ΔG2(1) = 50.09, critical = 27.23). This, in addition to the lower 
BIC value in the capture model than in the model without capture, suggests that capture – 
interpreted as representing inhibitory control – influenced responding in the memory task. This 
finding may seem surprising given that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task 
was unrelated to susceptibility to false memory. Potential reasons for this discrepancy are 
outlined in the Experiment 1 discussion. 
Since MPT modeling can be overly sensitive to small deviations between the observed 
and estimated values when determining model fit (see Millar et al., 2018), I plotted the observed 
and predicted values for the capture model to determine whether its fit was as poor as the G2 
value would suggest (see Figure 11). The plot suggests that the capture model generally did a 
good job of predicting responses in the memory task, although there were some deviations for 
hits judged as remembered/known in the baseline and congruent conditions and false memory 
responses in the incongruent condition. However, it is important to note that this was the most 
basic model in which none of the parameters were allowed to deviate between younger and older 
adults. Since younger and older adults differed in their responding in the memory task, we would 




 To assess whether individual parameters in the capture model differed between age 
groups, I created models in which each individual parameter was allowed to vary between age 
groups while the other parameters were held constant and compared these models to the base 
capture model in which all parameters were held constant. I found significant age differences in 
capture (ΔG2(1) = 245.59, critical = 27.22, BIC = 253.66), recollection (ΔG2(1) = 78.43, BIC = 
420.81), accessibility bias (ΔG2(1) = 60.61, BIC = 447.90), and attribution threshold (ΔG2(1) = 
176.58, BIC = 322.66), but not in word generation (ΔG2(1) = .61, BIC = 507.90). Looking at the 
individual parameter estimates revealed that older adults were more likely to be captured by 
Figure 11. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the 
base capture model of memory. FM = false memory; Other = responses other than the target 




context than younger adults (.37 vs. .01), were more likely to recollect the target word than 
younger adults (.46 vs. .32), had greater accessibility bias than younger adults (in baseline 
condition: .44 vs. .34; in congruent/incongruent conditions: .85 vs. .74), and were more likely to 
characterize their responses as remember or know than younger adults (.80 vs. .62). While the 
finding that older adults were deemed more likely to recollect the target word than younger 
adults may seem to contradict past findings of age-related declines in memory (for a review, see 
Nyberg et al., 2012), this merely indexes older adults’ better performance in the baseline 
condition of the memory task relative to younger adults. Since the presentation-time 
manipulation in the study phase (i.e., showing older adults the word pairs for 3000 ms vs. 1000 
ms for younger adults) resulted in better performance by older, relative to younger, adults in the 
present study, this difference was reflected in the MPT model. 
 Finally, I created models allowing all possible combinations of parameters to differ 
across younger and older adults to determine which model best fit the memory task data. Table 5 
lists the G2 and BIC values for each of these models. Comparing these models based on their 
BIC values, the best fitting model allowed for group differences in capture and recollection. This 
model is parsimonious, suggesting that only two of the five parameters needed to be allowed to 
differ across age groups to best account for the observed data. It should be noted that this model 
was still classified as a poor fit to the data according to its G2 value (G2(15) = 63.91, critical = 
48.93). However, as can be seen in Figure 12, the model did a much better job of predicting 
responses than the most basic capture model, with only minor deviations between the observed 
and predicted response counts. Thus, I believe that the model accounting for age differences in 





Fit statistics for each MPT model in the memory task 
Parameters allowed to vary G2 BIC 
None 425.08 489.97 
C 179.49 253.66 
R 346.65 420.81 
A 364.47 447.9 
W 424.47 507.9 
AT 248.5 322.66 
C, R 63.91 147.34 
C, A 164.24 256.94 
C, W 178.89 271.59 
C, AT 138.48 221.91 
R, A 312.68 405.38 
R, W 344.61 437.32 
R, AT 239 322.44 
A, W 362.7 464.67 
A, AT 160.86 253.56 
W, AT 247.86 340.57 
C, R, A 57.73 159.7 
C, R, W 61.38 163.36 
C, R, AT 62.97 155.68 
C, A, W 163.67 274.92 
C, A, AT 113.45 215.42 
C, W, AT 137.91 239.88 
R, A, W 308.48 419.72 
R, A, AT 160.79 262.77 
R, W, AT 238.4 340.37 
A, W, AT 159.77 271.02 
C, R, A, W 55.74 176.25 
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C, R, A, AT 57.47 168.71 
C, R, W, AT 60.7 171.95 
R, A, W, AT 159.75 280.27 
C, R, A, W, AT 55.35 185.13 
Note. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; C = Capture; R = Recollection; A = Accessibility bias; W 
= Word generation; AT = Attribution threshold. 
 
 
Figure 12. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the 
capture model of memory allowing group differences in capture and recollection. FM = false 




2.2.5.2  SPIN task 
Turning next to the SPIN task, I found that neither the model in which the capture parameter was 
constrained to 0 (G2(18) = 1889.32, critical = 62.99, BIC = 1946.67) nor the capture model 
(G2(17) = 1172.08, critical = 61.67, BIC = 1238.98) provided good fit to the data. However, once 
again the capture model provided significantly better fit to the data than did the model that did 
not include the capture parameter (ΔG2(1) = 717.24, critical = 36.08). This, along with the lower 
BIC value in the capture model than in the model without capture, suggests that inhibitory 
control – or another cognitive ability resulting the same pattern of responses – influenced 
responding in the SPIN task. Thus, as was true for false memory, results of the MPT modelling 
contradicted the findings of the auditory Stroop task, suggesting that inhibitory control may have 
influenced susceptibility to false hearing. Reasons for these contradictory findings are discussed 
below.  
I again plotted the observed and predicted values for the capture model to determine 
whether its fit to the SPIN data was as poor as the G2 value suggested (see Figure 13). The plot 
suggests that the basic capture model struggled to fit correct responses rated as hear or know, 
“other” responses (i.e., responses other than the target word or the pre-selected alternative to the 
target word), and false hearing responses rated as hear or know in the incongruent condition, but 
generally did well with other response types. However, since younger and older adults differed in 





 I next created models in which each individual parameter was allowed to vary between 
age groups while the other parameters were held constant and compared these models to the 
basic capture model in which all parameters were held constant to determine whether age groups 
differed in any of the parameters. I found age differences in capture (ΔG2(1) = 46.66, critical = 
36.08, BIC = 1201.88), hearing (ΔG2(1) = 41.53, BIC = 1207.01), and word generation (ΔG2(1) 
= 37.45, BIC = 1220.65), but not in accessibility bias (ΔG2(1) = 33.20, BIC = 1224.91) or 
attribution threshold (ΔG2(1) = 13.02, BIC = 1235.53). Looking at the individual parameter 
estimates revealed that older adults were more likely to be captured by context than younger 
Figure 13. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the 
base capture model of hearing. FH = false hearing; Other = responses other than the target 




adults (.49 vs. .39), were more likely to hear the word than younger adults (.60 vs. .53), and were 
less likely to generate the pre-selected alternative word in the baseline condition but more likely 
to do so in the congruent and incongruent conditions than younger adults (in baseline condition: 
.01 vs. .03; in congruent/incongruent conditions: .16 vs. .07). Again, while it may seem odd that 
older adults were classified as more likely to hear the target word than younger adults given past 
studies showing age-related hearing loss (Morrell et al., 1996; Sommers et al., 2011), this 
difference simply reflects older adults’ higher accuracy in the baseline condition of the SPIN task 
resulting because the SNRs chosen for each age group failed to equate performance. 
 Finally, I created models allowing all possible combinations of parameters to differ 
across younger and older adults. Table 6 lists the G2 and BIC values for each of these models. 
Comparing these models based on their BIC values, the best fitting model allowed for group 
differences in the capture, hearing, word generation, and attribution threshold parameters. This 
model was still classified as a poor fit to the data according to its G2 value (G2(12) = 1042.00, 
critical = 54.85). Additionally, as can be seen in Figure 14, the model still had trouble fitting 
correct responses rated as hear or know in the baseline and congruent conditions, “other” 
responses, and false hearing responses rated as hear or know in the incongruent condition. This 
suggests that there may be additional parameters beyond those considered here that are needed to 









Fit statistics for each MPT model in the SPIN task 
Parameters allowed to vary G2 BIC 
None 1172.08 1238.98 
C 1125.42 1201.88 
H 1130.55 1207.01 
A 1138.88 1224.91 
W 1134.63 1220.65 
AT 1159.06 1235.53 
C, H 1101.83 1187.86 
C, A 1096.5 1192.08 
C, W 1087.97 1183.55 
C, AT 1105.5 1191.52 
H, A 1104.21 1199.79 
H, W 1095.93 1191.51 
H, AT 1099.35 1185.37 
A, W 1101.83 1206.97 
A, AT 1138.6 1234.18 
W, AT 1127.8 1223.38 
C, H, A 1077.01 1182.15 
C, H, W 1066.6 1171.74 
C, H, AT 1066.99 1162.57 
C, A, W 1059.46 1174.16 
C, A, AT 1092.22 1197.36 
C, W, AT 1075.73 1180.87 
H, A, W 1069.91 1184.61 
H, A, AT 1092.93 1198.07 
H, W, AT 1074.32 1179.46 
A, W, AT 1101.08 1215.78 
C, H, A, W 1042.06 1166.32 
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C, H, A, AT 1061.74 1176.43 
C, H, W, AT 1042 1156.7 
H, A, W, AT 1065.08 1189.34 
C, H, A, W, AT 1034.48 1168.29 
Note. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; C = Capture; H = Hear; A = Accessibility bias; W = 





Figure 14. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the 
capture model of hearing allowing for group differences in the capture, hearing, word 
generation, and attribution threshold parameters. FH = false hearing; Other = responses other 




2.3 Experiment 1 discussion 
In Experiment 1, I successfully replicated findings of past studies of false memory (Jacoby et al., 
2005, Experiment 2) and false hearing (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). I found that 
older adults’ responses in both the memory and SPIN tasks were more likely to be based on 
available contextual cues than those of younger adults, as demonstrated by increased benefit 
from valid contextual cues and increased detriment from invalid contextual cues. Additionally, 
older adults were more susceptible than younger adults to both false memory and false hearing, 
showing that older adults were more likely to respond based on available contextual cues than 
younger adults even when these cues were invalid. 
The primary goal of Experiment 1 was to test the hypothesis that false hearing and false 
memory result from similar cognitive mechanisms. In support of this claim, I found a significant 
positive relationship between susceptibility to false hearing and susceptibility to false memory. 
This was the first demonstration of a direct relationship between these two phenomena. I then 
investigated the roles of two potential mechanisms that may underlie this relationship, each of 
which has been shown to be predictive of false memory in past studies: inhibitory control and 
executive functioning.  
Results with regards to inhibitory control were mixed. Inhibitory control as measured by 
the auditory Stroop task was not a significant predictor of either false memory or false hearing. 
This was surprising given that a relationship between inhibitory control and false memory was 
observed by Sommers and Huff (2003, Experiment 2) using the same auditory Stroop task.  
There are several potential explanations for why the predicted relationship between 
inhibitory control as measured by the auditory Stroop task and false hearing and false memory 
did not emerge in the present study. For example, it is possible that the auditory Stroop task was 
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not sensitive enough to pick up on age differences in inhibitory control. Whereas both younger 
and older adults experienced the typical Stroop effect (i.e., slower response time in the 
incongruent condition than in the baseline condition), there was no difference in the magnitude 
of the Stroop effect across groups, suggesting that younger and older adults did not differ in the 
response suppression aspect of inhibitory control. Since I observed significant age differences in 
susceptibility to both false hearing and false memory in the present study, the lack of age 
differences in the magnitude of the Stroop effect would mitigate the correlation between auditory 
Stroop performance and both false hearing and false memory. It is possible that the auditory 
Stroop task used in the present study accurately measured individual differences in the response 
suppression aspect of inhibitory control, in which case we would conclude that younger and 
older adults did not differ in this ability and that this ability was unrelated to susceptibility to 
false hearing and false memory. However, the lack of age differences in the Stroop effect in the 
present study was surprising given the extensive literature demonstrating an age-related decline 
in inhibitory control (Cohn et al., 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher et al., 1997; Jacoby et al., 
2005; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers & Danielson, 1999, Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, 
Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000) and the finding of increased interference in older, relative to 
younger, adults on an identical auditory Stroop task in the study by Sommers and Huff (2003, 
Experiment 2). The auditory Stroop paradigm has demonstrated inconsistency in detecting age 
differences in the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control. Whereas some studies using 
the auditory Stroop paradigm have found that older adults demonstrated greater interference than 
younger adults (Sommers & Danielson, 1999, Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, 
Experiment 2), two recent studies detected no age differences (Mazaheri et al., 2015; Vervoort et 
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al., 2019)8. The inconsistency of the auditory Stroop paradigm with regards to detecting age 
differences in inhibitory control raises the concern that the null age difference in the present 
study reflected lack of measurement sensitivity or reliability as opposed to lack of age 
differences in inhibitory control per se. Therefore, it could be the case that the ability to suppress 
a prepotent, but incorrect, response contributed to susceptibility to false hearing and false 
memory, but this ability was not accurately measured by the auditory Stroop task. 
 A second possible reason for the discrepancy in findings with regards to age differences 
in inhibitory control between the present study and the study by Sommers and Huff (2003, 
Experiment 2) was that the statistical methods used to analyze the data differed across the two 
studies. I used mixed-effects linear regression to analyze the Stroop data and mixed-effects 
logistic regression to determine the relationship between Stroop reaction times and susceptibility 
to trial-by-trial false hearing and false memory, whereas Sommers and Huff used repeated-
measures ANOVA to analyze their Stroop data and linear regression to determine the 
relationship between Stroop performance and average susceptibility to false memory. Mixed-
effects modeling has the benefit of accounting for within-subject variability by using individual 
trial outcomes as opposed to averages, but it is possible that accounting for this variability 
suppressed the effect observed by Sommers and Huff. To test this possibility, I re-ran my 
analyses using the same statistical method as Sommers and Huff. As in my original analyses, I 
 
8 In the studies by Mazaheri et al. (2015) and Vervoort et al. (2019), the auditory Stroop task 
involved listening to the words high and low spoken in high- or low-pitched voices and 
identifying the pitch of the voice, whereas the task in the studies by Sommers and Danielson 
(1999) and Sommers and Huff (2003) was to identify the gender of the speaker (male/female) 
saying the words male (father in Sommers and Danielson), female (mother), or person. 
Additionally, participants in the study by Mazaheri et al. (2015) completed the task while 
walking on a treadmill, whereas participants in the other studies completed the task while seated. 




found that there was a significant Stroop effect using repeated measures ANOVA, F(1,114) = 
163.71, p < .001. However, there was once again no difference across age groups in the 
magnitude of the Stroop effect, F(1,114) = .87, p > .05. Similarly, adding incongruent Stroop 
reaction time to a linear regression model with age group and average baseline Stroop reaction 
time did not improve model fit when predicting average susceptibility to either false memory, 
F(1,114) = 1.20, p > .05, or false hearing, F(1,114) = 2.48, p > .05, suggesting that the response 
suppression aspect of inhibitory control, as measured by the auditory Stroop task, was unrelated 
to these phenomena. Thus, differences in statistical methods cannot account for the failure to 
replicate Sommers and Huff’s findings in the present study. 
 Another difference between the present study and the study by Sommers and Huff (2003, 
Experiment 2) is the memory task that was used. I used the process dissociation task from Jacoby 
et al. (2005, Experiment 2), whereas Sommers and Huff used a phonological DRM paradigm. It 
is possible that different paradigms used to evoke false memories place different requirements on 
inhibitory control, and the process dissociation task I used required less inhibitory control, or a 
different aspect of inhibitory control, than a phonological DRM paradigm. There is evidence 
showing that susceptibility to false memories in the DRM paradigm is uncorrelated with 
susceptibility to false memories in the misinformation paradigm (Ost et al., 2013; Patihis et al., 
2018) and that there is no significant correlation between false memories evoked using semantic 
DRM paradigms and phonological DRM paradigms (Ballou & Sommers, 2008). Therefore, it is 
plausible that false memories evoked using different paradigms rely on different cognitive 
mechanisms. However, this would not account for the lack of age differences in the magnitude of 
the Stroop effect. The inconsistency of age differences in the Stroop effect between the present 
study and the study by Sommers and Huff makes it impossible to evaluate whether the failure to 
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replicate their findings resulted from differences in the Stroop task, the memory task, or 
elsewhere. 
 The results of the EFA showing that the Stroop difference score did not load onto the 
same latent factor as the measures of executive functioning raises further concerns regarding the 
auditory Stroop task as a measure of inhibitory control. Since inhibitory control is typically 
considered a component of executive functioning (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007), we would expect it 
to load onto the same factor as other measures of executive functioning. Showing that this was 
not the case raises uncertainty regarding what the auditory Stroop task measured. It could be the 
case that auditory Stroop performance indexed an aspect of inhibitory control that was not 
captured by other measures of executive functioning in the present study, which would explain 
why these measures did not load onto the same factor. In their update of Hasher and Zacks’ 
(1988) original theory of inhibitory control, Lustig et al. (2007) detailed three distinct functions 
of inhibitory control: stopping irrelevant information from entering working memory, removing 
irrelevant information from working memory, and suppressing highly activated, but incorrect, 
responses. Therefore, it is possible that the auditory Stroop task tapped into a different 
component of inhibitory control than the measures included in the executive functioning battery. 
For example, the role of inhibitory control in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test may be to remove 
the previous sorting rule from working memory when it is no longer relevant, whereas the role of 
inhibitory control in the auditory Stroop task is thought to be to suppress the response activated 
by the spoken word. This conclusion is supported by past work showing that the number of 
categories achieved on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test loaded onto a different factor than 
Stroop interference (Boone et al., 1998; Pineda & Merchan, 2003; Rodríguez-Aranda & Sundet, 
2006). However, Rodríguez-Aranda and Sundet (2006) also found that Stroop interference 
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loaded onto the same factor as the number of words generated on the COWAT, another of the 
measures included in the executive functioning battery. I found no correlation between Stroop 
interference and the number of words generated on the COWAT in the present study, and found 
that these variables loaded onto different factors in the EFA. Given that relationships between 
Stroop interference and other measures of executive functioning seem to be inconsistent or 
absent, this suggests that the auditory Stroop task measured something that was not captured by 
the executive functioning battery. It is possible, for example, that differences in reaction time 
between the baseline and incongruent conditions of the auditory Stroop task indexed something 
other than inhibitory control, like general confusion or strategic slowing to avoid errors. Due to 
the uncertainty surrounding the sensitivity and validity of the auditory Stroop task as a measure 
of inhibitory control in the present study, researchers should be cautious when interpreting 
findings involving the auditory Stroop task. 
 Although results involving the auditory Stroop task indicated that the response 
suppression aspect of inhibitory control might be unrelated to false hearing or false memory, 
evidence for the role of inhibitory control in these phenomena was provided by the MPT models. 
Specifically, adding the capture parameter – interpreted by Jacoby et al. (2005) as representing 
inhibitory control – improved the fit of MPT models for both the SPIN task and the memory 
task. Additionally, as in the study by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2; see also Millar et al., 
2018 for more recent use of the capture model), the best-fitting MPT model to the memory data 
suggested that there were significant age differences in susceptibility to capture, supporting age 
differences in inhibitory control observed in past studies (Cohn et al., 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 
1988; Hasher et al., 1997; Jacoby et al., 2005; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers & Danielson, 1999, 
Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000). Therefore, 
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Experiment 1 provided some evidence for the role of inhibitory control in false hearing and false 
memory, and suggested that age differences in at least one aspect of inhibitory control may 
account, in part, for age differences in susceptibility to false memory. However, as described 
above, it is possible that the capture parameter may represent processes other than, or in addition 
to, inhibitory control, and thus this finding should be interpreted with caution. 
The MPT models also suggested a critical difference between responding in the memory 
task and responding in the SPIN task. Whereas age differences in the memory task could be 
accounted for by differences in the capture and recollection parameters, the best fitting model for 
the SPIN data allowed age differences in the capture, hearing, word generation, and attribution 
threshold parameters (i.e., all but the accessibility bias parameter). Even with this far more 
complex model, the capture model was still a poor fit to the SPIN data, whereas a much simpler 
model provided relatively good fit to the memory data. It is clear that additional parameters 
would be necessary to explain responding in the SPIN task. For example, given that hits 
characterized as hear/know tended to be overestimated in the baseline condition but 
underestimated in the congruent condition, specifying a separate hearing parameter in the 
baseline condition may help to resolve this issue. This change is theoretically justifiable given 
that participants may need to try harder to hear the target word in the absence of contextual cues, 
whereas the contextual cues may clue participants in to what sounds they should listen for in the 
congruent and incongruent conditions. Similarly, specifying a separate accessibility bias 
parameter in the congruent condition may help to resolve the tendency of the model to 
underestimate “other” responses in the baseline and incongruent conditions and overestimate 
“other” responses in the congruent condition. This change also makes sense given that we would 
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expect the target word to be particularly accessible in the congruent condition due to the 
availability of valid contextual cues. 
To test this hypothesis, I re-ran the MPT model for the SPIN task specifying these 
additional parameters. The basic capture model with no group differences between parameters 
was still classified as a poor fit to the data (G2(15) = 662.17, critical = 58.99, BIC = 748.19), but 
the predicted counts showed much closer correspondence to the observed counts than the models 
above that did not specify condition differences in hearing and accessibility bias (see Figure 15). 
Interestingly, the best-fitting model included group differences in only two parameters: 
accessibility bias and word generation. Older adults were more biased towards the most easily 
accessible word in all conditions (baseline = .58, congruent = .85, incongruent = .32) than were 
younger adults (baseline = .50, congruent = .73, incongruent = .18). Older adults were also more 
likely to generate the alternative word in the congruent and incongruent conditions than younger 
adults (.30 vs. .16), but the likelihood of  generating the alternative word in the baseline 
condition was approximately equivalent across groups (.01 vs. .03)9. This MPT model was also 
classified as a poor fit to the data (G2(10) = 519.96, critical = 51.97, BIC = 653.78), although 
there was very good correspondence between the predicted and observed counts (see Figure 16).  
 
9
 The likelihood of generating the alternative word in the baseline condition was much lower 
than in the combined congruent/incongruent conditions because the alternative word in the 
incongruent condition was the contextually predicted word (e.g., box for the sentence She put the 
toys in the fox). In the baseline condition, the alternative word was a phonological neighbor of 
the target word selected at the outset of the study, and there were no contextual cues from which 
to predict this word (e.g., cage for the sentence The word is page). Thus, the high predictability 
of the alternative word in the incongruent condition resulted in the higher word generation 




Figure 15. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the 
basic capture model of hearing specifying a different hearing parameter in the baseline 
condition and a different accessibility bias parameter in the congruent condition. FH = false 





When I re-ran the MPT analysis on the memory data with the same parameter changes, I 
found that the best fitting model was still one in which age differences were permitted in capture 
and recollection (G2(12) = 60.66, BIC = 171.90). Additionally, there was no significant 
difference in fit between the original best-fitting model presented in the Results section above 
and the more complex model described here (ΔG2(1) = 3.25, critical = 27.22), suggesting that the 
additional parameters needed to fit the SPIN data were not necessary to fit the memory data. 
Together with the findings above, this suggests that the parameters specified in the capture 
Figure 16. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the 
capture model of hearing specifying a different hearing parameter in the baseline condition 
and a different accessibility bias parameter in the congruent condition allowing age 
differences in accessibility bias and word generation. FH = false hearing; Other = responses 




model may be able to account for responding in both the memory and SPIN tasks, but increased 
model specificity is needed to accurately model responding in the SPIN task. Additionally, my 
findings suggest that different processes may underlie age differences in responding in the 
memory and SPIN tasks. Whereas age differences in the memory task could be accounted for by 
differences in susceptibility to capture and ability to recollect the studied word, differences in the 
SPIN task were best accounted for by differences in bias towards the most easily accessible word 
and in the likelihood of generating the pre-selected alternative word. Thus, while similar 
cognitive processes may be at work in both the memory and SPIN tasks, different processes may 
underlie age differences in the two tasks. 
Whereas evidence for the role of inhibitory control in false hearing and false memory was 
mixed, executive functioning demonstrated consistent and significant relationships with both 
phenomena. Specifically, participants who had better scores on the executive functioning 
composite tended to be less susceptible to both false memory and false hearing after controlling 
for age group. The relationship between executive functioning and false hearing also remained 
significant after accounting for individual differences in hearing acuity, lending further credence 
to the idea that false hearing results, in part, due to cognitive deficits as opposed to solely 
sensory deficits (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). Importantly, the relationship 
between age group and susceptibility to both false hearing and false memory became non-
significant after controlling for the executive functioning battery. This suggests that differences 
in executive functioning may be able to fully explain older adults’ increased susceptibility to 
false hearing and false memory observed here and in past studies (Balota et al., 1999; Jacoby, 
1999; Jacoby et al., 2005; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Mitchell et al., 2003; Roediger & Geraci, 
2007; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015; Watson et al., 2001). 
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Executive functioning also accounted for significant variance in both false hearing and 
false memory after controlling for the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control as 
indexed by the auditory Stroop task. Whereas this may seem to suggest that executive functions 
other than the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control played a role in false hearing and 
false memory, this conclusion requires additional investigation given the results of the EFA 
showing that the Stroop difference score did not load on the same latent factor as the measures of 
executive functioning. This indicates that the mechanism causing slowing in the incongruent 
condition of the auditory Stroop task relative to the baseline condition – be it the response 
suppression aspect of inhibitory control or some other process – was best considered separate 
from the latent executive functioning variable. Because of this complication, we cannot draw the 
conclusion that controlling for Stroop performance accurately partialled out variance attributable 
to the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control in the executive functioning battery. 
Therefore, it could be the case that differences in one or more aspects of inhibitory control that 
remained in the executive functioning battery after controlling for aspects of inhibition assessed 
by the auditory Stroop task accounted for the relationships between executive functioning and 
false hearing and false memory. However, it could also be the case that executive functions other 
than inhibitory control accounted for these relationships. This will be discussed further in the 
General Discussion. 
 Another novel contribution of the present study was an examination of the subjective 
experience of cases of false hearing using a hear/know/guess paradigm. I found that both 
younger and older adults were more likely to characterize cases of false hearing as heard than 
either known or guessed, suggesting that cases of false hearing may be accompanied by a 
subjective experience akin to veridical hearing. In the memory task, however, both younger and 
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older adults displayed relatively similar odds of characterizing false memories as remembered 
versus known or guessed. In fact, younger adults were numerically most likely to characterize 
cases of false memory as guessed and least likely to characterize cases of false memory as 
remembered, the opposite of the pattern observed for cases of false hearing. This suggests that 
there may be qualitative differences between experiencing false memory and experiencing false 
hearing, with false hearing being more easily confused with veridical hearing than false memory 
with veridical memory. 
It is possible that characteristics of the memory task used in the present study gave rise to 
the approximately equal likelihood of characterizing false memories as remembered, known, or 
guessed. Past studies have shown that the relative likelihood of characterizing false memories as 
remembered versus known depends on the task being used, with DRM paradigms using 
semantically related lists resulting in a higher rate of false memories characterized as 
remembered than known (Norman & Schacter, 1997, Experiment 1; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995, Experiment 2; Watson et al., 2003, Experiment 3), and DRM paradigms using 
phonologically related lists resulting in a higher rate of false memories characterized as known 
than remembered (Watson et al., 2003, Experiment 3). Therefore, it is possible that the high rate 
of false memories judged as known or guessed in the present study may result from features of 
the memory task itself as opposed to reflecting a common feature of all false memories. I believe 
that the high proportion of know and guess ratings in the memory task relative to the SPIN task 
resulted from it being easier to generate the contextually predicted word in this particular 
memory task. Specifically, the remaining letters in the fragment completion task limited the 
scope of plausible responses to words that could complete the fragment. For example, for the 
cue-fragment pair head – s--l-, there are a limited number of words that could complete the 
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fragment, increasing the likelihood of generating the response associated with false memory 
(scalp) when participants were not captured by context or responding based on accessibility, but 
rather were simply guessing a word that could plausibly complete the fragment. This could 
account for the higher proportion of false memory responses being characterized as known or 
guessed relative to remembered. In the SPIN task, however, the target word was fully masked by 
background noise and there was no constraint on what word could be provided as a response. 
Thus, participants may have been more likely to generate a response other than either the 
predicted word or the target word (i.e., an “other” response) unless they were able to hear (or 
falsely hear) the target word in the incongruent condition. This would result in the majority of 
cases of false hearing being characterized as heard as opposed to known or guessed. To test the 
hypothesis that participants were more likely to generate an “other” response in the incongruent 
condition of the SPIN task than of the memory task, I conducted an ANOVA with age group, 
task (memory vs. SPIN), and the age group by task interaction predicting proportion of “other” 
responses on incongruent trials. The age group by task interaction was significant, F(1,232) = 
18.47, p < .001, so I conducted t-tests within each age group to determine whether tasks differed 
in proportion of “other” responses. In support of my hypothesis, younger adults were more than 
nine times less likely to generate an “other” response in the memory task (M = .04) than in the 
SPIN task (M = .30), t(106.49) = 17.50, p < .001. Older adults were also less likely to generate 
an “other” response in the memory task (M = .03) than in the SPIN task (M = .21), t(79.10) = 
14.86, p < .001, but as indicated by the significant interaction in the ANOVA, the difference 
between tasks was smaller than for younger adults. This supports the conclusion that participants 
characterized more cases of false memory as known or guessed relative to cases of false hearing 
because the scaffolding provided in the memory task made it easier to generate the contextually 
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predicted word in cases where the participant could not remember (or falsely remember) the 
studied word. Therefore, differences observed in the subjective judgements of false hearing and 
false memory may reflect task differences as opposed to indicating differences in the subjective 
experience of these phenomena per se. 
Given that inhibitory control has previously been shown to be related to false memory 
(Colombel et al., 2016; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2) and is hypothesized to be a 
primary mechanism underlying false hearing in older adults (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 
2015), it was surprising that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task was 
unrelated to both false memory and false hearing in the present study. In Experiment 2, I further 
examined the potential role of inhibitory control in false hearing. First, I tested whether the 
predictive strength of sentences was related to the likelihood that false hearing would occur. 
Then I used eye-tracking to gain insight into how sentence context influenced activation of the 
sentence-final target word and to examine age differences in the ability to suppress this 
activation when context turned out to be invalid. 
Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
False hearing is often described as resulting from an inability to suppress an expected response, 
reflecting a failure of inhibitory control (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). Using the 
stimuli from Experiment 1 as an example, the sentence “She put the toys in the…” creates a 
strong expectation of what word should follow (box). In the case of incongruent sentences, the 
participant must then suppress their expectation of the word box to correctly hear the presented 
(but unpredicted) word fox. As described above, within the expanded version of the NAM (Luce 
& Pisoni, 1998) proposed by Sommers and Danielson (1999), increasing expectation based on 
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context can be thought of as increasing activation of the contextually predicted word in the 
mental lexicon. This increased activation due to expectation increases the likelihood of 
accurately hearing the predicted word when context is valid (i.e., in the congruent condition) and 
increases the likelihood of experiencing false hearing when context is misleading (i.e., in the 
incongruent condition). If false hearing results from an inability to suppress an expected 
response, then the likelihood of false hearing may depend, in part, on the predictive strength of 
the preceding sentence. Specifically, in the incongruent condition, sentences that are stronger 
predictors of a phonological neighbor of the sentence-final word should result in higher rates of 
false hearing due to increased activation of the predicted (but unpresented) word relative to less 
predictive sentences. 
Although the effect of predictive strength has yet to be investigated with regards to false 
hearing, it has been investigated in false memory. Indeed, in Deese’s (1959) seminal study that 
would later give rise to the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), the 
likelihood of falsely recalling a critical word in a list-memory paradigm was shown to be 
positively correlated with the associative strength between the words in the studied list and the 
critical word (backward associative strength; see Figure 17). More recently, this effect was 
replicated by Roediger et al. (2001b), who sought to determine which characteristics of critical 
words in the DRM paradigm were related to the likelihood of false recall. The authors found that 
backward associative strength was the best predictor of false recall and the second-best predictor 
of false recognition (after only veridical recall) in the DRM paradigm. Therefore, the degree to 
which a critical word is predicted by the words in the studied list is positively associated with the 




In Experiment 2, I explored the possibility that the predictive strength of sentence stimuli 
influenced the likelihood that false hearing would occur. I conducted analyses on data from both 
Experiments 1 and 2 to determine whether the cloze probability of sentences was predictive of 
susceptibility to false hearing. Cloze values were obtained from a sample of 34 participants on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for each sentence using a visual sentence-completion task. The 
sentence-final target words were removed from each sentence (e.g., She put the toys in the 
_____), and participants were instructed to type the first word that came to mind to complete 
each sentence. In line with past findings in false memory (Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001b), I 
predicted that incongruent sentences with higher cloze values – indicating greater predictive 
strength – would be more likely to result in false hearing than sentences with lower cloze values. 
This would support the activation-based account of false hearing described above drawing upon 
the NAM (Luce & Pisoni, 1998) and the findings of Sommers and Danielson (1999), suggesting 
Figure 17. The correlation (r = .87) 
between the likelihood of falsely 
recalling a given word and the 
likelihood of generating that word as 
an associate of other words in the list 
from Deese (1959). 
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that stronger contextual cues convey more activation to the predicted word than weaker 
contextual cues, increasing the likelihood of hearing the predicted word even when it is not 
presented. 
To supplement the cloze value analyses, I conducted a novel experiment to determine 
how activation of different response options changed in real time using eye-tracking in a visual 
world paradigm. The visual world task was similar to the SPIN task from Experiment 1, but 
while each sentence was played, four pictures were presented on the computer screen. The 
pictures depicted the target word (e.g., box), a phonological neighbor of the target word (e.g., 
fox), and two words that did not sound like the target word and were not predicted by the 
sentence context (e.g., key and paw). Using eye-tracking, I was able to determine how the 
proportion of fixations on each of the images changed over the course of the sentence and after 
the target word was presented. As mentioned above, the proportion of fixations on each image in 
the visual world paradigm can be used as a proxy for changes in activation, with a greater 
proportion of fixations relative to other images indicating higher activation (Tanenhaus et al., 
2000). Based on the findings of past studies using eye-tracking (Ito et al., 2018; Kukona, 2020), 
hearing incongruent sentences should lead to increased fixations on an image depicting the 
contextually predicted (but incorrect) word before the target word is presented, reflecting 
increased activation of the response supported by context. If participants are able to suppress the 
activation of the contextually predicted word when the unpredicted target word is presented, 
fixations on the image depicting the contextually predicted word should decrease and fixations 
on the image depicting the target word should increase following presentation of the target word. 
The eye-tracking data also allowed me to test for age differences in the response suppression 
aspect of inhibitory control by comparing younger and older adults’ likelihood of decreasing 
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their proportion of fixations on the contextually predicted image after the target word was 
presented in incongruent sentences. 
I formed specific hypotheses regarding how younger and older adults’ fixation patterns 
would change over the course of baseline, congruent, and incongruent sentences. In the baseline 
condition, I predicted that the proportion of fixations on each of the images should remain 
approximately equal until the target word was presented since there were no contextual cues 
upon which to form an expectation. After the target word was presented in the baseline 
condition, fixations on the target image should increase in accordance with participants’ ability 
to accurately hear the target word. In congruent and incongruent sentences, I hypothesized that 
both younger and older adults would become increasingly fixated on the contextually predicted 
image leading up to presentation of the target word, demonstrating increasing anticipatory 
activation of the word supported by context. I predicted that this increased focus on the 
contextually predicted image might be greater for older than for younger adults, reflecting older 
adults’ increased context-based responding, as demonstrated in Experiment 1 and in previous 
studies (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). Whereas fixations on the target image should 
continue to increase for both age groups once the target word was presented in the congruent 
condition, I predicted that age groups would differ in their reaction to the target word’s 
presentation in the incongruent condition. Specifically, I predicted that younger adults would 
decrease their proportion of fixations on the contextually predicted image and increase their 
fixations on the unpredicted target image after the target word was presented, reflecting their 
ability to suppress the activation of the expected word. Older adults, on the other hand, were 
expected to maintain or even increase their fixations on the contextually predicted image after 
the target word was presented in incongruent sentences, reflecting an inability to suppress the 
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activation of the expected word. This finding would support the theory that age differences in 
susceptibility to false hearing result, in part, from an inability to inhibit a prepotent response. 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
Participants were 23 younger adults ages 18-29 (M = 21.00, SD = 2.68) and 19 older adults ages 
66-81 (M = 73.31, SD = 4.45). I had planned to collect 30 participants in each age group, but 
data collection had to be halted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. All participants completed the 
demographics form described in Experiment 1 and the Shipley Vocabulary Test (Shipley, 1940). 
Younger (M = 33.04, SD = 3.04) and older adults (M = 34.42, SD = 3.91) displayed equivalent 
vocabulary knowledge, t(33.61) = -1.26, p > .05. As in Experiment 1, hearing thresholds were 
assessed for octave frequencies from 250 to 8000 Hz in a sound-attenuating booth using standard 
audiometry. Older adults (M = 23.68, SD = 11.78) had poorer best-ear PTAs (500/1000/2000 Hz 
frequencies) than younger adults (M = 4.42, SD = 3.39), t(20.47) = -6.90, p < .001. All 
participants were native English speakers who did not require the use of a hearing aid and self-
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
3.1.2 Materials 
Materials were baseline, congruent, and incongruent sentences from the SPIN task in Experiment 
1 in which the target words could easily be depicted in picture form. Periods of silence of 
different lengths were inserted at the start of each sentence so that the onset of the target word 
began at the same time on each trial to facilitate eye-tracking analyses. Four images were 
gathered for each sentence: one depicting the target word (e.g., box for the sentence She put the 
toys in the box), one depicting a semantically unrelated phonological neighbor of the target word 
that acted as the target word in incongruent sentences (alternative image; e.g., fox), and two 
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semantically unrelated foil words that did not sound like the target word (e.g., key and paw)10. 
The length, frequency, phonological neighborhood density, and concreteness of target words 
were collected from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007), and averages across 
sentence conditions are presented in Table 7. Target words did not differ significantly in terms of 
any of these lexical characteristics across sentence conditions, all ps > .05. Additionally, the 
alternative word and foil words were matched with the target word based on these lexical 
characteristics within each sentence type, ps > .05. 
Table 7 
Means and standard deviations of lexical characteristics of target words across conditions 
 Baseline Congruent Incongruent 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Length 4.20 .76 4.37 .85 4.23 1.01 
Frequency 33,266.53 77,434.77 28,985.50 44,531.67 32,123.90 44,336.55 
Phono N 19.07 9.45 18.67 9.89 20.80 11.16 
Concreteness 4.66 .26 4.71 .41 4.61 .39 
Note. Phono N = Phonological neighborhood density 
 
I selected an image depicting each target word, alternative word, and foil word, and 
resized each image to 300 x 300 pixels. For images that did not have equal width and height, a 
white border was added to the shorter dimension to achieve the 300 x 300 size. I conducted a 
pilot test to ensure that all images to be used in the visual world task were identifiable as the 
words they were meant to depict. Twenty younger adults participated in this pilot study. First, 
 
10
 Two foil images were included on each trial as opposed to including a second phonological 
neighbor or a semantic competitor of the target word so that participants would not divide their 
fixations across two images tapping the same source of information (semantic or phonological). 
This allowed for clearer assessment of how fixations were impacted by semantic congruency and 
phonological similarity.  
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participants completed a study phase in which they saw each image along with the word the 
image was meant to depict for 2000 ms. Participants then completed a test phase wherein each 
written word was presented at the center of the screen one at a time along with four images. One 
of the images depicted the written word at the center of the screen, and the other three images 
were the images paired with the initial image on trials in the Experiment 2 SPIN task. For 
example, when the target word was fox, the four images on screen depicted a fox, a box, a key, 
and a paw, and the same four images were presented when the target word was box, key, and 
paw. The images were randomly assigned to one of the four quadrants of the screen. Participants 
were tasked with clicking on the image that depicted the word at the center of the screen. 
Average accuracy for identifying the image depicting each target word was 99.42%. In fact, only 
two images were identified correctly in less than 90% of cases, one of which was only used in 
the practice trials of the SPIN task (joker, Accuracy = 75%) and the other was a foil (till, 
Accuracy = 70%). Given the high identification accuracy of virtually all images in the pilot study 
and the similarity of the pilot study’s procedure to that of the SPIN task in Experiment 211, I felt 
confident that participants would associate each image with the word they were intended to 
depict in the SPIN task. 
Initial pilot testing revealed that accuracy on the SPIN task was at ceiling in the baseline 
condition for younger adults using the -4 dB SPL SNR from Experiment 1 (M = .93), and older 
adults’ performance at the +1 dB SPL SNR from Experiment 1 was also higher than the desired 
.50 (M = .73). It was important to ensure that baseline performance was not too high so that 
participants had room to improve with the addition of congruent context and so that there was 
 
11
 The only difference between the procedure of the pilot study and the SPIN task in Experiment 
2 was that target words were visually presented at the middle of the screen in the pilot study 
whereas target words were presented aurally in noise at the end of sentences in the SPIN task. 
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enough ambiguity as to the identity of the target word for false hearing to occur. The high 
accuracy in Experiment 2 was unsurprising given that the SPIN task was a four-alternative 
forced-choice test as opposed to the open-set response format of Experiment 1. Further pilot 
testing was conducted to determine what SNRs should be used to equate performance in younger 
and older adults. It was determined that an SNR of -10 dB SPL for younger adults and -7 dB SPL 
for older adults would achieve approximately equal performance across groups with accuracy 
that left room for improvement from the baseline condition to the congruent condition. 
3.1.3 Procedure 
Participants first completed the demographic questionnaire and the audiogram inside a sound-
attenuating booth. Then participants were seated at an EyeLink 1000 eye-tracking-enabled 
computer, where they completed the Shipley Vocabulary Test (Shipley, 1940) before beginning 
the visual world task. Participants placed their chins on a chinrest with their foreheads against a 
forehead rest to complete the visual world task. The distance from the back of the forehead rest 
to the eyepiece of the eye-tracker was 52.07 cm and the distance from the back of the forehead 
rest to the center of the computer monitor was 57.78 cm. Participants first completed a study 
phase wherein each image to be shown in the visual world task was shown with the word the 
image was meant to depict for 2000 ms to ensure that participants knew what each image 
represented. Participants then completed three practice trials, followed by 90 test trials, equally 
divided between the three sentence types (baseline/congruent/incongruent). Each trial began 
when the participant clicked on a central fixation cross. On each trial, a sentence was played 
through headphones with the final word in noise, and the four images associated with that 
sentence were presented on screen, one randomly assigned to each quadrant (see Figure 18). 
Participants were instructed to look at and click on the image corresponding to the word 
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presented in noise, and were told that they could move their eyes freely about the screen as long 
as the images were displayed. Images remained on screen until the participant clicked on one of 
them. After clicking on an image, participants clicked on a number from one to five to indicate 
their confidence that they had selected the correct image, where one indicated a complete guess 
and five indicated absolute certainty. 
 
 The eye-tracker was calibrated immediately before test trials to ensure accurate eye-
tracking. For the calibration task, dots appeared at 13 different locations on the screen and 
participants were tasked with fixating on each dot when it appeared and continuing to look at the 
dot until it disappeared. Participants completed the calibration task until it had been rated a 
“good” calibration by the EyeLink program, then completed an additional validation calibration 
to ensure that calibration was consistently accurate. 
Figure 18. An example of the screen during the visual world task for the 





I first analyzed age differences in accuracy across the baseline, congruent, and incongruent 
conditions using the same analyses as in Experiment 1. Average accuracy in the baseline, 
congruent, and incongruent conditions is presented in Figure 19. Younger and older adults 
differed significantly in their accuracy in the baseline condition, but unlike in Experiment 1, 
younger adults displayed better baseline accuracy than older adults (OR = .64, z = -2.05, p < .05). 
As expected, younger adults displayed improved performance in the congruent condition (OR = 
3.17, z = 2.67, p < .01) and poorer performance in the incongruent condition (OR = .29, z = -
3.25, p < .01) relative to the baseline condition. As in Experiment 1, however, older adults 
experienced significantly greater benefit in the congruent condition (OR = 6.62, z = 4.15, p < 
.001) and significantly greater detriment to performance in the incongruent condition (OR = .43, 
z = -2.63, p < .01) relative to baseline than did younger adults. These results replicate those from 
Experiment 1 and support the argument that older adults’ performance was influenced more by 




3.2.2 False hearing 
I next employed the same statistical analysis as in Experiment 1 to determine whether younger 
and older adults differed in susceptibility to false hearing. As shown in Figure 19, both younger 
and older adults experienced false hearing. The odds that a younger adult would experience false 
hearing on incongruent trials was equivalent to the odds of giving any other response combined 
(OR = .98, z = -.05, p > .05). Older adults were more than four times as likely to experience false 
hearing than were younger adults, which was significant (OR = 4.04, z = 3.47, p < .001).  
I also analyzed the odds of experiencing false hearing with maximum confidence – 
referred to in past studies as dramatic false hearing (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015) – 
in younger and older adults (see Figure 19). The odds that a younger adult would experience 
dramatic false hearing was far less than the odds of giving any other response in the incongruent 
condition combined (OR = .03, z = -8.14, p < .001). Similar to previous studies (Rogers et al., 
Figure 19. Average proportion of hits and susceptibility to false hearing (FH) and dramatic 




2012; Sommers et al., 2015), the odds that older adults would experience dramatic false hearing 
was more than 10 times greater than for younger adults (OR = 10.46, z = 4.97, p < .001). Thus, 
despite having an image depicting the correct target word presented on screen, both younger and 
older adults incorrectly reported hearing the contextually predicted word in over 50% of 
incongruent sentences, with older adults doing so more often and being far more likely to report 
maximum confidence in these errors than younger adults. 
3.2.3 Confidence 
3.2.3.1  Accurate responses 
To determine whether sentence condition and age group differences existed for confidence in 
accurate responses, I created a linear mixed-effects regression model using the lmer function 
from the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2015) using a subset of data that included only accurate 
responses. As in the accuracy analyses, the model included an intercept term corresponding to 
confidence in accurate responses for younger adults in the baseline condition, two dummy coded 
variables indicating the change in confidence from the baseline condition to the congruent and 
incongruent conditions for younger adults, a group variable representing the change in 
confidence from younger to older adults in the baseline condition, and the interaction of group 
with the congruent and incongruent condition dummy codes to determine whether the change in 
confidence from the baseline condition to the congruent and incongruent conditions differed 
between younger and older adults. Confidence in the baseline condition and changes in 
confidence from the baseline condition to the congruent and incongruent conditions were 




Average confidence in accurate responses (hits) in the baseline, congruent, and 
incongruent conditions is presented in Figure 20. Younger adults expressed confidence slightly 
above a neutral rating for accurate responses in the baseline condition, with the model estimating 
an average confidence of 3.53 out of 5. Younger and older adults’ confidence did not differ in 
the baseline condition (ED = .06, t = .32, p > .05). Younger adults’ confidence did not differ in 
either the congruent condition (ED = .10, t = .43, p > .05) or the incongruent condition (ED = -
.23, t = -1.10, p > .05) relative to the baseline condition. Additionally, the difference in 
confidence between the baseline and incongruent conditions did not differ in older adults relative 
to younger adults (ED = -.02, t = -.18, p > .05). However, there was a significant interaction 
suggesting that older adults’ confidence increased to a greater degree than younger adults’ from 
the baseline condition to the congruent condition (ED = .39, t = 2.18, p < .05). Overall, these 
findings suggest that participants’ confidence in accurate responses remained quite stable 
regardless of the context condition, aside from higher confidence in the congruent condition by 
older, relative to younger, adults. This differs from in past studies (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers 
et al., 2015), where both younger and older adults have demonstrated lower confidence in 
accurate responses in the baseline condition than in the congruent condition. It is possible that 
changing to a four-alternative forced-choice paradigm resulted in the consistently high 
confidence in accurate responses in the present study. For example, if a participant thought they 
heard the word box, they might be more confident in that response because an image of a box 
was among the four options on screen. Therefore, the feedback provided by images on screen 




3.2.3.2  False hearing responses 
I then conducted a second linear mixed-effects regression analysis to determine whether younger 
and older adults differed in their confidence in cases of false hearing. This model was conducted 
on a subset of data that included only cases of false hearing on incongruent trials. The model 
included an intercept term corresponding to younger adults’ confidence in cases of false hearing 
and a dummy-coded group variable indicating the change in confidence from younger to older 
adults. Confidence in cases of false hearing was allowed to vary randomly across subjects and 
items. 
Although there was little difference between age groups for confidence in accurate 
responses, younger and older adults did differ in their confidence in cases of false hearing (see 
Figure 20). Younger adults expressed approximately neutral confidence in cases of false hearing, 
Figure 20. Average confidence in hits in the baseline, congruent, and incongruent conditions, 
and in cases of false hearing (FH) in the incongruent condition for younger and older adults. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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with the model estimating an average confidence of 3.12 out of 5. Older adults’ estimated 
average confidence in cases of false hearing was .81 higher than that of younger adults, which 
was a significant difference (t = 4.08, p < .001). Thus, older adults were both more susceptible to 
and more confident in cases of false hearing than were younger adults. 
3.2.4 Cloze value analyses 
The analysis of the effect of cloze value on susceptibility to false hearing was conducted with 
mixed-effects logistic regression using the glmer function from the lme4 package in R (Bates et 
al., 2015). A similar analysis could have been conducted to examine the relationship between 
cloze value and the odds of an accurate response in the congruent condition, but since 
participants displayed nearly perfect accuracy in the congruent condition in both experiments, it 
was unlikely that there would be sufficient variability for a relationship to emerge. For this 
reason, I focused on the relationship between cloze value and susceptibility to false hearing. 
Since I was specifically interested in false hearing, this analysis was conducted on a subset of 
data that included only incongruent trials. The predictors of trial-by-trial false hearing in the 
model were cloze value standardized across incongruent sentences, age group, and the cloze 
value by age group interaction. Susceptibility to false hearing and the effect of cloze value were 
allowed to vary randomly across participants. Susceptibility to false hearing was not allowed to 
vary randomly across items because this variance may be systematically related to cloze value as 
opposed to occurring randomly, so allowing false hearing to vary randomly across items may 
suppress the effect of cloze value. This analysis was conducted once using data from the SPIN 
task in Experiment 1 and again using data from the SPIN task in Experiment 2. For the analysis 
of Experiment 1 data, a dummy-coded counterbalancing variable and the interaction of 
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counterbalancing condition with cloze value were also included as predictors to account for 
differences in average cloze value across counterbalancing conditions. 
Looking first at the data from the SPIN task in Experiment 1, I found that the interaction 
between cloze value and age group was non-significant, so I dropped the interaction term from 
the model to allow for interpretation of main effects. In the updated model, the interaction 
between cloze value and counterbalancing condition was significant (OR = 1.31, z = 3.85, p < 
.001), so I analyzed the effect of age group and cloze value separately within each 
counterbalancing condition. The interaction of age group and cloze value was not significant in 
the first counterbalancing condition (OR = .95, z = -.47, p > .05) or the second counterbalancing 
condition (OR = .85, z = -1.61, p > .05), so the interaction terms were dropped from the models. 
In the first counterbalancing condition, a one standard deviation increase in cloze value increased 
the odds of false hearing by a factor of 1.13, which was significant (z = 2.37, p < .05). Age group 
was also a marginally significant predictor of false hearing after controlling for differences in 
cloze value in the first counterbalancing condition (OR = 1.46, z = 1.79, p < .07), suggesting that 
older adults tended to be more susceptible to false hearing than younger adults controlling for the 
cloze value of sentences. In the second counterbalancing condition, cloze value had an even 
greater effect on susceptibility to false hearing: A one standard deviation increase in cloze value 
increased the odds of false hearing by a factor of 1.53 (z = 7.78, p < .001). Age group was not a 
significant predictor of false hearing after controlling for differences in cloze value in the second 
counterbalancing condition (OR = 1.31, z = 1.00, p > .05). Thus, although the magnitude of the 
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effect of cloze value differed across counterbalancing conditions12, more predictive sentences 
were more likely to evoke false hearing in Experiment 1.  
Interestingly, the interaction between cloze value and age group was marginally 
significant in Experiment 2 (OR = .77, z = -1.99, p = .05). To investigate this interaction, I tested 
the relationship between cloze value and false hearing separately in each age group. Younger 
adults in Experiment 2 looked much like the participants in Experiment 1, with a one standard 
deviation increase in cloze value increasing the odds of false hearing by a factor of 1.39 (z = 
4.07, p < .001). However, there was no significant relationship between cloze value and false 
hearing for older adults (OR = 1.09, z = .81, p > .05). Thus, the predictive strength of contextual 
cues was positively related to susceptibility to false hearing in all cases except for older adults in 
Experiment 2. A possible reason for the absence of a relationship between cloze value and 
susceptibility to false hearing for older adults in Experiment 2 is detailed in the Experiment 2 
discussion. 
The use of the hear/know/guess paradigm in the SPIN task from Experiment 1 also 
allowed me to test whether sentences that were more predictive were more likely to result in 
false hearing experiences characterized as heard relative to known or guessed. To test this 
hypothesis, a mixed-effects multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted using the 
brm function from the brms package in R (Bürkner, 2017). Age group, standardized cloze value, 
the age group by standardized cloze value interaction, counterbalancing condition, and the 
counterbalancing condition by standardized cloze value interaction were entered as predictors. 
 
12 The magnified effect of cloze value in the second counterbalancing condition may have 
occurred because sentences were slightly more predictive on average in this condition relative to 
the first counterbalancing condition (.78 vs .76).  
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The odds of characterizing a response as heard relative to either known or guessed and the effect 
of cloze value on those odds were allowed to vary randomly across subjects.  
In the mixed-effects multinomial logistic regression model, the age group by standardized 
cloze value interaction was non-significant when comparing both know and hear judgments (OR 
= 1.07, 95% CI = .80 – 1.41) and guess and hear judgements (OR = 1.10, 95% CI = .69 – 1.73), 
so it was removed as a predictor. The interaction between counterbalancing condition and cloze 
value was also non-significant when comparing guess and hear judgements (OR = 1.09, 95% CI 
= .69 – 1.75) but was significant when comparing know and hear judgements (OR = .68, 95% CI 
= .51 – .89), so this interaction was left in the model. The counterbalancing condition by cloze 
value interaction remained significant when comparing know and hear judgements in the updated 
model (OR = .68, 95% CI = .51 – .90), so I conducted the analysis again within each 
counterbalancing condition.  
In the first counterbalancing condition, the odds of characterizing a false hearing 
response as known relative to heard increased significantly as cloze value increased (OR = 1.26, 
95% CI = 1.04 – 1.56), an effect in the opposite direction of what I had predicted. Cloze value 
was unrelated to the odds of characterizing a false hearing response as guessed relative to heard 
(OR = .95, 95% CI = .57 – 1.79). In this counterbalancing condition, older adults were less likely 
than younger adults to characterize false hearing responses as known relative to heard controlling 
for cloze value (OR = .50, 95% CI = .29 – .83), but there was no difference between age groups 
for the odds of characterizing false hearing responses as guessed relative to heard (OR = 1.61, 
95% CI = .50 – 5.28).  
In the second counterbalancing condition, the odds of characterizing a false hearing 
response as known relative to heard did not vary significantly with cloze value (OR = .85, 95% 
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CI = .66 – 1.08), and the same was true for characterizing a false hearing response as guessed 
relative to heard (OR = .93, 95% CI = .64 – 1.44). Older adults were again less likely than 
younger adults to characterize false hearing responses as known relative to heard controlling for 
cloze value (OR = .39, 95% CI = .17 – .92), and there was no difference between age groups for 
the odds of characterizing false hearing responses as guessed relative to heard (OR = .63, 95% CI 
= .26 – 1.58). Therefore, across counterbalancing conditions, I did not observe the predicted 
increase in false hearing responses characterized as heard relative to known or guessed as 
sentences became increasingly predictive, and I observed the opposite effect for heard versus 
known responses in the first counterbalancing condition. A potential reason for these unpredicted 
effects is discussed below. 
3.2.5 Fixation analyses 
To determine changes in the proportion of fixations on each image across time in the visual word 
task, linear mixed-effects regression was used to analyze the proportion of fixations on each 
image following the analyses used in a recent eye-tracking study that employed a similar visual 
world paradigm (Ito et al., 2018). Separate analyses were conducted for each sentence type 
(baseline, congruent, incongruent). Sentences were divided into three 2000 ms bins for fixation 
analyses. The first bin started from 500 ms after the start of the trial since there were very few 
fixations on any of the images before this time (participants tended to still be looking at the 
central fixation cross). The second time bin started 2500 ms into the trial and continued until just 
before the target word was presented. The third time bin started 4500 ms into the trial, exactly 
when the target word onset. These three bins allowed me to determine the proportion of fixations 
on each image early in the sentence (bin 1), late in the sentence but before the target word was 
presented (bin 2), and from the presentation of the target word onwards (bin 3). Each mixed-
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effects model had 24 dummy coded variables corresponding to the four picture types (target 
image, alternative image, and two foil images) within each age group (younger/older adults) at 
each time bin as fixed effects predicting the proportion of fixations. Proportion of fixations was 
allowed to vary randomly across subjects and items for each image type within each time bin. 
Linear combinations of the fixed effects were tested using the multcomp package in R (Hothorn 
et al., 2008) to determine how the proportion of fixations on each image changed over time, and 
whether these changes differed across age groups. Since the target image and the alternative 
image (i.e., the contextually predicted image in incongruent sentences) were of primary interest 
to my hypotheses, I will focus on fixation trends for these image types in the Results section. For 
analysis of the fixation trends for the two unrelated foil images, see the Appendix. 
3.2.5.1  Baseline sentences 
The proportion of fixations over time for baseline sentences is presented in Figure 21. For 
baseline sentences, I predicted that fixations on the target image would not increase until time 
bin 3 since there were no contextual cues in baseline sentences to afford anticipatory activation 
to any particular response. This prediction was supported by the fixation analysis. In baseline 
sentences, there was no difference in fixations on the target image from time bin 1 to time bin 2 
(ED = .03, z = 1.48, p > .05), but fixations on the target image increased from time bin 2 to time 
bin 3 (ED = .27, z = 12.80, p < .001). There was no interaction with age group for the difference 
from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = .00, z = .08, p > .05) or from time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = 
.02, z = .74, p > .05). Therefore, as predicted, both younger and older adults only increased 
fixations on the target image after the target word had been presented in baseline sentences, 
demonstrating that neither group experienced anticipatory activation of the target word when no 




I next considered changes in the proportion of fixations on the alternative image (i.e., the 
image depicting the phonological neighbor of the target word). In baseline sentences, there was a 
significant reduction in fixations on the alternative image from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = -
.05, z = -2.24, p < .05). However, there was an interaction with age group (ED = .05, z = 2.68, p 
< .01) that revealed that older adults reduced fixations on the alternative image from time bin 1 
to time bin 2 (ED = -.05, z = -3.29, p < .01), whereas younger adults did not (ED = .00, z = .32, p 
> .05) . From time bin 2 to time bin 3, there was a marginally significant decrease in proportion 
of fixations on the alternative image (ED = -.04, z = -1.76, p = .08) and there was no significant 
interaction with group (ED = -.03, z = -1.22, p > .05), demonstrating that the proportion of 
fixations on alternative image decreased slightly as fixations on the target image continued to 
increase for both groups. 
Bin 3 Bin 2 Bin 1 
Figure 21. Proportion of fixations on each image type over time in baseline sentences for 
younger and older adults. The vertical line at 4500 ms represents the onset of the target word. 
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3.2.5.2  Congruent sentences 
For congruent sentences, I had predicted that both age groups would begin looking towards the 
contextually predicted target image before the target word was presented. Additionally, I 
predicted that older adults might increase their fixations on the target image to a greater degree 
than younger adults, reflecting increased influence of context over responding. As can be seen in 
Figure 22, these predictions were mostly supported by the fixation data. Fixations on the target 
image increased from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = .25, z = 12.98, p < .001) and again from 
time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = .26, z = 12.81, p < .001). Whereas there was no interaction 
between age group and the change in fixations from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = -.01, z = -.27, 
p > .05), there was an interaction with age group for the change in fixations from time bin 2 to 
time bin 3 (ED = -.15, z = -7.17, p < .001). For younger adults, there was a significant increase in 
proportion of fixations on the target image from time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = .06, z = 4.13, p < 
.001), but this increase was much greater for older adults (ED = .20, z = 13.69, p < .001). Thus, 
both younger and older adults increased fixations on the target image before the target word was 
presented, demonstrating anticipatory activation of the target word based on available contextual 
cues. Older adults increased fixations on the target image to a greater degree than younger adults, 
but only after the target word had been presented. This suggests that younger and older adults 
formed context-based expectations at a similar rate, but older adults became more fixated on the 
contextually predicted response once additional support for this response was provided by 
presentation of the target word. The greater increase in fixations on the target image after the 
target word was presented by older, relative to younger, adults suggests that older adults may use 
the auditory signal to confirm their context-based expectations. When the auditory signal 
supports the word they expected to hear, older adults become increasingly fixated on that 




 As fixations increased on the target image, the proportion of fixations on the alternative 
image decreased. Fixations decreased from time bin 1 to time bin 2 for the alternative image (ED 
= -.08, z = -4.13, p < .001) and there was no interaction with group (ED = -.02, z = -.84, p > .05). 
Fixations did not decrease significantly from time bin 2 to time bin 3 for the alternative image 
(ED = -.02, z = -.96, p > .05). However, there was a significant interaction with age group (ED = 
.06, z = 3.02, p < .01) indicating that younger adults did not reduce their fixations on the 
alternative image from time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = .02, z = 1.51, p > .05), whereas older 
adults did (ED = -.04, z = -2.73, p < .01). 
3.2.5.3  Incongruent sentences 
Finally, for incongruent sentences, I had again predicted that both younger and older adults 
would look towards the contextually predicted image before the target word was presented. In 
incongruent sentences, the alternative word was predicted by context as opposed to the target 
Figure 22. Proportion of fixations on each image type over time in congruent sentences for 
younger and older adults. The vertical line at 4500 ms represents the onset of the target word. 
Bin 3 Bin 2 Bin 1 
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word, so I predicted that fixations on the alternative image would increase before the target word 
was presented. Here again I had predicted that older adults would increase fixations on the 
alternative image to a greater degree than younger adults, reflecting greater influence of context 
over responding. After the target word was presented, I predicted that fixations on the alternative 
image would decrease and fixations on the target image would increase for younger adults as 
they realized that the presented target word differed from the contextually predicted word. 
However, I predicted that older adults would be less likely than younger adults to shift their 
focus towards the target image, instead either maintaining or increasing fixations on the 
alternative image, reflecting older adults’ poorer ability to suppress the expected response and 
increased susceptibility to false hearing in incongruent sentences. 
 Average fixations over time in incongruent sentences can be seen in Figure 23. As 
predicted, the proportion of fixations on the alternative image increased from time bin 1 to time 
bin 2 (ED = .17, z = 8.87, p < .001), whereas fixations on the target image did not increase (ED = 
-.02, z = -1.07, p > .05). There was no interaction with age group for the difference between time 
bin 1 and time bin 2 for fixations on the alternative image (ED = -.01, z = -.70, p > .05), but there 
was a marginally significant interaction for fixations on the target image (ED = -.04, z = -1.92, p 
= .05). This interaction reflected that younger adults significantly decreased fixations on the 
target image from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = -.03, z = -2.24, p < .05) whereas older adults’ 
fixations on the target image did not change (ED = .01, z = .57, p > .05). Interestingly, fixations 
increased from time bin 2 to time bin 3 for both the alternative image (ED = .04, z = 2.03, p < 
.05) and the target image (ED = .16, z = 7.65, p < .001). However, as predicted, there were 
significant interactions with age group for the difference in fixations from time bin 2 to time bin 
3 for both the alternative image (ED = -.14, z = -6.90, p < .001) and the target image (ED = .12, z 
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= 5.88, p < .001). Younger adults decreased fixations on the alternative image (ED = -.05, z = -
3.51, p < .001) and increased fixations on the target image (ED = .14, z = 9.75, p < .001) from 
time bin 2 to time bin 3. Older adults, however, increased fixations on the alternative image (ED 
= .09, z = 6.20, p < .001) and did not increase fixations on the target image (ED = .02, z = 1.23, p 
> .05) from time bin 2 to time bin 3. As can be seen in Figure 23, older adults only began to 
slightly decrease fixations on the alternative image and increase fixations on the target image at 
the very end of time bin 3, whereas younger adults made this change in fixations shortly after the 
target word had been presented. 
 
3.3 Experiment 2 discussion 
The findings of Experiment 2 were interesting for several reasons. This was the first study of 
false hearing to employ a four-alternative forced-choice test as opposed to using open-set 
Figure 23. Proportion of fixations on each image type over time in incongruent sentences for 
younger and older adults. The vertical line at 4500 ms represents the onset of the target word. 
Bin 3 Bin 2 Bin 1 
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responding. By having participants click on one of four images to indicate which word they 
heard in noise as opposed to saying the word aloud as in previous studies (Rogers et al., 2012; 
Sommers et al., 2015) or typing the word as in Experiment 1, I limited the range of words that 
participants had to consider in the perceptual process. This resulted in a substantially easier task, 
requiring the SNRs to be decreased to get similar baseline accuracy to that in Experiment 1. 
However, despite having an image depicting the target word on screen in incongruent sentences, 
participants – especially older adults – still experienced false hearing and even dramatic false 
hearing. This demonstrates the robust effects of context on speech perception: Even when the 
right answer was presented to participants in an image, younger adults still chose the 
contextually predicted (but incorrect) option on approximately 50% of incongruent trials, 
whereas older adults committed these context-based errors on approximately 70% of incongruent 
trials. 
 This was also the first study to test the relationship between the strength of contextual 
cues and susceptibility to false hearing, a relationship that has been observed in past studies of 
false memory (Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001b). As in false memory, the predictive strength 
of sentences in the SPIN task was positively related to the likelihood of experiencing false 
hearing in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 of the present study. This finding supports an 
activation-based account of false hearing. Specifically, this finding lends credence to Sommers 
and Danielson’s (1999) suggestion that hearing predictive contextual cues increases the 
activation of words in the mental lexicon that are compatible with the context. However, this 
finding expands upon Sommers and Danielson’s hypothesis by suggesting that the activation 
allotted to contextually predicted words is proportional to the predictive strength of the sentence. 
Thus, misleading sentences with greater predictive strength allotted more activation to the 
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contextually predicted (but unpresented) word, resulting in increased probability that the 
activation of the contextually predicted word would exceed that of the target word, resulting in 
false hearing. 
Interestingly, the relationship between cloze value and susceptibility to false hearing was 
not observed for older adults in Experiment 2. One possible reason for this null finding is that 
only one image was compatible with context on each incongruent trial. Even in cases where the 
context provided by incongruent sentences was a relatively weak predictor, the alternative image 
(e.g., the image depicting a box in the sentence She put the toys in the fox) was still the only one 
that fit with the semantic structure of the sentence. So, if older adults were more likely to 
respond based on context than younger adults, we would expect that they would select the 
contextually compatible image even in cases where context was a relatively weak predictor. By 
contrast, the open-set response format in Experiment 1 would allow older adults to generate 
semantically viable words other than the pre-selected alternative word, and thus weaker contexts 
would correspond to a lower probability of generating the specific alternative word. This would 
account for the positive relationship between cloze value and susceptibility to false hearing for 
older adults observed in Experiment 1 and the absence of a significant relationship in Experiment 
2. 
Although greater predictive strength of sentences was related to increased susceptibility 
to false hearing, it was not related to increased odds of characterizing false hearing responses as 
heard relative to known or guessed in Experiment 1. In fact, I found that the odds of 
characterizing false hearing responses as known relative to heard increased as predictive strength 
increased in one counterbalancing condition. It is possible that these unpredicted findings 
resulted from restriction of range of cloze values. Given that the above findings established that 
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sentences with greater predictive strength were more likely to evoke false hearing than those 
with weaker predictive strength, it is possible that including only data in which false hearing 
occurred limited the number of sentences with weaker predictive strength in the analysis. To test 
this possibility, I conducted the same mixed-effects multinomial regression model including all 
incongruent trials as opposed to just cases of false hearing to determine whether responses for 
incongruent sentences with stronger predictive strength were more likely to be rated as heard 
relative to known or guessed. It is important to note that this analysis included correct responses 
on incongruent trials, which would be predicted to occur more often for sentences with low cloze 
values (since sentences with high cloze values were more likely to result in false hearing) and to 
be rated as heard (since the auditory signal was the only source of information supporting this 
response). Thus, including these trials actually worked against my hypothesis that increasing 
cloze value should increase the proportion of responses rated as heard on incongruent trials.  
As in the original analysis, the age group by cloze value interaction was non-significant 
for the comparison of incongruent responses rated as heard versus known (OR = .95, 95% CI = 
.80 – 1.13) and heard versus guessed (OR = 1.07, 95% CI = .91 – 1.27), so it was removed from 
the model to allow for interpretation of the main effects. The interaction between cloze value and 
counterbalance condition was significant for the comparison of responses rated as heard versus 
guessed (OR = 1.31, 95% CI = 1.11 – 1.56), so I tested the effect of age group and cloze value 
within each counterbalancing condition. In the first counterbalancing condition, cloze value was 
unrelated to the odds of characterizing responses as known versus heard (OR = 1.05, 95% CI = 
.90 – 1.22), but more predictive sentences were less likely to be characterized as guessed than 
heard (OR = .63, 95% CI = .54 – .72). There were no age effects for the odds of classifying 
responses as known relative to heard (OR = 1.18, 95% CI = .66 – 2.08) or guessed relative to 
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heard (OR = .86, 95% CI = .49 – 1.47). In the second counterbalancing condition, cloze value 
was unrelated to the odds of characterizing responses as known versus heard (OR = .94, 95% CI 
= .83 – 1.06), but more predictive sentences were again less likely to be characterized as guessed 
than heard (OR = .82, 95% CI = .73 – .93). There were no age effects for the odds of classifying 
responses as known relative to heard (OR = 1.04, 95% CI = .53 – 1.98) or guessed relative to 
heard (OR = 1.03, 95% CI = .65 – 1.60) in the second counterbalancing condition. Therefore, as 
misleading sentences became more predictive and participants became more likely to commit a 
context-based error, the odds that participants would rate their responses as heard as opposed to 
guessed increased. This suggests that increasing the predictive strength of sentences altered the 
subjective experience associated with responses to be more similar to veridical hearing. 
 Finally, I presented eye-tracking data that provided the first visualization of the real-time 
processing that occurred during baseline, congruent, and incongruent sentences. I found that 
participants formed early expectations regarding what the target word would be in the congruent 
and incongruent conditions, increasing their fixations on the image supported by context before 
the target word was presented. Additionally, whereas older adults’ gaze tended to linger on the 
contextually predicted (but incorrect) image after the target word was presented in incongruent 
sentences, younger adults were more likely to shift their gaze to the correct target image. These 
findings align with the idea that one can be “captured” by available contextual cues, and that 
older adults are especially prone to being captured. These findings also support the role of the 
response suppression aspect of inhibitory control in false hearing, suggesting that older adults 




 One prediction that I had made at the outset of the study that was not reflected in the eye-
tracking data was increased expectation on the part of older adults relative to younger adults. 
Specifically, I predicted that older adults would increase fixations on the contextually predicted 
image to a greater degree than younger adults before the target word was presented in congruent 
and incongruent sentences. I found that older adults did display a greater proportion of fixations 
on the contextually predicted image, but only after the target word had been presented. This was 
true in both the congruent and incongruent conditions, leading to increased fixations on the 
correct image when context was valid and increased fixations on the incorrect image when 
context was misleading for older, relative to younger, adults. This finding suggests that younger 
and older adults formed expectations based on context at a similar rate, but older adults became 
disproportionately fixated on the contextually predicted image after the target word was 
presented. As described above, this may suggest that older adults used the auditory signal to 
confirm their context-based expectations, whereas younger adults were more willing to consider 
alternative responses to that predicted by context. 
Chapter 4: General discussion 
In the present study, I sought to learn more about the mechanisms underlying false hearing by 
drawing upon the more expansive false memory literature and using a diverse set of research 
methods, including behavioral assessments of performance, self-reports of subjective experience, 
analyses of individual differences, MPT modeling, and eye-tracking. It has been suggested that 
false hearing and false memory may rely upon similar cognitive mechanisms (Jacoby et al., 
2012; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015), but this was the first study to directly test this 
theory. I tested whether individual differences in two cognitive processes previously shown to be 
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predictive of false memory – inhibitory control (Colombel et al., 2016; Sommers & Huff, 2003, 
Experiment 2) and executive functioning (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade 
et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007) – were also predictive of false hearing. I then further 
examined the role of inhibitory control by testing whether the predictive strength of sentences 
was related to susceptibility to false hearing. Finally, I used eye-tracking to determine whether 
participants became increasingly fixated on the contextually predicted response over the course 
of sentences, and whether younger and older adults differed in their ability to suppress the 
activation of the predicted response when context turned out to be invalid. 
4.1 Relationship between false hearing and false memory 
Supporting the idea that false hearing and false memory share at least one underlying cognitive 
mechanism, I found a significant positive relationship between susceptibility to false hearing and 
susceptibility to false memory. Importantly, I also found that age group was not a significant 
predictor of false hearing after controlling for an individual’s average susceptibility to false 
memory. This finding supports the theory that age differences in a common cognitive 
mechanism, as opposed to age differences in sensory-specific or memory-specific mechanisms, 
gave rise to older adults’ increased susceptibility to false hearing and false memory relative to 
younger adults. 
 Whereas past studies have hypothesized that false hearing and false memory might rely 
on common cognitive mechanisms (Jacoby et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 
2015), the present study provided the first direct evidence for a relationship between the two 
phenomena. Showing that false hearing and false memory are correlated does not, however, 
identify what common mechanism(s) gave rise to these phenomena. To begin to investigate 
specific mechanisms, I tested the effects of two related cognitive abilities that have been 
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mentioned in past studies of false hearing as potential mechanisms underlying false hearing and 
false memory: inhibitory control and executive functioning. 
4.2 Evidence for mechanisms underlying the relationship 
between false hearing and false memory 
4.2.1 Inhibitory control 
To test the role of inhibitory control in false hearing and false memory, I first employed an 
auditory Stroop task that has previously been shown to be predictive of phonological false 
memory in the DRM paradigm (Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2). I did not replicate the 
relationship between the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control and false memory 
observed by Sommers and Huff, nor did I observe a relationship between this aspect of inhibitory 
control and false hearing. This suggests that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop 
task was not the common mechanism underlying false hearing and false memory. However, as 
stated above, it is possible that this null finding resulted from insensitivity of the auditory Stroop 
task to age differences in inhibitory control, lack of validity of the auditory Stroop task as a 
measure of inhibitory control, different demands placed on inhibitory control in the auditory 
Stroop task relative to the SPIN and memory tasks, or my use of a different memory task than 
Sommers and Huff. It is also plausible that the auditory Stroop task measured a different aspect 
of inhibitory control (see Lustig et al., 2007) than was involved in the incongruent conditions 
SPIN and memory tasks. For example, as will be described in further detail below, the results of 
the cloze and eye-tracking analyses suggest that false hearing results when participants are 
unable to suppress a highly activated (but incorrect) response, but interference on the auditory 
Stroop task may reflect the increased effort needed to stop the task-irrelevant spoken word from 
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entering working memory. Future studies should investigate which aspect of inhibitory control is 
measured by the auditory Stroop task to clarify this issue. 
 To further assess the role of inhibitory control in false hearing in the present study, I 
analyzed the relationship between the predictive strength of sentences (i.e., cloze values) and 
susceptibility to false hearing. Previous studies using the DRM paradigm have shown that the 
associative strength of studied list words to the critical word is highly predictive of false memory 
(Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001b). Roediger et al. (2001b) interpreted their findings within an 
activation/monitoring framework, which proposes that false memories arise when 1) an incorrect 
response becomes highly activated in memory due to its association with contextual cues, and 2) 
the individual is unable to distinguish whether this activation reflected a veridical memory trace 
or resulted from context (i.e., a failure of source monitoring). The authors argued that the 
stronger the association between the studied list words and the critical word, the more activation 
should spread from the list items to the critical word, and that the likelihood of falsely 
remembering the critical word should increase as the word became more highly activated. Within 
this framework, inhibitory control can be used to suppress the spread of activation from studied 
items to the unpresented critical word (Balota et al., 1999; Roediger et al., 2001a), and thus, 
individual differences in inhibitory control may be related to individual differences in 
susceptibility to false memory.  
This activation-based explanation for false memory is similar to an explanation I 
described above for false hearing based on the expanded version of the NAM (Luce & Pisoni, 
1998) proposed by Sommers and Danielson (1999, Experiment 2). Specifically, Sommers and 
Danielson suggested that inhibitory control is used to suppress activation of phonological 
neighbors of the spoken word in the mental lexicon, and that placing the spoken word within a 
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predictive semantic context reduces the need to inhibit semantically incongruent neighbors by 
selectively increasing the activation of the spoken word. I argued that false hearing may occur 
when a phonological neighbor of the spoken word is predicted by context whereas the spoken 
word is not – as in the incongruent condition of the SPIN task – thereby selectively increasing 
the activation of the contextually predicted phonological neighbor. This would increase reliance 
on inhibitory control to suppress activation of contextually predicted phonological neighbors to 
accurately hear the spoken word. In cases where the listener was unable to suppress the 
activation of the contextually predicted neighbor to a level less than the activation of the spoken 
word, false hearing could occur. Therefore, just as increasing activation of the critical word by 
strengthening its association with studied words increased susceptibility to false memory (Deese, 
1959; Roediger et al., 2001b), increasing the activation of a phonological neighbor of a spoken 
word by strengthening contextual cues predicting this neighbor may also increase susceptibility 
to false hearing. This was the first study to test this hypothesis. 
Whereas analyses using the auditory Stroop task as a predictor of false hearing and false 
memory suggested that the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control was not related to 
either phenomenon, the relationship between this aspect of inhibitory control and false hearing 
was supported by the cloze value analyses. Sentences that were stronger predictors of a 
phonological neighbor of the spoken target word were more likely to evoke false hearing than 
were less predictive sentences. This supports the hypothesis that false hearing occurs when 
context increases the activation of a phonological neighbor of the target word beyond the 
activation of the target word. However, given that even the most predictive sentences (Use a 
comb to fix your… and He got a letter in the… each with cloze values of 1.00 indicating that all 
participants completed the sentences with the same words, hair and mail) did not evoke false 
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hearing in all cases (Hair: MYounger = .27 and MOlder = .45; Mail: MYounger = .14 and MOlder = .21), 
participants may have been able to inhibit the activation gained from context to accurately hear 
the target word. Therefore, the cloze value analyses suggest that failure to sufficiently inhibit the 
activation of contextually predicted phonological neighbors of the spoken word in the mental 
lexicon may contribute to false hearing. This explanation aligns with activation-based theories of 
false memory (Balota et al., 1999; Roediger et al., 2001a). 
 The role of the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control in false hearing and the 
activation-based explanation of false hearing presented above are supported by the fixation data 
from the visual world paradigm used in Experiment 2. Increasing fixations on a particular image 
may represent increasing activation of the word that the image depicts (Tanenhaus et al., 2000). 
In incongruent sentences, the proportion of fixations on the contextually predicted alternative 
image increased as the sentence was played for both younger and older adults, suggesting that 
activation of the alternative image increased above the level of the other three response options 
because it alone fit with the semantic context. Once the target word was presented in the 
incongruent condition, younger adults decreased their fixations on the alternative image and 
increased fixations on the target image, representing their ability to inhibit activation of the 
contextually predicted alternative word to accurately hear the target word. Older adults, on the 
other hand, did not decrease their fixations on the alternative image or increase their fixations on 
the target image to the same extent as did younger adults, suggesting that older adults were less 
able to inhibit the activation of the contextually predicted alternative word than younger adults. 
This is in line with past findings of poorer inhibitory control in older, relative to younger, adults 
(Cohn et al., 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher et al., 1997; Jacoby et al., 2005; MacLeod, 
1991; Sommers & Danielson, 1999, Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West 
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& Alain, 2000), and would account for older adults’ increased susceptibility to false hearing 
relative to younger adults. Thus, whereas the auditory Stroop task was unable to detect age 
differences in inhibitory control in the present study, it is possible that these differences were 
captured by fixation trends in the visual world task. 
 As a final assessment of the role of inhibitory control in false hearing, I fit the capture 
model used by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) to the SPIN and memory task data in 
Experiment 1. I found that adding a capture parameter – interpreted by Jacoby et al. as 
representing inhibitory control – to models significantly improved overall fit to data from both 
the memory and SPIN tasks. This finding was important, as it suggested that the model that 
accounted for hearing/recollecting the target word, accessibility-based responding, and guessing 
was insufficient to accurately predict response rates. An additional capture parameter, allowing 
for increased rates of both congruent hits and cases of false hearing and false memory in the 
incongruent condition, improved the model’s predictive ability. Although it is possible that the 
capture parameter could reflect processes other than, or in addition to, inhibitory control that 
would result in similar patterns of responding, finding that adding the capture parameter 
improved model fit, in conjunction with evidence from the cloze and eye-tracking analyses, 
suggests that inhibitory control may indeed have played a role in both the memory and SPIN 
tasks. 
 One interesting finding from the MPT models was that the best-fitting model to the SPIN 
data described in the Experiment 1 discussion did not specify age differences in the capture 
parameter. This seems to contradict the conclusion drawn from the fixation analyses and 
suggests that younger and older adults did not differ in inhibitory control. There are several 
potential explanations for these findings. First, it is possible that changing the paradigm from 
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open-set responding in Experiment 1 to four-alternative forced-choice in Experiment 2 increased 
the need to employ inhibitory control. It could be the case that having an image of the predicted 
(but incorrect) word on screen on incongruent trials in Experiment 2 increased participants’ 
focus on that response option, thereby requiring increased inhibitory control to suppress this 
response. This explanation is supported by substantially higher rates of false hearing for both 
younger and older adults in Experiment 2 (see Figure 19) relative to Experiment 1 (see Figure 8). 
Second, it is possible that the magnitude of age differences in the capture parameter was 
suppressed by the capture parameter’s inclusion of both correct responses in the congruent 
condition and false hearing responses in the incongruent condition. Since age differences 
appeared to be smaller for congruent hits relative to cases of false hearing (see Figure 8), 
potentially due to near-perfect performance by both groups in the congruent condition, it is 
possible that including congruent hits reduced the ability of the model to detect age differences 
in the capture parameter. Indeed, allowing the capture parameter to vary across age groups in this 
model revealed that older adults were numerically more susceptible to capture than younger 
adults (.32 vs. .26), but the BIC value indicated that this difference was not large enough to 
justify the added model complexity. Therefore, both the fixation and MPT analyses are 
suggestive of age differences in inhibitory control, but these differences were not large enough to 
justify the added model complexity in the MPT analysis. 
Although the MPT model provided additional evidence for the role of inhibitory control 
in false hearing, it is important to note that the capture model I originally tested based on the 
model used by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) tended to overestimate the number of cases of 
false hearing rated as heard or known. It was not until individual accessibility bias parameters 
were specified in each sentence condition that the model was able to accurately estimate cases of 
128 
 
false hearing. This suggests that accessibility bias – the tendency to respond with the most easily 
retrieved response – may play a role in false hearing. Additionally, whereas the best-fitting 
model for the memory task specified age group differences in the capture parameter, the best-
fitting model for the SPIN task did not specify group differences in capture but did specify group 
differences in accessibility bias. This suggests that age differences in susceptibility to false 
hearing may reflect, in part, older adults’ increased bias towards the most easily accessible word 
relative to younger adults. 
Importantly, age differences in accessibility bias can also account for the results of the 
cloze value analyses and the age differences in fixation patterns observed in the visual world task 
in Experiment 2. Above, I argued that strengthening predictability of sentences increased 
susceptibility to false hearing because the increased activation afforded by context made it more 
difficult to inhibit the contextually predicted (but unpresented) word. However, it could also be 
the case that more predictive sentences were more likely to result in false hearing because these 
sentences made the predicted word more easily accessible than other options. Participants may 
thus have chosen this response in cases where they were unable to hear the target word because it 
was the most easily accessed option, not because they were unable to resist this response. 
Similarly, I explained above that older adults’ inability to reduce fixations on the contextually 
predicted image after the target word was presented in the incongruent condition in Experiment 2 
reflected a failure to inhibit the expected response. However, it could also be the case that older 
adults did not decrease fixations on the expected image whereas younger adults did because 
older adults were more heavily biased towards the most easily accessible option, whereas 
younger adults were more likely to consider the less easily accessible target word. Therefore, 
both inhibitory control and accessibility bias can explain these findings. 
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Age differences in accessibility bias may also help to explain why older adults increased 
fixations on the target image to a greater degree than younger adults after the target word was 
presented in the congruent condition. Above, I argued that this increase may result because older 
adults used the auditory signal to confirm their context-based expectation, becoming increasingly 
fixated on the target response when it was supported by both context and the auditory signal. I 
suggested that this increase in fixations on the target image may have been smaller in younger 
adults because younger adults were more willing to consider alternative options. These patterns 
can also be explained in terms of accessibility bias. According to the expanded version of the 
NAM (Luce & Pisoni, 1998) proposed by Sommers and Danielson (1999), activation of words in 
the mental lexicon is increased by both phonological similarity to the spoken word and 
congruency with available context. Therefore, we would expect activation of the target word to 
increase as contextual support is presented in congruent sentences, and that its activation would 
also increase when the target word is presented due to phonological similarity, further increasing 
the accessibility of this response. Older adults’ increased bias towards the most easily accessible 
option would lead them to become more fixated on the target image after the target word was 
presented, whereas younger adults may consider alternative options because they are less biased 
towards the most easily accessible option. Therefore, differences in fixation patterns across 
younger and older adults in both the congruent and incongruent conditions can be readily 
explained by differences in accessibility bias. 
The similarity of the effects of inhibitory control and accessibility bias is reflected in the 
capture model itself. As can be seen in Figure 4, responding based on capture and accessibility 
bias both result in accurate responding in the congruent condition and false hearing in the 
incongruent condition. Additionally, like capture, responses based on accessibility bias can be 
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characterized as heard/remembered or known in cases where the attribution threshold is met. 
Thus, it is unsurprising that the inhibitory control and accessibility bias accounts are difficult to 
disentangle. 
The idea that differences in accessibility bias may contribute to age differences in false 
hearing is not a new one. In discussing the high rate of accurate responses in the congruent 
condition and high rate of false hearing responses in the incongruent condition of their study, 
Rogers et al. (2012) stated that the “increase in both hits and false alarms provides evidence that 
the effect of providing context was, at least, partially due to an influence on bias” (pp. 42). The 
authors went on to suggest that age differences in false hearing resulted from decreased reliance 
on controlled, effortful processing (i.e., careful listening) and increased reliance on automatic, 
context-based responding by older, relative to younger, adults. Although Sommers et al. (2015) 
described older adults’ increased reliance on automatic processing as potentially resulting from 
failures of inhibitory control (i.e., failing to restrict responding to sensory information), it is 
possible that this reflects a shift towards increased accessibility-based responding in older, 
relative to younger, adults: Rather than expending the extra effort to listen carefully to the stimuli 
in noise, older adults may simply provide the response made easily accessible by context. 
Similarly, it is possible that the increased reliance on automatic memory processes and context-
based guessing attributed to older adults with low relative to high executive functioning in past 
studies (Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012) reflects a change in accessibility bias. 
Thus, differences in accessibility bias could account for both age differences in susceptibility to 
false hearing (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015) and differences in susceptibility to false 
memory attributed to executive functioning in past studies (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & 
McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007). 
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As indicated within the capture model itself, both inhibitory control and accessibility bias 
can independently contribute to false hearing. Indeed, demonstrating that model fit was improved 
by adding a capture parameter to an MPT model that already included an accessibility bias 
parameter suggests that capture – which may represent failure to inhibit the response activated by 
context – accounted for unique variability in responding in both tasks. Even after specifying a 
separate hearing parameter in the baseline condition and a separate accessibility bias parameter 
in the congruent condition in the model described in the Experiment 1 discussion, model fit was 
significantly better when the capture parameter was included relative to when it was constrained 
to 0 (ΔG2(1) = 167.32, critical = 36.08). Similarly, it is possible that both inhibitory control and 
accessibility bias influenced the effect of sentence predictability (i.e., cloze value) on false 
hearing, and that age differences in each of these processes contributed to older adults’ inability 
relative to younger adults to reduce fixations on the predicted image in the incongruent condition 
of the visual word task. Future studies should seek to dissociate the influences of inhibitory 
control and accessibility bias on false hearing and false memory. 
4.2.2 Executive functioning 
Whereas findings with regards to inhibitory control were mixed, I found that better executive 
functioning was associated with decreased susceptibility to both false hearing and false memory. 
Importantly, the relationship between executive functioning and false hearing remained 
significant after controlling for best-ear PTA, suggesting that false hearing does not purely 
reflect deficits in hearing acuity. Additionally, I found that age group was not a significant 
predictor of either false hearing or false memory after controlling for performance on the 
executive functioning battery, suggesting that differences in executive functioning can fully 
account for age differences in each of these phenomena. This corroborated the findings of past 
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studies showing that age differences in susceptibility to false memory are reduced or eliminated 
when comparing younger adults to only older adults with high executive functioning (Butler et 
al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007), and 
suggested that a common role of executive functioning may account for the observed 
relationship between false memory and false hearing. 
 At the outset of the study, I had predicted that executive functioning would not account 
for additional variance in susceptibility to false hearing and false memory after controlling for 
individual differences in the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control. This prediction 
was based on the fact that executive functioning is composed of several cognitive processes, 
including inhibitory control, and the common theory that false hearing results from failures to 
inhibit the context-based response (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). Therefore, it is 
possible that the relationship between executive functioning and false memory observed in past 
studies (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 
2007) may, in fact, be indexing a relationship between the response suppression aspect of 
inhibitory control and false memory. 
 To attempt to assess whether executive functions other than the response suppression 
aspect of inhibitory control were related to susceptibility to false hearing and false memory, I 
conducted an analysis of the relationship between the executive functioning battery and each of 
these phenomena controlling for performance on the auditory Stroop task. Unfortunately, due to 
concerns surrounding the auditory Stroop task as a measure of the response suppression aspect of 
inhibitory control described in detail above, I was not able to draw conclusions regarding the 
roles of other executive functions in false hearing and false memory in the present study. 
However, showing that executive functioning, in general, was related to both false hearing and 
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false memory is important to advancing the theory that these phenomena rely on similar 
cognitive mechanisms, and narrows the scope of potential mechanisms to be investigated in 
greater detail in future studies.   
Although I focused on inhibitory control as a specific component of executive 
functioning that may explain the relationship between executive functioning and false memory in 
past studies (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & 
Geraci, 2007) and between executive functioning and both false hearing and false memory here, 
it is possible that other aspects of executive functioning contribute to these phenomena. For 
example, past studies have argued that different response strategies may explain differences in 
susceptibility to false memory between individuals with low and high executive functioning 
(Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012). Above, I argued that this difference in strategies 
could reflect either differences in inhibitory control or accessibility bias. Additionally, there is 
some evidence that working memory capacity may play a role in false memory (Bixter & Daniel, 
2013; Long et al., 2008; Unsworth & Brewer, 2010; Watson et al., 2005). Specifically, past 
studies have shown that individuals with greater working memory capacity were less likely to 
endorse lures as “old” on recognition tests (Long et al., 2008; Unsworth & Brewer, 2010) and 
less likely to experience false memories in the DRM paradigm (Bixter & Daniel, 2013; Watson 
et al., 2005) than individuals with lower working memory capacity. However, individuals with 
greater working memory capacity were only less susceptible to false memories in the DRM 
paradigm when participants were warned that the word lists were designed to elicit false 
memories (Bixter & Daniel, 2013; Watson et al., 2005). This led the authors of these studies to 
suggest that working memory capacity is involved in maintaining task goals as opposed to 
having a direct effect on susceptibility to false memory. It is important that future studies 
134 
 
investigate the contributions of individual components of executive functioning to false hearing 
and false memory to better understand why these phenomena occur and to develop methods of 
reducing susceptibility to these errors. 
4.3 Implications for the common-mechanisms theory of 
false hearing and false memory 
The findings presented in this study provide substantial evidence in support of the theory that 
false hearing and false memory result from at least one shared cognitive mechanism. The 
findings that most strongly supported this theory were the demonstration of a positive correlation 
between susceptibility to false hearing and false memory, and the finding of a positive 
relationship between executive functioning and both false hearing and false memory. I not only 
presented the first direct evidence of a relationship between false hearing and false memory, 
suggesting that a common mechanism may give rise to these phenomena, but also presented 
evidence that executive functioning may be one such mechanism (or set of mechanisms).  
 Further evidence for the common-mechanisms theory came from the demonstration that 
false hearing was more likely to occur as the predictive strength of sentences increased, similar 
to the finding of a positive relationship between backwards associative strength and false 
memory observed in previous studies (Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001b). Showing that 
similar manipulations – in this case, increasing predictive strength of contextual cues – has a 
similar effect on false hearing and false memory strengthens the case that similar processes 
underlie these phenomena. I argued that either inhibitory control, accessibility bias, or a 
combination of the two could account for the effect of increasing predictive strength on 
susceptibility to false hearing, and the same could be argued for its effect on susceptibility to 
false memory. Above, I described how inhibitory control may be needed to suppress spreading 
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activation from studied list words to the critical word in the DRM paradigm, and how failures to 
suppress this activation may result in false memory. However, it could also be argued that 
participants endorse the critical word in the DRM paradigm because it has been made easily 
accessible in memory due to its association with the studied list words, not because they are 
unable to resist this response. Therefore, the similar effect of increasing predictive strength of 
contextual cues on false hearing and false memory could be explained by similar roles of 
inhibitory control, accessibility bias, or a combination of both. 
 This study also provided evidence for differences between false hearing and false 
memory. For example, initial attempts to fit the MPT model revealed that this model was a better 
fit to the memory task data than to the SPIN data: Additional parameters (a different hearing 
parameter in the baseline condition and a different accessibility bias parameter in the congruent 
condition) had to be specified to achieve accurate estimations of the observed SPIN data. This 
suggests that the effect of context may have differed in the memory and SPIN tasks, resulting in 
different patterns of responding that could not be accounted for with the same model. The MPT 
models also suggested that age differences in responding in the memory and SPIN tasks were 
best accounted for by different parameters: capture and recollection in the memory task, and 
accessibility bias and word generation in the SPIN task. This suggests that whereas similar 
processes may have contributed to responding in each task, different processes may have given 
rise to age differences in responding in the memory and SPIN tasks.  
There was also evidence that the subjective experience associated with false memories 
differed from that associated with cases of false hearing. Specifically, whereas the vast majority 
of cases of false hearing were characterized as heard, there was relatively equal likelihood of 
characterizing false memories as remembered, known, or guessed. This could suggest that the 
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subjective experience of false hearing was more similar to that of veridical hearing than the 
subjective experience of false memory was to that of veridical memory. However, as described 
above, it is also possible that characteristics of the specific memory task used in the present study 
(e.g., the ease of generating the false memory response provided by the remaining letters in the 
fragment completion task) gave rise to the high rate of false memories characterized as guesses, 
rather than reflecting a characteristic common to all false memories. 
Finally, showing that the relationship between age and false hearing persisted after 
controlling for average susceptibility to false memory suggests that age differences in 
mechanisms that are not shared with false memory contributed to age differences in false 
hearing. For example, it could be the case that sensory-specific mechanisms, such as hearing 
acuity, contributed to susceptibility to false hearing but did not impact susceptibility to false 
memory. Conversely, memory-specific mechanisms, such as the ability to encode information 
into long-term memory and the ability to retrieve this information, may have contributed to 
susceptibility to false memory without affecting susceptibility to false hearing. The findings of 
the present study provide compelling evidence for at least one shared mechanism, but also 
suggest that additional, distinct mechanisms contribute to false hearing and false memory. 
4.4 Implications for our understanding of speech 
perception 
In addition to informing the theory that false memory and false hearing share at least one 
common mechanism, the findings of the present study also advance our understanding of speech 
perception. The results of the cloze value analyses, for example, have important implications for 
activation-based theories of speech perception. Whereas Sommers and Danielson (1999) 
suggested that activation of words in the mental lexicon is greater when placed in the context of 
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a highly predictive sentence relative to a sentence providing no predictive value, the results of 
the cloze value analyses extended this argument by suggesting that the activation imparted by 
context varies continuously with the predictive strength of contextual cues. This finding will 
allow for better prediction of the outcome of perception by models such as the NAM (Luce & 
Pisoni, 1998). 
 The fixation analyses from Experiment 2 also offered interesting insights into how 
younger and older adults process contextual cues in speech perception. Specifically, these 
analyses showed that both younger and older adults formed expectations regarding what would 
be said in the future based on the semantic cues presented earlier in a sentence. Younger and 
older adults formed these expectations at a similar rate, which countered my expectation that 
older adults might become fixated on the expected word to a greater degree than younger adults, 
reflecting increased reliance on context as a basis for responding. It was only after the target 
word had been presented that older adults demonstrated increased fixation on the expected word 
relative to younger adults: Older adults increased fixations on the expected word to a greater 
degree than younger adults after presentation of the target word in congruent sentences and failed 
to reduce fixations on the expected word in the incongruent condition to the same degree as 
younger adults. This pattern of fixations after presentation of the target word suggests that older 
adults may have used the target word to confirm, but not to override, their context-based 
expectation. When the target word aligned with their expectation (i.e., in the congruent 
condition), older adults increased their fixations on the expected image. When the target word 
differed from their expectation (i.e., in the incongruent condition), older adults did not decrease 
their fixations on the expected image. This lends further credence to the idea that context plays a 
greater role in determining the outcome of perception for older, relative to younger, adults 
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(Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015), and as argued above, may reflect increased bias 
towards the most easily accessible response by older adults. 
 Finally, this study was the first to assess the subjective experience of cases of false 
hearing, giving us greater insight into whether participants actually “hear” the incorrect word or 
are simply making an informed guess based on context. To assess the subjective experience of 
false hearing, I used a hear/know/guess paradigm – similar to the remember/familiar/guess 
paradigm used in the study of false memory by Jacoby et al. (2005) – wherein participants 
indicated whether they had heard the specific sounds of the word when it was presented, had not 
heard the specific sounds of the word but knew their answer was the word that had been 
presented, or had simply guessed. The findings of this study suggest that cases of false hearing 
are accompanied by a subjective experience similar to that of veridical hearing, with the vast 
majority of cases of false hearing being classified as heard. This not only advances our 
understanding of false hearing, but also advances our understanding of speech perception, 
generally, suggesting that the subjective experience of hearing is not always based on one’s 
ability to discern the acoustic features of a spoken word, but can also be based on one’s 
expectations regarding what word should have been presented. 
4.5 Limitations and future directions 
There are several limitations associated with the present study. One limitation is the use of a 
single task (the auditory Stroop task) as opposed to a composite of multiple tasks to measure the 
response suppression aspect of inhibitory control in Experiment 1. Above and beyond the 
potential issues with the auditory Stroop task discussed above, using a composite of multiple 
tasks assessing a particular construct provides a better measure than a single task since it allows 
the researcher to partial out variance that is not shared across measures. This removes error 
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variance and task-specific variance, thereby providing a more reliable measure of the latent 
construct. For example, Colombel et al. (2016) used a composite of three measures of inhibitory 
control – a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), the Hayling task (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), and a 
directed forgetting task (see Sego et al., 2006) – to test the relationship between inhibitory 
control and false memory in the DRM paradigm.  
There were two primary reasons for my decision to use only the auditory Stroop task as a 
measure of the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control in the present study. First, one 
of the primary goals of this study was to determine whether measures and manipulations that 
have been shown to be related to susceptibility to false memory in past studies were also related 
to susceptibility to false hearing. To accomplish this goal, I used the exact measures that have 
previously demonstrated relationships with false memory. Since performance on the auditory 
Stroop task was shown to be related to susceptibility to false memory by Sommers and Huff 
(2003, Experiment 2), I wanted to determine whether this measure was also predictive of false 
hearing. The second reason I decided to use only the auditory Stroop task was that I was 
concerned that participants would experience cognitive fatigue if more tasks were added to the 
procedure. Participants completed 10 distinct tasks split across two one-hour sessions in 
Experiment 1. I was worried that adding more tasks would cause participants – older adults in 
particular – to lose focus, resulting in data that was not representative of their cognitive ability 
and defeating the purpose of having multiple measures of inhibitory control. However, in future 
studies that focus specifically on inhibitory control, I recommend that researchers use multiple 
measures of inhibitory control to increase the reliability of their measure. 
A second limitation of Experiment 1 is that I only focused on false memories evoked 
using the process dissociation paradigm (see Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby et al., 2005). Many other 
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paradigms have been used to study false memory, including the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995), misinformation paradigms (Loftus, 1975), inference paradigms 
(Brewer, 1977; Chan & McDermott, 2006; Chan & McDermott, 2007), schema paradigms 
(Bartlett, 1932; Brewer & Treyens, 1981), and the imagination inflation paradigm (Goff & 
Roediger, 1998). It is currently unclear whether false memories resulting from these diverse 
paradigms result from similar mechanisms. As mentioned above, there is some evidence showing 
that susceptibility to false memories evoked using the DRM paradigm is uncorrelated with 
susceptibility to false memories evoked using a misinformation paradigm (Ost et al., 2013; 
Patihis et al., 2018) and that there is no significant correlation between false memories evoked 
using DRM paradigms with semantically related lists and those with phonologically related lists 
(Ballou & Sommers, 2008), suggesting that different mechanisms may be involved in different 
types of false memories even within the same basic paradigm. Therefore, whereas I have shown 
that a correlation exists between susceptibility to false hearing and susceptibility to false memory 
evoked using a process dissociation paradigm, it is not necessarily the case that susceptibility to 
false hearing is related to susceptibility to false memories evoked using different paradigms. 
Similarly, as mentioned above, it is possible that my inability to replicate Sommers and Huff’s 
(2003, Experiment 2) finding of a relationship between the response suppression aspect of 
inhibitory control and false memory resulted from my use of a process dissociation paradigm and 
their use of a phonological DRM paradigm. Therefore, researchers should be cautious when 
extrapolating the findings of this study to other types of false memory. 
The final limitation that I will consider here is the truncated sample size in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 was originally intended to have a sample of 30 younger and 30 older adults, but 
data collection was halted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The resulting sample size was 
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approximately two-thirds of what was intended. Because of this limited sample size, it is possible 
that results could change in a larger sample. However, given that the data followed all 
predictions made at the outset of the study – including replicating the patterns in the SPIN task 
from Experiment 1 – and that observed differences were statistically reliable, I believe that the 
conclusions drawn are valid. Nonetheless, I recommend that future studies seek to replicate the 
findings from Experiment 2 with a larger sample. 
  One reason, in particular, that it would be useful to replicate Experiment 2 with a larger 
sample is to allow for more detailed analysis of fixations over time in the visual world paradigm. 
My limited sample resulted in random fluctuations in the proportion of fixations, especially early 
in sentences, that may have been smoothed in a larger sample size. To counteract this issue, I 
decided to group fixations into three relatively large (2000 ms) time bins to simplify analyses. 
While binning data in this way still allowed me to address my hypotheses, future studies with 
more fixation data could potentially examine changes in the proportion of fixations on each 
image in bins of 500 ms or shorter. This added level of detail could improve our understanding 
of age differences in context-use in speech perception and of sentence processing, generally. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The present study offered several insights into false hearing and speech processing in general. 
This was the first demonstration of the often-hypothesized relationship between false hearing and 
false memory, furthering the theory that these phenomena rely on similar cognitive mechanisms. 
Importantly, this study also offered evidence for a specific mechanism – or rather, a set of 
mechanisms – that could underlie this relationship: executive functioning. Showing that 
individuals with low executive functioning were more prone to both false hearing and false 
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memory advances our theoretical understanding of these phenomena and helps to identify 
individuals who may be most at risk of experiencing them. 
 In addition to identifying the individuals who were most susceptible to false hearing, 
Experiment 2 offered insights into the stimuli that were most likely to give rise to false hearing. I 
found that the greater the predictive strength of a sentence, the greater the likelihood that false 
hearing would occur. Using eye-tracking, I was able to show how participants – older adults in 
particular – became increasingly focused on the contextually supported response as predictive 
sentences were presented. Older adults were less likely than younger adults to shift their gaze 
from the contextually predicted word to the target word when context was misleading. These 
findings were interpreted as evidence for the potential roles of the response suppression aspect of 
inhibitory control and accessibility bias in speech perception. Predictive sentence context may 
have increased activation of the expected word in the mental lexicon, resulting in an incorrect 
response becoming highly activated when context was misleading. False hearing then occurred 
when participants were either unable to suppress the activation of the contextually predicted 
word or were biased towards responding with the most easily accessible response. Regardless of 
the mechanism (or combination of mechanisms), these findings suggest that it is important to be 
mindful of preceding information and the expectations of the listener when conversing, as it may 
be difficult for listeners to abandon these expectations in cases where they are violated. 
 Finally, it is important to note that context is rarely misleading outside of the laboratory, 
and thus, context-based responding is adaptive. Rather than seeing older adults’ increased 
susceptibility to false hearing and false memory as a cognitive deficit, it could be viewed as the 
result of an effective adaptation to changing life circumstances. The perceptual system may 
recalibrate to emphasize easily accessible, context-based responses to compensate for declining 
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hearing acuity across the lifespan. The results of this study increase our understanding of this 
adaptation and should be used to improve communication with older adults. Knowing that older 
adults – particularly those with low executive functioning – are prone to overuse of contextual 
cues, speakers could increase their likelihood of being understood by carefully framing important 
information within supporting context. Providing this type of scaffolding may improve both 
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Here, I present analyses of the proportion of fixations on the two foil images – which I will refer 
to as foil 1 and foil 2 – over the course of baseline, congruent, and incongruent sentences. 
Baseline 
Fixations did not change from time bin 1 to time bin 2 for either foil 1 (ED = .00, z = .18, 
p > .05) or foil 2 (ED = .01, z = .60, p > .05). From time bin 2 to time bin 3, fixations decreased 
significantly for both foil 1 (ED = -.12, z = -5.69, p < .001) and foil 2 (ED = -.11, z = -5.35, p < 
.001) as fixations on the target image increased. There were no significant interactions with 
group (ps > .05). 
Congruent 
Fixations decreased from time bin 1 to time bin 2 for foil 1 (ED = -.05, z = -2.39, p < .05) 
and foil 2 (ED = -.13, z = -6.46, p < .001). There was no interaction with group for foil 1 (ED = -
.02, z = -.79, p > .05), but there was a marginally significant interaction for foil 2 (ED = .04, z = 
1.90, p = .06). Younger adults decreased fixations on foil 2 from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = -
.04, z = -3.41, p < .001) but older adults decreased their fixations on this image to a greater 
degree (ED = -.08, z = -5.61, p < .001). Fixations decreased further from time bin 2 to time bin 3 
for foil 1 (ED = -.13, z = -6.41, p < .001) and foil 2 (ED = -.11, z = -5.44, p < .001). There were 
significant interactions with age group for the change in fixations between time bin 2 and time 
bin 3 for foil 1 (ED = .06, z = 3.04, p < .01) but not for foil 2 (ED = .02, z = -1.11, p > .05). For 
foil 1, younger adults reduced their fixations from time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = -.03, z = -2.47, 





As fixations increased on the alternative image and, later, the target image, there was a 
steady decrease in fixations on the two foil images in incongruent sentences. For foil 1, fixations 
decreased from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = -.07, z = -3.53, p < .001) and from time bin 2 to 
time bin 3 (ED = -.11, z = -5.40, p < .001). Fixations on foil 2 also decreased from time bin 1 to 
time bin 2 (ED = -.08, z = -4.28, p < .001) and from time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = -.09, z = -
4.28, p < .001). There were no significant interactions with age group (ps > .05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
